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Payments for Ecosystem Services







“Payments for ecosystem services” (PES) represents a new form of environmental 
governance rooted in the logics of capitalist economics.  As such, PES frequently 
produces new conceptions and material forms of nature that embody the principles of
neoliberal ideology.  This thesis explores the processes by which these policies have 
been deployed and taken root in Costa Rica, one of the foremost sites of financialized
conservation worldwide.  It provides a historical account of policy formation and the 
neoliberalization of Costa Rican nature.  I situate this analysis in a critique of 
capitalist logic, explaining the particular type of neoliberalization that emerges as a 
consequence of capital's own internal contradictions.  I place particular emphasis on 
ideological inconsistencies in the deployment of neoliberal ideals while highlighting 
the justice implications that inevitably still emerge.  I do so by adopting a critical 
political-ecology perspective that sees questions of environmental management as 
fundamental questions of social and environmental justice – how are conservation 
mechanisms designed, by whom, for what purposes, and to whose ultimate benefit?  
Specifically, I consider three aspects of neoliberalization in Costa Rica's national 
Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) program:  the design of a new market-like 
financing mechanism; the promotion of individualized contracting and participation; 
and the expansion of exclusionary land management practices.  I show that these 
actions produce the conditions for uneven development, facilitate the consolidation 
of control over resources, and enable the accumulation of benefits among larger, 
wealthier landowners.  I further explore conceptual understandings of neoliberalism 
(as ideology or process) and address the growing concern in the critical literature 
with ways that policy deviates from doctrine.  I explain that such an emphasis on 
ideologically divergent practice distracts from the material and justice effects of 
encroaching neoliberalization, which invariably operates in partial and unfinished 
ways.  Finally, I revisit the role of the internal contradictions of capital in producing 
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“A revolution is taking place”, proclaims the website of the recent World Forum on 
Natural Capital  (World Forum 2013).  But this is not a grassroots revolution of the 
people.  It is a revolution “in how businesses and governments account for natural 
capital” (ibid.).  At the highest levels of society, ecosystem functions and natural 
resources are being recast as “services” and “capital”, in order to conform to the 
dominant language of business and government.  The objective is arguably little 
different from those that have existed for decades – to manage limited resources and 
protect important environments – but this move is significant in that it seeks to 
reconcile the inherent tension between conservation and development by bringing 
conservation into alignment with the logics of capitalist economics.
It is increasingly mainstream among conservationists, scholars, and development 
specialists to view the commodification of nature as being essential for its continued 
survival – in effect, “selling nature to save it” (McAfee 1999, 146).  In Büscher's 
words, we are presented with “the paradoxical idea that capitalist markets are the 
answer to their own ecological contradictions” (2010, 30).  It is the idea that 
development and conservation interests can be aligned so that one necessarily 
supports the other.  This, of course, runs counter to the previous understanding that 
over-development and consumption were centrally responsible for environmental 
decline.  Bringing conservation into alignment with capitalist development, however, 
is appealing because it requires far less sacrifice.  Instead of “reduce, reuse, recycle”, 
the ethos may be better captured by something along the lines of “mitigate, offset, 
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exchange”.  In this new frame we do not need to reduce development if we can 
mitigate its environmental damage; we do not need to curb our emissions if they can 
be offset; and we do not need to actively protect biodiversity if its market value 
exceeds its instrumental value.
Assurances of “win-win” scenarios for conservation and development mean that the 
financialization of conservation is met with great enthusiasm.  The Property and 
Environment Research Center (PERC), a private think tank “dedicated to improving 
environmental quality through property rights and markets” (PERC 2014a), for 
example, extolls “free market environmentalism” as a way to solve environmental 
problems while expanding economic growth (PERC 2014b).  For PERC's 
“enviropreneurs” (PERC 2014c), “the principles of profitable environmental 
stewardship come to life” in developing alliances between business and conservation 
(PERC 2014d).  But it is not just at the fringes that these ideas are finding traction.  
Organizations such as Conservation International, the IUCN, and the World Wildlife 
Fund are all pressing forward with the concept as a way “to provide new justification 
for conserving nature based on economic interests and human welfare” (WWF 2014).
Development organizations as diverse as the World Bank, UNDP, USAID, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank are embracing the concept.  Pavan Sukhdev 
(Chair of the TEEB Advisory Board and study lead for the TEEB Report)1, for 
example, is counting on natural capital reporting to “trigger a new stage in the 
evolution of today's corporation”, creating an entity that has its goals “aligned to 
society and the planet” and “generates positive externalities while it makes profits” 
(Sukhdev 2014).
1 TEEB stands for “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity”.
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Amid all this excitement, however, caution is being thrown to the wind.  While there 
is some concern “that an economically driven focus” may lead to environmental 
governance that is “detrimental to long-term survival of the nonhuman parts of the 
ecosystems” (Redford and Adams 2009, 786), little concern has been given to the 
social implications of financializing conservation.  Issues of justice and equity do not
feature in valuation exercises and, thus, there is a danger that the economic valuation 
of nature will begin to encourage the “wrong type” of conservation – i.e. that which 
makes good economic sense, but not necessarily good social or ecological sense.  
Recasting conservation in economic terms alters how conservation decisions are 
made, by whom, for what reasons, and to whose ultimate benefit.  Aligning 
conservation outcomes with business interests leaves little space for pursuing human 
or even environmental aims.  As management decisions are reduced to matters of 
“rational” economic calculus, issues of power, justice, and equity are pushed to the 
side – this is the primary concern that I take up in this thesis.
I provide a detailed history of the formation of policies to make “payments for 
ecosystem services” (PES) in Costa Rica, I explore the neoliberalization of those 
efforts, and I connect my findings to a broader scale understanding of the 
development, contradictions, and crises of capitalism.  Rather than explore 
techniques for implementing these new regimes, I concern myself with understanding
the historical processes by which they have become embedded in current policy.  
Specifically, I focus on Costa Rica's national payments scheme, which is one of the 
most significant and influential programs to develop PES worldwide.  It is a program 
that has served as a model for many similar efforts (including the global-scale 
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REDD+ initiative).  And, as such, this thesis offers insight not only to the 
development of experimental (financialized) approaches to conservation, but also to 
their diffusion around the world.  Within my specific context, I explore the ways in 
which these new forms of environmental governance have altered the rationale for 
supporting forest management and re-defined the practices of ecosystem 
conservation.  I do so by way of a combined approach of policy document analysis, 
key-informant interviews, and observation.  I then link my insights to broader 
conceptual themes concerning the neoliberalization of nature and identify the crucial 
junctures at which neoliberal policies push through ostensibly non-neoliberal 
practices.  My objective is to go beyond simply identifying examples of 
neoliberalization, to instead reveal something about the deceptively ambiguous way 
in which it operates, the way it defies classification and, as a result, is able to evade 
scrutiny.
In this opening chapter, I lay the groundwork for this thesis by introducing the 
fundamental aims and motivations of my research.  I then briefly clarify my politics 
and specify my intellectual framework – both of which will be further developed in a 
comprehensive review of the literature (Chapter 2).  I then provide greater resolution 
to the concept of “ecosystem services” and the conservation schemes that make 
payments for their provision.  Following this, I explain the significance of my 
research in terms of understanding the growing alliances between conservation and 
capitalist development and, more specifically, the rise in neoliberal forms of 
environmental governance.  I also identify how the internal contradictions of capital 
are responsible for the particular form of neoliberalization that emerges.  I then 
explain why Costa Rica is the ideal context for exploring these issues.  Finally, I 
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provide structure for the thesis with an overview of the chapters that will follow.
Aims, Motivation, and Perspective
Conservation is inextricably a question of justice.  It concerns much more than the 
use or preservation of resources; it concerns decisions over access and distribution, 
relative shares of benefits, and issues of equity and accumulation.  Decisions about 
conservation, however, are frequently treated as little more than practical questions of
resource management, especially when they are merged with economic development 
and framed as win-win or triple-win propositions (McAfee and Shapiro 2010).  The 
fundamental aim of my research, on the other hand, is to introduce a critical concern 
for justice and equity in place of the economic rationalism that dominates current 
discourse.  I, of course, am motivated by my own sense of justice and a desire to see 
broader control over resources, wider distribution of wealth, and more responsible, 
socially-motivated forms of resource conservation.  I come at the issue from the 
perspective that the economic valuation of nature does more to promote uneven 
accumulation of wealth and extend the reach of global capitalism than it does to 
expand sound ecological management (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Corson, 2010).
I take an unabashedly political stance in my research.  Influenced by the tradition in 
the social sciences that is skeptical of claims of “objectivity” (Haraway 1998), I take 
the position that politics is unavoidable.  In accordance with a feminist epistemology,
I believe that it is impossible to remove “bias”, sidestep partiality, or look beyond 
particular lenses.  Attempts to separate research from the positioning of the 
researcher or remove it from the political context in which it sits does not make 
research apolitical, but rather “anti-political” (Ferguson 1990) – that is, the denial of 
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politics does not depoliticize interventions, it simply conceals positionings within 
technical, scientific, or bureaucratic discourses while advancing particular regimes of
power.  Rather than profess neutrality (or pretend that it is possible), I make my 
politics explicit:  I stand in defense of social and environmental justice, I oppose the 
concentration of wealth and power, and (like other political ecologists working in 
geography) I am convinced that capitalism is antithetical to these objectives.
Given this position, I approach my research on the economics of conservation from a 
different angle to much of the scholarly work directed at the subject.  Rather than 
assume the economic valuation of nature to be a simple tool for resource 
conservation, I understand it as a shift in governance that fundamentally alters the 
reasons conservation is carried out.  Guided by a critical framework, I see 
environmental management as much more than technical and bureaucratic 
administration of resources.  Beyond simply attempting to understand how the 
economy might work for conservation, I seek to understand for whom it works when 
aligned to such objectives.  While devotees of economic approaches to conservation 
believe that capitalism has the potential to solve environmental problems, I draw on 
Harvey (2014) to explain that it cannot possibly have this result – i.e. there are 
internal contradictions to capital that ensure it is inherently unstable, inequitable, and 
consumptive of the environments it produces.
The primary objective of this research is to understand the alliances that are being 
forged between conservation and development interests, specifically with regard to 
the social and ecological implications of new financialized approaches to 
conservation.  There are, of course, practical motivations to understanding this trend 
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(as it concerns actual resource management policy) but within this thesis I wish to 
contribute, in a much broader sense, to our understandings of the conditions of 
contemporary capitalism and the patterns of governance that constitute this era of 
neoliberal environmentalism.
The Emergence of Payments for Ecosystem Services
Conceptions of Nature
The recent economically-oriented trend in conservation is best understood in the 
context of historical conceptions of nature – that is, the “external”, “intrinsic”, and 
“universal” conceptions – which posed nature as characteristically asocial and 
removed from society, as having inherent unchanging qualities, and as all-
encompassing or predictably mechanistic (Castree 2001, 6-8).  As critical scholars 
(e.g. Castree and Braun 1998; Katz 1998; Demeritt 1998; Castree 2001; Demeritt 
2001; Gregory 2001; Proctor 2001) have demonstrated, these “traditional” views of 
nature were mobilized to sustain hegemonic control over resources and advance a 
particular social order.  The oppositional concept of “social-nature”, by contrast, re-
framed nature as the product of social relations (Castree and Braun 2001).  This 
framework sought to undermine claims that nature was an apolitical and neutral 
entity by contextualizing our understandings and relations to it within social 
processes.  The result was an interpretation of nature as constructed (both materially 
and discursively) through complex social interactions, negotiations, and power 
struggles (Braun and Castree 1998).  The objective was clear:  reveal uneven power 
relations, destabilize the foundation on which they are built, and counter injustice.
While the traditional views of nature remain dominant, narratives have shifted in 
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some domains.  Within conservation, the historical appeal of external nature has 
declined with introduction of the idea that successful conservation cannot take place 
without consideration for the well-being of local communities.  The concept of 
“sustainable development”, which incorporates social and economic development as 
essential components of nature conservation, is the product of this line of thinking.  
Society's reliance on natural resources was explicitly acknowledged and further 
integrated into conservation with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 
2003), the defining framework for contemporary conservation.  The Assessment's 
strong language marks a definitive shift in the relationship between society and 
nature within conservation, proclaiming that “[e]veryone in the world depends 
completely on Earth’s ecosystems and the services they provide” (2005, 1) and 
“posit[ing] that people are integral parts of ecosystems” (ibid., v).  To an uncritical 
eye, this would seem to mark the demise of the elite notion of external nature and 
signal the onset of a new era in social justice.  However, as I will demonstrate in the 
chapters that follow, entrenched interests have responded to this alternative framing 
and co-opted the narrative to extend the reach of global capitalism.  They have done 
so by appropriating the concept of “ecosystem services” and placing it at the 
foundation of expanded capitalist development.
Ecosystem Services
Ecosystem services are conceived as the benefits derived by society from functioning
ecological systems.  The idea is that “natural” ecosystems provide many of the 
conditions that sustain human life.  This goes beyond the obvious material resources 
that can be extracted from nature to include the benefits of actual ecosystem 
functions.  They include, for example, hydrological services provided by watersheds, 
8
carbon sequestration services provided by forest regrowth, biodiversity services 
provided by forest conservation, soil retention services provided by vegetative cover, 
and pest control services provided by predation (Daily 1997).
These “services” are seen as absolutely critical to human well-being; “they are the 
life support system of the planet” (Kubiszewski and Costanza 2012).  The ecological 
processes of a forested watershed, for example, ensure that clean drinking water is 
provided to downstream populations centers.  While technological alternatives such 
as an industrial water treatment facility may be able to stand in for degraded 
environments, “natural” systems, it is argued (Daily 1997), almost always perform 
better.  Not only does the forest purify water, it serves to regulate flow and prevent 
flooding, it slows erosion of the best agricultural soils, and it reduces sedimentation 
that can harm fisheries or disrupt hydro-power generation.  Additionally, standing 
forests provide habitat for important species and store carbon that would otherwise 
contribute to climate change.  Forests clearly provide humanity with benefits 
essential not just to human survival, but also prosperity.  Their services must, 
therefore, be at least as important – at least as “valuable” – as those provided by 
technological alternatives.
Appraisal of ecosystem service “value” began as an effort to qualitatively assess an 
ecosystem's benefit to society, but it has evolved into something far more literal.  For 
at least the first two decades of the concept's existence, it was only to a limited 
degree that ecological concerns were framed in economic terms, and it was primarily 
done only “to stress societal dependence on natural ecosystems” (Gómez-Baggethun 
et al. 2010, 1213).  The concept first appeared in the field of ecology in the 1970s, 
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but remained largely the subject of scientifically oriented analyses aimed at 
measuring ecological processes important to society (Mooney and Ehrlich 1997).  
With the exception of a few early experimental programs (e.g. that of Costa Rica), 
the concept was almost entirely unknown outside of the academy.  It was not until the
MEA that ecosystem services entered a new era of importance to conservation, 
moving from “academic backwater to the mainstream” (Redford and Adams 2009, 
785).
Initially the concept was intended to emphasize that ecosystems “serve us” and that 
there were social benefits to their conservation (Peterson et al. 2010).  As time 
progressed, however, they were increasingly framed in terms of their actual 
economic value, since governments “in most western nations … require that 
environmental decisions be made within the framework of cost-benefit analysis” 
(ibid., 115).  In this regard, the initial framing of ecosystem services in economic 
terms can be seen as an attempt by conservationists to “communicate the value of 
biodiversity … using a language that reflects dominant political and economic 
views” (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010, 1215).  Early attempts at valuation, therefore, 
may be interpreted as a strategic maneuver to gain leverage “where traditional 
narratives for conservation … failed to influence economic decision making” (ibid.).
The use of  “ecosystem services” as a communication tool, however, quickly gave 
way to more applied endeavors as economically minded (and politically motivated) 
technocrats seized the opportunity to promote policies and deploy structures that 
would remake nature's services as marketable commodities.  From the mid-1990s, 
calculations of the monetary value of the ecosystem services became the norm.  
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Analyses used, for instance, the dollar equivalence of services provided by technical 
alternatives, measures of increases to productivity resulting from improved 
ecosystem management, and estimations of buyers' “willingness-to-pay” (Goulder 
and Kennedy 1997; Costanza and Folke 1997) to calculate the monetary value of 
ecosystems.  The most prominent of these was the assessment by Costanza et al. 
(1997) that valued the entirety of the world's ecosystem services at $33 trillion per 
year, nearly twice the world's total annual economic activity at the time.
Once the ideology of the monetary quantification of ecosystem value was firmly in 
place, the focus shifted to deployment of structures to facilitate exchange.  The 
ecosystem service concept set the stage for this in situ commodification, and 
environmental managers simply had to build the infrastructure to launch a totally 
new way of managing nature.  This expansion of “market logics in[to] the field of 
nature conservation”, however, remains “a controversial outcome of the economic 
framing of environmental concerns” (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010, 1215), primarily
because of its distributional implications.  Nevertheless, it has become the dominant 
framework, backed by those who believe that “a major factor driving [ecosystem] 
conversion” is the fact that their benefits “are not traded in formal markets and [thus] 
do not send price signals of changes in their supply or condition” (Daily 1997, 2).
Payments for Ecosystem Services
At the forefront of the strategies being developed to encourage conservation and 
restoration of ecosystem services is PES, which is theorized as a way of internalizing 
positive environmental externalities in economic decision making.  In other words, it 
is a way of capturing the economic benefits of functioning ecological systems, so that
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owners have greater incentive to protect them.  As Pesche et al. explain,
two relatively independent processes … led to the emergence of the ES 
concept on one hand and the PES concept on the other. Whereas the concept 
of ES is closely linked to a desire to attract official attention to the threats to 
ecosystems posed by human pressure, the concept of PES seems rather to 
have stemmed from a concern to ensure funding for conservation in tropical 
countries over the long term (2012, 68-69).
The concept is built on the idea that ecosystems are currently undervalued by society 
because their services are free.  PES schemes are designed to attach an economic 
value to ecosystem services and, thus, make conservation the economically rational 
option.  On the surface, this is not a particularly new concept.  Many previous 
systems have offered monetary incentives for conservation.  However, PES differs 
(theoretically) from direct incentives in the way that it is financed.2  Whereas 
previous systems may have sought to encourage conservation through subsidies, PES
seeks to connect beneficiaries of services with providers of services through direct 
financial transactions – an important distinction that will be elaborated in the course 
of this thesis.
Schemes for making these payments for ecosystem services operate in many distinct 
ways.  The basic idea is to transfer the equivalent cost that would be incurred by 
service users (in the event of environmental degradation) to service providers in 
exchange for conservation (which is oftentimes simply presumed to result in the 
provision of ecosystem services, Pagiola 2008).  For example, conversion of forest to
pasture would result in reduced service provision, and service users would incur costs
in replacing those services with technological alternatives (e.g. water treatment 
2 They differ “theoretically” because the way in which these programs are actually implemented 
often times does not correspond very well to the idealized conception (Fletcher and Breitling 2012;
Matulis 2013), as I explore in Chapter 4.
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facilities, flood control infrastructure, pest control measures, climate regulation 
technology).  In applying the concept of PES, however, service users preempt this 
land-use conversion and subsequent service degradation by offering payment directly
to service providers.  If the amount of the payment exceeds the opportunity cost of 
the foregone land conversion (and actors are assumed to be motivated primarily by 
economics), conservation will be achieved.  Since the payment amount must be less 
than the technological alternative (or else service users would decline participation), 
the program is usually characterized as a win-win situation for all involved (Engel et 
al. 2008).
Since its inception, however, PES has taken a turn towards more explicitly market-
oriented designs.  The “dominant Coasian approach” (Muradian et al. 2010, 1207) 
envisions more heavily abstracted ecosystem service commodities that can be 
circulated in markets to not only make conservation economically viable but also to 
create a system in which the value of those commodities becomes unbound from the 
actual use of ecosystem services.  As Robertson elaborates, this commodification “is 
not merely an expansion of capital toward the acquisition or industrialisation of new 
resources, but the making of a new social world” (2012, 386).  The problem with 
this, of course, is that questions of social justice or equity enter nowhere into the 
Coasian equation.  Coase is concerned only with the “optimal” use of resources, not 
the distributional implications that are associated with it (Muradian et al. 2010; 
Tacconi 2012).
Value, Capital, and Neoliberalization
Assessing the distributional, justice, and equity implications of financialized 
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conservation requires understanding ecosystem services in the context of capital.  For
this, the distinction between the use and exchange value of nature is paramount.  
Nature, of course, has important use values, as it provides the resources that fuel the 
economy.  The raw materials of nature can be extracted, manipulated, and produced 
into salable goods.  This means that the use value of material nature has long been 
recognized by society.  More recently, however, as ecosystem science has shown the 
importance of ecological functions, we have begun to recognize the value of the 
things that nature does.  This too is an expression of the use value of nature, but 
historically it has remained outside economic calculations.  The argument is that 
ecosystems are lost to development because the use value of their processes is not 
fully integrated to our decision-making calculus.  As I explained above, this has 
caused a proliferation of (monetary) valuation techniques in the hope that nature's 
full value can be made explicit.  With the advent of PES (particularly Coasian PES), 
however, it is the exchange value of nature that is emerging as an expression of 
ecosystem importance.  Exchange value structures are being deployed to stand in for 
the use value of ecosystem functions.
While the effort to value ecosystem functions in economic terms may have emerged 
from the realization of environmental crisis (i.e. degradation spurred the 
conservationist response), the effort to attach exchange values emerged from the 
realization of economic crisis.  Capitalist economies must continually grow to service
the debt on which they are based and, in a resource consumptive economy, this 
means environmental degradation, exhaustion of resources, and inherent 
unsustainability – it is James O'Connor's “second contradiction” of capital (1988), 
which says that capital produces the environmental conditions of its own decline.  As 
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resources are consumed and (socially-produced) ecological limits are approached, 
growth is threatened and the economy falters.  In the face of these simultaneous 
ecological and economic crises, society has a choice:  abandon the system that 
requires ever-increasing metabolism of nature, or invent new ways of expanding 
capital that do not degrade ecology.  This choice is what we have seen recently and, 
with the advent of “ecosystem services”, there has been a clear decision in favor of 
the latter:  expand the logic of capital into new realms by aligning conservation with 
economic development.
Fundamentally, PES is about increasing the value of nature so that conservation 
becomes the economically rational and profitable thing to do.  In theory, this can be 
achieved by bringing well-defined “ecosystem services” into a market (Wunder 
2005).  If the “services” that ecosystems provide are exchanged in markets, they can 
come to hold value (an exchange value) far greater than that of nature's extracted 
material resources – or, at least, this is the logic that has generated so much 
excitement for the idea.  The fear among critics, of course, is that conservation under 
market rule will come to be governed by all the same logics that govern capital:  
circulation, profit, accumulation, debt, “efficiency”.  Once market infrastructure is in 
place, and ecosystem services are being valued according to market rates, nature 
comes to be seen in a very singular way; it becomes fully exposed to the brutal logic 
of market rationality.  Exacerbating this hazard is the danger that ecosystems may not
actually be able to hold an exchange value.  If ecosystem services are “weakly 
comparable” (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998) or “uncooperative” (Bakker 2004), nature 
may actually be devalued in markets,3 presenting an internal contradiction of PES 
3 It is not possible to compare, for example, the value of a tree plantation (which provides climate 
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(i.e. the aim is to procure the use value of ecosystem functions through an exchange 
value structure, but the exchange value falls below competing uses, ensuring the loss 
of ecosystems).4
Nevertheless, proponents of financialized conservation have proceeded with great 
enthusiasm; pilot programs, frameworks, and now full-scale systems abound 
(Wunder et al. 2008).  In spite of an inclination towards market strategies (Engel et 
al. 2008), however, there has been much difficulty in establishing these regimes and 
achieving monetary valuation.  Very few, if any, “true” markets for ecosystem 
services actually exist.  As Milne and Adams (2012) explain, most attempts to 
implement PES have resulted in programs that simply “masquerade” as markets.  
Governments, development organizations, and NGOs have had to step in and create 
programs that approximate market transactions; they are propping up markets so that 
ecosystems can hold some level of proxy value in exchange.  This creation of 
pseudo-markets for ecosystem services has been explained as an effort to kickstart 
exchange that would give way to “real” markets (Fletcher and Breitling 2012) and as 
a socially-acceptable or politically-viable compromise to complete marketization 
(Rodriguez, interview, 2011).  But these explanations do not consider the 
contradiction of capital that is expressed in PES nor do they clarify why free-standing
markets may necessarily fail to develop.
regulatory services) to the value of biodiversity conservation (a genetic diversity provisioning 
service) because they serve two entirely different functions.  One cannot be worth $X while the 
other is worth $Y because “dollars” assumes a common unit of measure can be applied.  In reality, 
they are incommensurable.  When a market places a value on carbon sequestration through 
plantation forestry, it necessarily devalues biodiversity (or vice versa) because the two are 
incompatible and mutually exclusive.
4 Devotees of market valuation, of course, contend that ecosystems are already undervalued, thus 
explaining why they are already being lost.  However, with direct monetary valuation and 
exchange in markets, it becomes impossible to step outside economics and make decisions 
according to other (e.g. social) priorities.
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Most considerations of PES do not appreciate how the internal logics of capital 
impede the exchange of “ecosystem services”; essentially, why have ecosystem 
services not been able to hold an exchange value?  For this, it is possible to turn to 
Harvey (2014), who provides the conceptual basis for understanding the inherent 
contradictions to capital that produce its perennial crises.  As I've suggested already, 
there may be a fundamental contradiction to PES in that it relies upon exchange 
values to ensure provision of use values, while its commodities are unsuitable for 
exchange.  This relates to the disconnect between the ecosystem being valued 
through PES and the actual bits of nature that are exchanged.  If, for example, it is 
hydrological services (e.g. filtration and flow control) that we are after, it is not the 
ecosystem that gets valued in exchange, but rather the water itself.  Municipal water 
users may be charged an extra “ecosystem service” fee to pay for conservation that 
enhances natural hydrological systems, but the connection is indirect and mediated 
by the consumption of water.  Water is the commodity, not the watershed.  There is 
no actual exchange of ecosystem services and, thus, an intermediary is required to 
make the link between consumer and producer explicit.  So what we end up with is 
“market-like” approximations that governments (and other institutions) must prop 
up.5
The “market” that results from this state-led form of capitalist development, however,
is every bit as insidious as the mythical one that arises from pure consumer/producer 
relations – it still circulates commodities, it still orients resource management 
5 As I will discuss in the following chapter, this is the ever-present “re-regulation” phase of 
neoliberalization.
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towards profit maximization, it still leads to concentrated wealth and benefits.  
Relative to “true” markets (where exchange value is entirely unbound from use 
value), however, accumulation is limited – a market-like mechanism cannot offer the 
same speculative opportunities that are presented in capitalist circulation directly.  
Since accumulation cannot be maximized under these conditions, opportunities must 
be sought elsewhere.  Capital, thus, responds to the exchange value contradiction in 
PES by shifting accumulation to other aspects of production.  In effect, the problems 
of capital are never solved, they are simply “moved around” (Harvey 2014), 
eventually requiring further interventions by the state in order to maintain the 
conditions in which capitalism can function.  It is this process that defines our era of 
neoliberal governance.6
An understanding of the fundamental logics of capital that are responsible for market 
failure can do a great deal to explain the type of governance that emerges as 
neoliberalization proceeds.  We know that the ideological “purity” of markets matters
rather little in terms of the social and material effects that they have; neoliberalism is 
never deployed onto a blank slate, existing institutional and political context 
constrains what is possible, and re-regulation is required to stabilize markets (Castree
2008a), and yet these markets still result in the uneven accumulation of wealth and 
unbalanced power relationships.7  We know already that markets do not just exist on 
their own.  What I want to do here is provide an understanding of neoliberalization in
the context of capitalist crisis; how does the neoliberalization process respond to the 
contradictions of capital in order to continue facilitating capitalist development?
6 A detailed discussion of neoliberalism (and neoliberalization) will come in Chapter 2.
7 Here, I am making an important distinction between neoliberalism (a coherent ideology) and 
neoliberalization (an incomplete and ever-adapting process).  It is a distinction that is central to the
way I conceptualize these ideas and, thus, will be discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 2.
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The study that follows in this thesis is a look at how neoliberalization has responded 
to the contradictions of capital on the ground.  It is a history of the development of 
PES and the mechanisms that support it.  I provide a detailed account of nature's 
neoliberalization in Costa Rica, one of the foremost sites of financialized 
conservation worldwide.  Empirically, I show how nature has been neoliberalized 
across three aspects of Costa Rica's national Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) 
program.  The study contributes to an understanding of the development of PES in 
globally significant context but, beyond this, it is an exploration of neoliberalization; 
I provide an understanding of the nature of neoliberalism itself and the way it 
operates in partial and perpetually unfinished ways, and I contribute to our 
understanding of the conditions of contemporary capitalism at its newest frontiers.  I 
explore what occurred when the decision to foster nature's exchange value was taken 
and how the state responded when those exchange values failed to take hold.  In other
words, this thesis asks how neoliberalization unfolded when capital came up against 
one of its central contradictions.
Costa Rica's PSA
Costa Rica's Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA), literally “Payments for 
Environmental Services”, is a national-scale program that implements the PES 
concept.  Ecosystem services became the foundation of Costa Rican forest policy in 
1996, a full year before Daily's (1997) seminal framework and nearly a decade before
the concept settled into the mainstream global policy arena with the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005).  As one of the earliest adopters of the concept, Costa 
Rica has been a proving ground for this experimental conservation mechanism.  
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Much like Chile and New York City were early experiments for neoliberalism 
(Harvey 2005), Costa Rica has served as a laboratory for neoliberal conservation.  
The PSA has been closely observed and is often looked to as a model for 
implementation elsewhere (e.g. Bennett and Henninger 2008; Brockett and Gottfried 
2002; Brown and Bird 2011), which is the primary reason I chose it as the focal point
of this thesis.  As one of the most advanced schemes carrying out PES (and 
remaining at the cutting-edge of policy innovation), Costa Rica's PSA is the ideal 
context for understanding capitalist approaches to conservation and processes of 
neoliberalization.
Figure 1.1:  Land enrolled in the PSA
From the very beginning, Costa Rica viewed the PSA as a strategy for “selling nature
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to save it” (to borrow the words of McAfee 1999, 146).  As former Environment 
Minister René Castro reflected in an institutional retrospective,
The sale and exploitation of our forests is one of the best tools for preserving 
them … such a statement would doubtless be received with shock and 
revulsion by most people. In these times, however, it is possible to 'sell and 
exploit' our forests in such a way that, paradoxically, their conservation is 
actually enhanced, and their development is encouraged (FONAFIFO 2005, 
13).
The policy was viewed as a “paradigm shift” (FONAFIFO 2005, 19) from incentive-
based conservation to service-provision-based conservation, and it has since been 
celebrated as a watershed experiment in natural resource governance.  As I will 
explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, however, Costa Rica struggled to get the PSA 
to conform to this idealized conception (Fletcher and Breitling 2012).
My analysis is centered on the historical policy process that has unfolded in response 
to the program's failure to achieve the intended market-based design.  Specifically, I 
focus on Costa Rica's engagement with the World Bank under two projects – 
“Ecomarkets” and “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for Environmental 
Management” – designed to bring the PSA into closer alignment with its underlying 
ideals.  This thesis is an interrogation of these nascent changes and shifts toward 
neoliberal governance, and it is an attempt to understand the social and 
environmental implications of them.  What are the specific neoliberal policies that 
have been introduced through World Bank influence?  How have they been enacted?  
And how do they relate to a broader scale understanding of capital?
Thesis Overview
This thesis consists of eight chapters organized into two parts.  Part One includes this
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introduction (Chapter 1), a comprehensive review of the literature (Chapter 2), a 
methodological and analytical framework for the research (Chapter 3), and a 
conservation history of Costa Rica (Chapter 4).  Part Two makes up the bulk of my 
empirical research, analyzing three aspects of the PSA – program financing (Chapter 
5), program contracting (Chapter 6), and property ownership (Chapter 7) – and a 
concluding chapter (Chapter 8) where I synthesize the empirical data and revisit the 
conceptual aspects of the study.
In Chapter 2, I engage with the literature relating to the political ecology of 
ecosystem services.  This is divided into two parts:  critically-oriented and 
implementation-oriented literature.  The former, with which I position myself, takes 
as its starting point a skeptical view of financialized approaches to conservation, 
while the latter assumes that the economic valuation of nature is favorable, 
inevitable, or both.  Within the critically-oriented literature, I explore capitalist 
approaches to conservation, Marxist and post-structuralist critiques of environmental 
governance, neoliberalism, and (more specifically) the process-based concept of 
neoliberalization.  The objective of reviewing this material is to articulate the 
analytical framework for challenging the mainstream economics of ecosystem 
conservation.  Following this, I present some of the key implementation-oriented 
literature and critique its main assumptions.  I do so by exploring the vision and 
underlying logics of PES, appraising the dominant Coasian approach to 
implementation, and reviewing some of the “best practice” debates.  Finally, I pivot 
to questions concerning social and environmental justice and suggest that placing 
emphasis on these concerns can guide critical research seeking to challenge dominant
conceptions of financialized conservation.
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Following my review of the literature, I describe the methodological and analytical 
frames employed.  I begin Chapter 3 with a brief exposition of my theoretical stance 
on information gathering, and then proceed with sections on my two primary data 
sources:  textual materials and interviews.  With each of these, I provide a synopsis of
the methods employed for data collection and the techniques used in analysis.  
Textual sources include policy and project documents, agency reports, non-
governmental assessments, legal documents, and interest group publications.  They 
were collected using reference tracing from documents that directly relate to the 
activities of interest, and they were processed using techniques from critical 
discourse analysis.  The interviewees for this project were identified through a 
process of institution mapping to identify key agencies and their central actors.  This 
was aided by familiarity with the textual sources issued from these agencies.  I also 
comment on supplementary data sources (e.g. participant observation) and ethical 
considerations.
Chapter 4 delves into important historical context for the conservation policies that 
currently exist in Costa Rica.  The chapter covers the period of history preceding 
Costa Rica's ecological fame (from the colonial period to late 1970s), the emergent 
conservation movement (1970s and 1980s), the period of forestry intervention and 
conservation incentives (1980s and 1990s), and the most recent re-orientation of 
policy towards neoliberal forms of governance (from the mid-1990s).  In preparation 
for my own empirical contribution, I then provide an overview of the neoliberal 
vision that was laid down for Costa Rica's PSA when it was first proposed, as well as 
an accounting of the actual policies that existed in early practice.  This sets the stage 
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for Part Two of the thesis, in which I investigate the ongoing neoliberalization of the 
program.
Part Two begins with a brief synopsis that reiterates the central purpose of the 
empirical work.  It is, first of all, an effort to bring clarity to the way in which 
neoliberalism operates in actually-existing context, to demonstrate how neoliberal 
ideologies are deployed and become grounded in one of the foremost sites of 
financialized conservation worldwide, and to understand the role of capital in 
shaping this neoliberalization process.  I explain, as well, that its second (though not 
secondary) purpose is to go beyond exemplification of neoliberalism-in-action to 
converse with the broader literature and place my conceptual tools in a new light.
Chapter 5 handles the neoliberalization of PSA financing.  I explain that early 
implementation of the PSA failed to achieve its neoliberal vision because it was 
financed through a tax on fossil fuels.  The tax, I explain, constitutes an important 
role for government in facilitating ecosystem service transactions and in prioritizing 
particular development objectives through redistributive action.  I show that when a 
second revenue stream was developed, a deliberate effort was made (at the 
encouragement of World Bank partners) to bring PSA financing into alignment with 
the concept of user fees – that is, direct financial transactions between users and 
providers of ecosystem services.  Finally, I provide evidence to suggest that this new 
financing mechanism will eventually (when it is fully implemented) result in 
geographically uneven patterns of conservation-development.
Chapter 6 deals with the neoliberalization of PSA contracting.  Specifically, it 
24
concerns two scalar shifts in the mediation between competition and cooperation:  the
individualization of forestry work, and the individualization of landowner 
participation.  I show that, in re-casting professional foresters as independent private 
contractors, administrators have succeeded in introducing competition to PSA 
contracting.  While the presumption is that this will lead to greater efficiency, I show 
that the result has been the uneven distribution of benefits as efficiency gains are 
delivered primarily to the largest and wealthiest landowners.  Then, directing focus 
onto the participants themselves, I explore the second scalar shift away from 
cooperative participation.  The result, I show, is that the smallest (and often poorest) 
landowners lose important support, further compounding the problem of large 
landowner advantage.
Chapter 7 explores the neoliberalization of property ownership.  In this chapter, I 
examine the effect of Costa Rica's PSA on property relations, demonstrating how 
constraints placed on program participants are resulting in the expansion of 
exclusionary management practices.  Stipulations written into PSA legislation oblige 
participants to monitor their forests and enforce practices outlined in their 
agreements.  Significant monetary incentives are provided to landowners who restrict
access to the broader community, at the same time that they are equipped with the 
ability to call upon enforcement authorities.  This, I explain, contravenes customary 
usufruct access that has historically existed throughout rural Costa Rica.  The 
ultimate result of this consolidated control over land is the accumulation of benefits 
by an ever-narrower segment of the population.
Finally, in Chapter 8, I conclude with a synthesis of my empirical findings and revisit
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the conceptual questions explored above and in the literature review.  I bring my 
three points of engagement with the neoliberalization of Costa Rica's PSA together to
explain how they collectively constitute a manifestation of neoliberal ideology.  I 
show that while they are by no means a perfect or pure representation of neoliberal 
ideals – or even of the neoliberal vision articulated for this program – they are a clear
manifestation of an actively unfolding process of neoliberalization.  I then revisit the 
analytical framework laid out in Chapter 2, and engage with intellectual concerns 
about connecting localized expressions of neoliberalization to the broader “neoliberal
project” that is acting on nature.  Finally, I return to the narrative of capital and its 
internal contradictions.  I explain how the exchange value contradiction identified 
above prevented the development of “true” markets for ecosystem services and 
produced the particular characteristics of the neoliberalization that has unfolded.  And
I show how capital has responded by “moving the problem around” to other aspects 




The literature concerning “payments for ecosystem services” can be divided into 
several categories.  First, there is a distinct divide between implementation-oriented 
and critically-oriented research.  Implementation-oriented research takes, as its 
starting point, the assumption that such forms of natural resource management are 
favorable, inevitable, or both.  The path forward, then, becomes a matter of assessing,
evaluating, debating, and prescribing best practices.  Critically-oriented research, on 
the other hand, is more cautious about accepting this form of resource management 
and skeptical of its grand promises.  The focus, therefore, of this segment of the 
literature is directed at questioning the very concept of managing resources in the 
way that it does.
Implementation-oriented research can be further divided in several ways, one of 
which is by the ideological foundations on which the policy prescriptions are made.  
These can be thought of in (perhaps overly) general terms as the market approach and
the more-than-market approach.  Proponents of marketizing ecosystem services 
assume that the formation of capitalist markets is the most efficient and effective way
of ensuring conservation (e.g. Engel et al. 2008; Wunder et al. 2008; Pagiola 2008).  
This is the dominant framing, and it is based on the Coase theorem, which says that 
given low transaction costs and enforceable property rights, bargaining will lead to 
efficient outcomes (Muradian et al. 2010; Tacconi 2012).  The more-than-market 
approach, by contrast, is far less dogmatic.  It is made up of scholars that are 
unconvinced by the promises of market capitalism (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and 
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Costanza 2010), that are pragmatic about what can be achieved given political 
constraints (Bohlen et al. 2009), or that are plainly opposed to capitalist designs 
(McCauley 2006).8  These alternative perspectives on PES, however, are still 
concerned with evaluating and prescribing particular policy actions, and (excepting 
McCauley 2006) largely still “endorse a neoliberal environmentality in their 
advocacy of an incentive-centered approach” (Fletcher and Breitling 2012, 409).
Critically-oriented research can also be divided in several ways.  One useful way is 
by the epistemological foundations on which arguments are constructed.  Broadly 
speaking, these are historical materialist and post-structuralist frameworks.  A third, 
hybrid category of the literature could be defined as drawing on both materialism and
post-structuralism in a complementary fashion in order to employ the strengths (and 
avoid the weaknesses) of each.  Materialist critiques understand ecosystem services 
in the context of their wider relationship to economic systems and modes of 
development (e.g. Roberston 2012).  They often draw on broader conceptual 
frameworks of political ecology, framing the phenomenon in terms of nature as an 
accumulation strategy (Katz 1998; Smith 2007), accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey 2003), and the remaking of nature through the capitalist mode of production 
(Smith 1984).  Post-structuralist critiques (e.g. Fletcher 2010; Fletcher and Breitling 
2012), on the other hand, situate this new way of managing resources in a framework
that “integrates politics more centrally, draws upon aspects of discourse theory which
demand that the politics of meaning and the construction of knowledge be taken 
seriously, and engages with the wide-ranging critique of development and
8 Certainly, the further division of my “more-than-market” category would be possible, given the 
diverse perspectives I've clumped into it, but as the prevailing tension within the implementation-
oriented literature is between markets and something else, I find it sufficient to categorize them as I
have.
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Figure 2.1:  Categories of Literature
29
modernity” (Peet and Watts 1996, 3).  In contrast to the understanding that 
overarching systems such as “the economy” structure the behaviors and activities of 
actors, this approach is more concerned with the processes that produce governable 
subjects (Luke 1999; Agrawal 2005a).  The idea is that social relations are governed 
and power is exercised in far more diffuse ways, for example through the promotion 
of particular social norms that constrain the behavior of subjects and lead to the 
desired outcome.
My research is oriented squarely towards the critical end of the spectrum and is based
in a hybrid framework of historical materialist and post-structuralist theories.  In the 
pages that follow, I review the literature relevant to this position and provide a 
critical evaluation of its utility in my engagement with PES in Costa Rica.  I begin 
with the literature concerning neoliberalism and environmental conservation.  
Specifically, I review the material critiquing the interface between conservation and 
capitalism, I discuss the Marxist and post-structuralism foundations of that critique, I 
explore the literature that considers the form and nature of neoliberalism, and I 
present the analytical framework within which this study is situated.  Ultimately, I 
argue that the neoliberal conservation frame must be conceptualized as an on-going 
and ever-adapting process of neoliberalization.  This segment of the literature is 
handled first in order to make my conceptual positioning immediately clear.  In the 
second part of this review, I turn to the implementation-oriented literature, which 
broadly accepts the economic valuation of nature.  I do this to provide greater 
understanding of the vision and logics underlying the push to bring these concepts 
into practice.  Finally, I present some of the critiques put forward specifically of 
“payments for ecosystem services” and identify how my engagement complements 
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the work that has already been done.
Neoliberal Nature
Capitalist Conservation
In recent years there has been a concerted effort among practitioners and policy-
oriented scholars to re-make the relationship between conservation and development.
Alliances have been forged to unite the interests of large-scale conservation 
organizations with those of international development, in an attempt to resolve the 
inherent tension between them.  It is an alliance that is “characterised by an 
aggressive faith in market solutions to environmental problems” (Brockington and 
Duffy 2010, 470), and one that is responsible for the proliferation of mechanisms to 
financialize the social encounter with nature.  While the relationship between 
conservation and capitalism is long and intertwined (Adams 2004), it is only recently
that an attempt has been made to bring the two into agreement on such an extensive 
scale.
Capitalist interests may have motivated many early conservation initiatives (such as 
parks development and the protection of certain species) (Brockington and Duffy 
2010), but this conservation was carried out in constant conflict with economic 
development.  It was possible to create expansive protected areas to satisfy the 
romantic ideals of elite individuals, but this necessarily meant that development (and,
thus, capitalist accumulation) had to be excluded.  Likewise, development could be 
carried out in the most distant reaches of the globe, but it required sacrificing the 
“wildness” of nature in those places.  In the colonial era, this translated to what has 
become known as “fortress conservation”, in which large swathes of “pristine” and 
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“exotic” nature were de-populated and guarded to create landscapes that conformed 
to European ideals (Brockington 2002).  It also translated to creation of management 
regimes that exploited resources for use in imperial development.  Similar 
antagonisms can be found in the conservationist debate represented by Gifford 
Pinchot and John Muir in the North American context, with respect to Pinchot's ethos
of conservation-for-future-use and Muir's preservationism (Nash 2001).  The post-
War development boom and a resurgence neo-Malthusian thinking only deepened the
idea that conservation was in contest with social needs (Linner 2003).
By the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the conservation movement began to see the 
antagonism between conservation and development as unproductive.  With initiatives
like the Earth Summits and treaties like Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, conservationists and bureaucrats began to push the idea of “sustainable 
development”, which was supposed to bring concerns for the environment, society, 
and the economy together to create socio-environmental and economic conditions 
that could be sustained indefinitely (Redclift 2005).  It was, in a way, a modern 
restoration of Pinchot's conservation-for-future use.  It was also the manifestation of 
a belief that growth did not (or should not) have to be compromised.  The inherent 
tension between conservation and development, however, is rooted in foundational 
contradictions within capitalism itself.
As James O'Connor (1988) famously identified, a “second contradiction” of capital 
arises because capitalist production, rooted in the growth imperative, depends on the 
very resources that it depletes.  This “capitalistically produced scarcity of nature” 
inevitably leads to under-production, ultimately threatening capitalism's existence 
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(O'Connor 1988, 34).  Following the logic laid out in Marx's “first contradiction” (in 
which it was said that the exploitation of labor would lead to an over-production 
crisis), O'Connor anticipates environmental limits to capitalist growth.  Importantly, 
these “natural limits” are seen to be produced by the internal contradictions to 
capitalism itself, rather than external conditions of the natural environment.  Just as 
Marx predicted that the over-exploitation of labor would ultimately lead to the self-
destruction of capitalism, O'Connor believed over-exploitation of the environmental 
conditions of production would lead to the same result.
While its future remains uncertain, however, capitalism has proven to be 
considerably more adaptive to these constraints on growth.  Drawing on Polanyi's 
(1944) concept of the “double movement”, in which markets and society are locked 
in constant mutual reconstruction, Castree identifies four “environmental fixes” to 
“the endemic problem of sustained economic growth” (2008a, 146).  These “fixes” 
are essentially the adjustments made to capitalist development so that growth can be 
sustained in the face of O'Connor's “second contradiction”.  In other words, they are 
the ways in which capitalism tries to overcome its own internal conflicts.  Of these 
“fixes”, the first is the most relevant to the rise of “ecosystem services” as a concept 
– it says that capitalism's internal contradictions can be overcome by “bringing 
[nature] more fully within the universe of capital accumulation” (Castree 2008a, 
147).9
9 The remaining three fixes explain the more conventional extractive relationship between capitalist 
development and nature; the second fix concerns the subsumption of previously protected or state-
controlled nature, the third concerns the expansion of capitalist metabolism of nature, and the 
fourth concerns the off-loading of state responsibilities for ensuring environmental stability 
(Castree 2008a, 147-149).
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The recent move has been to re-conceptualize both conservation and development so 
that one necessarily brings about the other.  This not only represents “an increase in 
the intensity and variety of forms of capitalist conservation”, it marks a fundamental 
“shift in the conservation movement's own conception of these practices” 
(Brockington and Duffy 2010, 470, emphasis original).  This transformation has been
so complete that “the idea that capitalism can and should help conservation save the 
world now occupies the mainstream of the conservation movement” (Brockington 
and Duffy 2010, 470).  It seems that scholars and activists increasingly subscribe to 
the maxim that we must “sell nature to save it” (McAfee 1999, 133).
Within geography, a community of scholars has emerged that is uneasy with this 
trend, believing that the new alliances re-frame conservation so that it “fuels 
processes of capital accumulation” (Brockington and Duffy 2010, 470).  Corson, for 
example, suggests that “the international biodiversity conservation agenda has 
created new … spaces for global capital expansion” and opened new opportunities 
for the uneven accumulation of wealth (2010, 579).  In other words, this approach to 
biodiversity conservation is more about extending the reach of global capitalism than
it is about expanding ecologically sound management.  These scholars have taken up 
an agenda that seeks to critically understand and counter the growing acceptance of 
this phenomenon, under what is broadly a critique of neoliberal environmental 
governance.
Foundations of the Critique:  Marxism
If nature at the millenium is, more than ever, a distinctively capitalist nature – 
one made and remade as a commodity form within the specific logics of 
capitalist production, competition and accumulation – then Marxian political 
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economy offers indispensable critical resources for making sense of and 
contesting those logics (Castree and Braun 1998, 7).
The foundations of the Marxist critique of environmental governance can be found in
Neil Smith's seminal work, Uneven Development (1984).  In that book, Smith 
articulates his theories on the “production of nature” under capitalism.  This is the 
idea that capitalism “produces” new social relations with nature that are based on the 
logics of capitalist production, most specifically concerning the profit and 
accumulation imperatives.  This provides an understanding of “how capitalism 
constructs and reconstructs whole landscapes as exchange values under the profit 
imperative” (Castree and Braun 1998, 8).  It is a Marxist theorization that has sought 
to re-orient questions about environmental management to address fundamental 
issues of social justice – who controls access to resources, what are the implications 
of their use, and who ultimately benefits?  The most important aspect of this 
contribution is demonstration of how the logics of capitalism re-frame the 
relationship between society and nature.  These themes have run throughout the work
of geographers for decades now.
Cindi Katz, for example, began to confront the capitalist accumulation of nature 
through conservation in an essay titled Whose Nature, Whose Culture? (1998).  Katz 
explains how “capital's need for clear channels of access to control nature and 
environmental resources” was manifested in new practices and language that, among 
other things, conceived of conservation as “investments” and protected areas as 
“biodiversity banks” (1998, 48).  The act of protecting nature, as she saw it, was an 
assertion of control over resources (an “accumulation strategy”) that imposed a 
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particular set of values and beliefs about what activities and what uses of nature were
acceptable.  Conservation, in these terms, could be seen as an act of appropriation not
just for the purposes of protecting nature, but for consolidating control and advancing
particular objectives.  “To all appearances,” Katz explaines, “the preserved landscape
is secure; but … its conversion to resource in some global accounting ledger has 
fundamentally altered its status and temporality” (1998, 49).  Deferred consumption 
of material resources, under this conception, was expected to have some future 
payoff whether it be in the form of ecotourism development, discovery of 
pharmaceutical compounds, carbon offset trading, or some other yet-to-be-imagined 
scheme.
Smith (2007) builds on the ideas of Katz (1998) by explaining how, over the 
intervening decade, the capitalist production of nature has only deepened the use of 
conservation as an accumulation strategy.  This, he explains, has been achieved 
through a transition from the “formal” to the “real” subsumption of nature, which can
be understood as a process that is making nature more fully capitalist – facilitating 
the circulation of capital through nature, but also the circulation of nature through 
capital (Smith 2007).  This analysis is an extension of Marx's commentary on the real
and formal subsumption of labor – the formal subsumption occurred when workers 
were brought into a wage relationship with capital, but the real subsumption occurred
when the relationship between capital and labor was transformed to one in which the 
laborer's role was pre-defined by existing social organization (Smith 2007).  
Accumulation, in the first instance, is facilitated by bringing more and more workers 
into the wage relationship but is (to an extent) contingent upon those workers' 
willingness to labor.  In the second, on the other hand, accumulation is facilitated by 
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the conditions of society, in which workers are pre-figured as elements in production 
and dis-empowered in their roles.  Similarly, with nature, Smith (2007) suggests that 
the formal subsumption exists in the extraction of resources for productive activity 
(nature is brought under capital to fuel the process of accumulation), while the real 
subsumption emerges in the transformation of this relationship with nature from “an 
incidental effect” to an “intended strategy” (Smith 2007, 33).  The “capitalization” of 
nature (i.e. the commodification and circulation of nature) was once an “unintended 
consequence” of production, but is now a “strategic goal” (Smith 2007, 33).  In this 
scenario, accumulation is facilitated not just by the ever-increasing commodification 
of biological material, but also the financialization of the entire human encounter 
with nature, including ecosystem functions and management activities.
Under Smith's conception, the production of nature in this advanced stage allows for 
capital to increasingly control how society uses (or protects) nature.  Social decisions
about the form and fate of nature are being handed over to the markets, and “[a]ny 
choice over what kinds of environments and landscapes are to be produced, and for 
what purposes, increasingly passes from any semblance of broad social discussion 
into narrow class control” (Smith 2007, 30).
The accumulation of nature, of course, is occurring on multiple fronts and in ways 
that do not necessarily involve production.  While Katz (1998) and Smith (2007) 
illuminate the ways in which capitalist conceptions of nature are resulting in the 
accumulation of control over natural resources and management practices, Harvey 
(2003) draws our attention to the way that accumulation is also achieved through a 
process of dispossession.  This is actually just a revision of Marx's concept of 
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“primitive accumulation”, which was formulated to explain the origin of surpluses 
that allowed for the capitalist mode of production to emerge.  It can be understood as 
the original enclosures that divorced the producer from the means of production and 
permitted accumulation beyond any one individual's productive capacities (Corson 
and MacDonald 2012).  This entailed what Marx saw as the “'forcible usurpation' of 
common property” through violence and state-sanctioned theft (Glassman 2006, 
610).  As Harvey points out, however, the term “primitive” suggests that this 
accumulation occurred long ago and, thus, “is considered no longer relevant” (2003, 
144).  Instead, he argues that this process of accumulation through “predation, fraud, 
and violence” is ongoing (2003, 144) and offers the alternative “accumulation by 
dispossession” to clarify.  This appreciates the fact that not only is wealth 
accumulated through capitalist re-production, it is also stolen through various 
processes, including privatization, commodification of labor, debt, and appropriation 
of assets, to name but a few (Harvey 2003, 145).
Of course, “accumulation by dispossession” frequently concerns nature.  
Swyngedouw (2005), for example, discusses how it has played a role in political 
struggles over water, and whether or not it should be managed by public or private 
interests.  As he explains, “privatization” is simply a more acceptable name for 
accumulation by dispossession, which conceals the predation, fraud, and violence 
under the conventional wisdom that “privately owned and market organized 
production” leads to “the most optimal output and the most socially desirable 
distribution of value” (2005, 83).  He goes on to explain how states have condoned, if
not encouraged, the consolidation of private control over water resources through 
everything from wholesale auctioning of resources and infrastructure in former to 
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socialist countries to the institution of favorable regulatory climates (Swyngedouw 
2005).  The result, of course, is much narrower involvement in governance and 
decision-making processes, decreased access for those who cannot afford to pay for 
services, and expanded accumulation for the new owners.
When viewed through these Marxist lenses, the expansion of capitalism into the 
realm of conservation and resource management can be seen as an attempt to 
organize society under the logics of capitalist economics and bring ever greater 
aspects of the world under its control.  Application of the critique, then, is counter-
hegemonic.  Fundamentally, critics that adopt this framework are approaching 
environmental questions with an eye towards social justice – conservation is not just 
a matter of ecological management, it also has important implications for the 
distribution of resources and social governance.  While the critical literature is deeply
indebted to these Marxist critiques, other frameworks can also offer tools for 
addressing the same concerns.
Foundations of the Critique:  Post-structuralism
Beginning in the 1990s, a community of scholars started to emerge that was 
concerned with the ways in which “discursive relations – and not just market 
relations – organize social and ecological change” (Castree and Braun 1998, 16).  
This group had been profoundly influenced by the production of nature thesis and the
Marxist concern for social justice, but it held that the social construction of nature 
involved “more than just capital and commodities conventionally understood” 
(Castree and Braun 1998, 6).  Following the work of Antonio Gramsci (and others), 
they turned their focus to the role of discourse and representation, recognizing that 
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“struggles over meaning are every bit as 'material' and important as practical 
struggles” (Castree and Braun 1998, 13).
Arturo Escobar was (and remains) a key figure in the move towards a post-
structuralist political ecology.  In an important essay (Escobar 1996), he made the 
case for the discursive study of political, economic, and ecological issues.  It was 
based on the belief that discourse not only concerns linguistic theory, but that it is 
also inseparable from the construction of “material reality”, accepting that language 
not only reflects the world around us, but that it is actually constitutive of it (Escobar 
1996).  What may first seem a rather outlandish idea becomes less so when it is 
understood that human “knowledges have material effects, insofar as people may 
believe and act according to them” (Castree 2001, 13).  Escobar deploys these ideas 
to demonstrate how capitalism has evolved, through discourses of sustainability and 
biodiversity conservation, into an “ecological phase” where capital has developed “a 
conservationist tendency, significantly different from its usual reckless, destructive 
form” (1996, 326).  Furthermore, Escobar asserts the importance of a post-
structuralist approach “as a means to ascertaining the types of knowledge that might 
be conducive to eco-socialist strategies” (1996, 327) – in other words, a means of 
imagining and enacting “alternative productive rationalities”.
The post-structuralist intervention to political ecology found its most comprehensive 
articulation in Peet and Watts's edited collection, Liberation Ecologies.  In the 
opening chapter, Peet and Watts (1996) identify several limitations to the traditional 
political ecology framework, and then formulate “liberation ecology” to capture new 
conceptual directions that have “extended the frontiers of political ecology” (Peet and
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Watts 1996, 9).  These new directions include attempts to make explicit “the causal 
connections between … capitalist growth and specific environmental outcomes”; to 
integrate the politics of everyday resistance and civic movements into questions of 
resource access and control; to assess the role of civil society and non-state actors in 
environmental issues; to integrate a “plurality of perceptions” through a number of 
lines that situate knowledges and reveal how particular understandings emerge as 
authoritative; and to revise the notion of “ecology” to reflect more contemporary 
conceptions of chaos, disequilibrium, and instability (Peet and Watts 1996, 9-13).  
This turn strongly retains the Marxist concern for social justice, but it opens a realm 
of possibilities for approaches to those issues, most specifically drawing on ideas 
from discourse theory.  As they indicate, the framework of liberation ecology is by no
means a settled matter with firm boundaries or doctrinal consensus.  Rather, it 
remains subject to “the fiercest debates” and is composed of highly varied (and 
sometimes contradictory) conceptual footings – an expression of its own postmodern 
character.  Despite this, however, these ideas have gained traction, and many scholars
are writing in this tradition.
Goldman (2001), for example, picks up the post-structuralist call to action and 
pursues a critique of environmental governance in Laos using an ecological version 
of the governmentality frame.  “Eco-governmentality”, as he refers to it, is 
formulated from the ideas of Michel Foucault, who saw government less as a 
hierarchy of structured power relationships and more as an “art” (Goldman 2001).  
From this view, the power of government is exercised not merely through structures 
that enforce state will, but through social practices and norms that produce subjects 
best suited to achieve government policy.  It concerns the rationalities of state and, 
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importantly, non-state actors and the “technologies” through which they exercise 
power.  This is a far more diffuse interpretation of the way that power operates, the 
way that ideology infuses policy, and the way that policies become practice.  Applied 
to environmental concerns, as Goldman (2001) has done, the task becomes one of 
understanding how, for example, development agencies, conservation organizations, 
individuals, and the state interact to deploy normalizing ideas about nature and/or 
visions for development that result in particular outcomes (i.e. conservation and/or 
capital accumulation).  This broadening of the focus from economic relations to more
general social relations opens possibilities for locating sites of power.  It is through 
this that “the art of eco-government … leads to new forms of capitalist expansion and
new modalities of power/knowledge” (Goldman 2001, 499).
The ideas of Foucault have also been applied in formulation of the similar 
“environmentality” (Agrawal 2005; Luke 1999).  The work of Agrawal (2005), for 
example, concerns the making of subjects that are best suited to achieve certain 
conservation objectives.  The idea is that “environmental subjects” (i.e. people with 
conservation-oriented values) are formulated not simply through the powerful 
colonizing forces of government or the influential mechanisms of the economy, but 
also through specific social practices in particular social contexts (Agrawal 2005).  
The concept of environmentality “refuse[s] to accept the common social-scientific 
practice of using identity categories [eg. class] … to infer people's interests” 
(Agrawal 2005, 167), as doing so “fail[s] to attend to the many different ways in 
which people constitute themselves [and] arrive at new conceptions of what is in 
their interest” (Agrawal 2005, 166).
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More recently, Fletcher (2010) has extended the concept of environmentality to 
intermesh with the critiques of neoliberal conservation, formulating “neoliberal 
environmentality”.  He does so by integrating Foucault's (2008) articulation of a 
neoliberal version of governmentality.  Neoliberal governmentality, Fletcher (2010) 
explains, differs from the earlier “disciplinary” form in the way it produces governed 
subjects.  Whereas “a disciplinary governmentality might seek to lower the birth rate 
through a public media campaign aimed to frame extramarital sex and pregnancy as 
immoral and irresponsible”, a “neoliberal strategy … might simply reduce the 
welfare benefits provided for children, thus altering the incentive structure within 
which reproductive decisions are made” (Fletcher 2010, 175).  Fletcher suggests that 
extending this distinction to environmentality is a particularly useful contribution to 
the critique of neoliberal environmental governance, as it allows for consideration of 
the more-than-economic social relations that factor into conservation politics.
Neoliberalism
As many have pointed out (e.g. Peck and Tickell 2002; Larner 2003; Castree 2010a), 
it seems that “neoliberalism” (and analysis of it) is everywhere these days.  Indeed, 
the contemporary critique of the intersection between conservation and capitalism 
largely falls under the banner of “neoliberal conservation” or, alternatively, the 
“neoliberalization of nature”.10  The “neoliberal” label, however, is often used quite 
loosely to refer to any form of pro-market ideology.  This imprecision has been 
criticized by scholars on the grounds that it results in the loss of meaning, becoming 
“nothing more than a vehicle for academics who like to criticise things that they do 
10 An important distinction can be made between these two conceptions – one is an ideology, the 
other a process – though they are often used interchangeably.  In this and the following section, I 
will elaborate the reasons that they should be understood differently.
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not like” (Igoe and Brockington 2007, 445).  Despite its loose usage, the ideology of 
neoliberalism is quite clearly defined (and generally agreed upon) by the community 
of scholars critically engaging with it.  Neoliberalism is an economic concept that 
stresses free trade, private enterprise, and a limited role for government, and it is 
most often embraced by political conservatives.  As identified by Castree (2008a, 
142-143), the key features of neoliberalism include:  privatization, marketization, 
deregulation, re-regulation, the establishment of market proxies, and an array of 
flanking mechanisms (figure 2.2).  Various other interpretations may include 
decentralization and “devolution of governance to non-state actors” (Fletcher and 
Breitling 2012, 402), and the primacy of individual liberty over communal 
responsibility.
Of course, as many empirical studies have shown (e.g. Fletcher and Breitling 2012; 
Matulis 2013), practice rarely aligns neatly with ideology.  The archetypal conception
described by Castree almost certainly exists nowhere as such – indeed, he 
acknowledges that his characterization is an abstraction of “multiple 
'neoliberalisations' extant in the world” (2008a, 142; 2008b) and that, given 
geographical variation, “[o]ne would hardly expect 'neoliberalism' to operate 
uniformly across the globe” (2008a, 134).  What purpose, then, does this 
conceptualization serve?  
The smooth-edged conception of neoliberalism presented (and then problematized) 
by Castree (2008a) is useful in its own right.  The “ideal type”, as articulated by 
sociologist Max Weber, helps to order our perception of disordered reality (Weber 
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Key Features of Neoliberalism
(Castree 2008a, 142-143)
1. Privatization – the transfer of “previously state-
owned, unowned, or communally owned” property 
to private hands.  This can include titling of 
previously untitled lands held in possession.
2. Marketization – the assignment of prices through 
market mechanisms to facilitate exchange.  This is 
one means of placing a monetary value on 
ecological functions.
3. Deregulation – the “'rollback' of state 'interference'”
in markets.  This can be the removal of previous 
restrictions on land use and their replacement with 
incentive-based measures.
4. Re-regulation – the “deployment of state policies” 
that facilitate the neoliberalization process.  This 
can include mechanisms that instate or stabilize 
markets.
5. Market Proxies – the restructuring of the “residual 
public sector” to operate more like the private 
sector.  This can include the management of public 
institutions under profit- rather than social-
imperatives (for instance the re-purposing of 
biological reserves from sites of preservation to 
“sights” of tourism).
6. Flanking Mechanisms – the encouragement of 
charities, NGOs, and private organizations to fill 
the void left by the state.  This can include, for 
instance, non-governmental management of 
conservation efforts.
Figure 2.2
2007 [1904]).  It is intended to represent a distillation of actually existing cases, even 
though it may only ever have loose correspondence to any one of them.  As Jessop 
explains, even though “[t]hese configurations are never found in pure form … their 
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conceptual construction may still be useful for heuristic, descriptive, and explanatory 
purposes” (2002, 460).  The ideal-type also constitutes a reference point that helps to 
bind our research together, so that broader-scale conclusions can be drawn.  While 
caution against “overly universal understandings” is advisable, the ideal-type 
provides structure for reading across empirical studies (see Bakker 2009; Castree 
2009), allowing them to be seen as more than just “a patchwork of qualitatively 
distinct parts that are relatively incommensurable” (Castree 2008b, 155).
There is danger, however, that the ideal-type can be misinterpreted as comprising the 
necessary and essential elements of a phenomenon, rather than serving as a device for
conceptualizing it.  In that case, the focus shifts to extreme examples and risks 
overlooking actual cases where certain elements exist only to a degree.  In other 
words, it has a tendency to make “the real thing” seem as though it is not a perfect 
representation of itself.  In assessing the “neoliberalness” of a particular case it would
be a mistake to conclude that it has no neoliberal characteristics simply because it 
lacks certain “ideal” elements (eg. markets) or includes other antithetical ones (eg. 
government involvement).
There is a growing number of scholars focused on the ways in which the “policies 
and practices” of PES “deviate considerably from neoliberal doctrine” (Dempsey and
Robertson 2012, 758).  Shapiro-Garza, for example, contends that “the great majority
of PES initiatives around the world maintain a strong, if not exclusive, degree of 
intervention by the state” and have “essentially become federally funded rural 
subsidies” (2013, 6-7).  Fletcher and Breitling (2012), as well, highlight a gap 
between the neoliberal vision and actual execution of certain environmental policies 
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in Costa Rica and suggest that practices deviate so significantly that they could 
actually “be described as a subsidy in disguise” (2012, 408).  In fact, they go as far as
asking to what extent institutions can “deviate from a free market ideal before they 
can [no] longer properly be labeled 'neoliberal' at all” (2012, 410).  Their suggestion 
is that when “ostensibly neoliberal structures are actually supported by decidedly 
non-neoliberal practices”, they may not be “amenable to characterization as 
'neoliberal' at all in any meaningful sense” (2012, 410).  These conclusions, however,
result from a view of neoliberalism that does not adequately appreciate the unfinished
and ever-adapting nature of the neoliberalization process.11
Neoliberalization
The tension between the ideal-type conceptualization of neoliberalism and 
manifestations of deployed neoliberal policies might mean that there are limitations 
to the use of neoliberalism as an analytical construct, but various theoretical 
interventions have refined the concept and formulated the idea of neoliberalization, a 
process that is only ever partially complete.  As Castree has pointed out, “it has 
become axiomatic among researchers that they are investigating a spatiotemporally 
variable process … rather than a fixed and homogeneous thing” (2008a, 137, 
emphasis original; see also Heynen and Robbins 2005).
11 Importantly, this is not intended to suggest that the conceptualization of neoliberalism put forward 
by Fletcher and Breitling (2012) is somehow lacking sophistication, or even that it does not 
appreciate the hybrid and piecemeal character of “actually existing” neoliberalisms.  Drawing on 
Foucault (2008, 218), they explain that their perspective “views neoliberalization in conservation 
policy not merely as an economic program but as a 'whole way of thinking and being,' … that is, 
an overarching approach to governing human behavior in general” (2012, 404).  They are careful 
to acknowledge that neoliberalism is invariably expressed “in syncretism with alternate 
conservation strategies and local sociocultural formations” (ibid.).  Despite this, however, their 
analysis emphasizes the ways in which neoliberalization has failed to influence conservation policy
in Costa Rica, rather than the ways in which it has taken root.  As a result, they have overlooked 
some important instances where neoliberal policies have already begun to enter practice (Matulis 
2013).
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Peck and Tickell (2002), for example, present the case for “a process-based analysis” 
of neoliberalization that is “neither monolithic in form nor universal in effect” (2002, 
384).  Their contention is that studies considering the effect of neoliberalism must 
focus on change “rather than on binary and/or static comparisons between a past state
and its erstwhile successor” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383).  The effect of doing 
otherwise is to simultaneously overstate its colonizing power (neoliberalism does not 
occur as a blanket proposition) and understate its integration into social organization 
(neoliberalization often occurs even alongside overtly non-neoliberal practices).
Similarly, Brenner and Theodore have stressed that studies must “explore the path-
dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes
and emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects” (2002, 351).  Their 
emphasis is on the “contextual embeddedness” of neoliberalism in contrast to an 
abstract and idealized neoliberal ideology, “in which market forces are assumed to 
operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are 'unleashed'” (2002, 
351).  They offer the concept of “actually existing neoliberalism” as a way of 
handling the messy realities of studying embedded neoliberalism and avoiding the 
pitfalls of ideological conceptions.  This can be thought of as the tangible ways in 
which neoliberal ideas play out within the “legacies of inherited institutional 
frameworks, policy frameworks, regulatory practices, and political struggles” 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002, 351).
Interventions such as these provide an understanding of neoliberalism as less of a 
monolithic force that displaces previous modes of economic governance and more of 
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a perpetually unfinished project.  From this point of view, it is not essential that every
aspect of the idealized neoliberalism exist for neoliberalization to be occurring, and it
is not essential that the process be complete for detrimental consequences to emerge. 
Neoliberalization can even exist simultaneously with overtly non-neoliberal 
practices, when new policies interact and overlap with existing ones – it is the messy 
product of complex histories and diverse geographies.  “Actually existing” 
neoliberalisms are the result of context- and place-specific histories, rather than grand
location-independent theories (Brenner and Theodore 2002).  In this sense, the result 
of neoliberal policies is always multiple neoliberalisms, according to local 
conditions.  They are frequently, therefore, ideologically fragmented and may only 
vaguely resemble each other when compared across space and time – neoliberal 
reform leads to divergent outcomes, “not … a neoliberalized end of history and 
geography” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383).  As Castree points out, “neoliberal 
practices always … exist in a more-than-neoliberal context” (2006, 3).
Since there is no finished product, no point at which the neoliberalization process is 
complete, neoliberalism can exist even in cases that deviate substantially from the 
idealized conception.  When it is present, it is always to varying degrees according to
the success of its promotion, its confluence with existing regimes, and the resistance 
mounted against it.  That is why, in many empirical cases, no matter how 
overwhelmingly non-neoliberal actual practice proves to be, there is still the 
possibility of encroaching neoliberalization.  It is important, therefore, to uncover 
and assess even the most subtle instances of neoliberal influence, in order to 
understand the serious consequences that can often still exist.
49
The neoliberalization concept demands more nuanced understandings of governance 
practices, and it forecloses on the wholesale categorization of particular policies or 
projects as patently neoliberal.  In my view, however, whether or not the “neoliberal” 
label can be attached to a program as a whole may be less important than whether or 
not certain aspects have undergone a degree of neoliberalization great enough to have
identifiable detrimental consequences, whether they be the expansion of existing 
inequity or the reconstitution of a new field of “winners” and “losers”.  That said, 
there are some reasons why this alternative process-based conception of 
neoliberalism is also deficient.  Just as there is a danger that the conception of 
neoliberalism (the abstract and idealized ideology) will obscure “actual” instances of 
neoliberalization, there is also the danger that rigid adherence to the neoliberalization
conception “will obscure the common 'logics' and processes operating within or 
between otherwise different spatiotemporal settings” (Castree 2008a, 137).  In other 
words, neoliberalism is neither a strictly local phenomenon unrelated to broader 
patterns of governance, nor a monolithic force acting universally and uniformly 
across space.  In order to provide a meaningful path forward, an analytical 
framework that reconciles the tension between the ideology (“-ism”) and process-
based (“-ization”) conceptions is needed.
Towards an Analytical Framework
In making their case for a process-based analysis of neoliberalization, Peck and 
Tickell (2002) begin “to explore some of the more generic and abstract features of 
the neoliberalization process” (2002, 382).  As with Castree (2008a; 2008b), they are 
concerned that “overly specific analyses of particular neoliberal projects … may 
downplay neoliberalism as an extra-local project” (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, 
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276).  What they set out is an attempt to find a middle-ground to overly general 
conceptions of “monolithic and omnipresent” neoliberalism and “excessively 
concrete and contingent” instances of neoliberalization (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381-
382).  They are in search of some way to draw the connections between discrete 
projects with specific instances of neoliberalization and the broader patterns that 
constitute this era of neoliberal governance.  What they recommend is an 
understanding of “the variable ways in which different 'local neoliberalisms' are 
embedded within wider networks and structures of neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 
2002, 380).
Peck (2004) elaborates on this idea, offering an approach to unifying the case study 
research that does not rely on abstraction or the formulation of an ideal-type model.  
Starting from the position that there is no “pure” neoliberalism, but rather only 
“institutionally mediated and geopolitically specific hybrids” (Peck 2004, 395), he 
suggests that the solution to the problem of cohesion between studies is in a “careful 
mapping of … hybrids-in-connection” (ibid., 403) – that is, unique and distinct 
neoliberalisms that have connections but do not constitute (or approximate) an 
abstract model.
In a similar vein, Brenner et al. assert that “the binary opposition between 
representations of neoliberalism as an omnipresent, hegemonic force, on the one 
hand, and its depiction as an unstable, hybrid and contextually specific presence, on 
the other, seriously impedes the critical investigation of patterns of market-oriented 
regulatory restructuring” (2010, 184).  Instead, they formulate the concept of 
“variegated neoliberalization” as a way to handle this tension between the 
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generalized and particular forms.  This approach eschews conventional articulations 
of difference and uniformity within conceptions of neoliberalism in favor of 
“variegation”, or “systematically produced geoinstitutional differentiation” (Brenner 
et al. 2010, 207).  It is a formulation that allows “neoliberalization processes [to be 
seen as] simultaneously patterned, interconnected, locally specific, contested and 
unstable” (Brenner et al. 2010, 184), instead of either universal or idiographic.
McCarthy and Prudham (2004) also grapple with the tension between the general and
particular notions of neoliberalism in their attempt to establish some coherence 
between the studies in a special issue of Geoforum (35.3).  In contrast to the 
“hybrids-in-connection” and “variegated” conceptions of neoliberalization, however, 
they rely on abstracted elements of an ideal-type neoliberalism that is quite similar to 
the one presented by Castree (2008a).  They argue that “despite its polyvalence, 
neoliberalism may be understood as a set of coherent ideologies, discourses, and 
material practices” (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, 276).  While acknowledging that 
the existence of defining characteristics and practices of neoliberalism is problematic,
they walk the line between the ideology (“-ism”) and process (“-ization”) 
conceptions.  It is an attempt to preserve the strength of empirical critiques in 
destablizing the phenomenon without foreclosing on the ability to also challenge it in
abstract conceptual terms.
This is precisely the tactic used by Castree (2008a; 2008b), though he arguably does 
so with far greater analytical rigor.  He too navigates a middle ground that draws on 
both conceptions – that is, he advocates the use of the ideal-type conception as a tool 
for reading across studies at the same time that he endorses the process-based 
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conception as the more realistic depiction of deployed neoliberalism.  Whereas Peck 
(2004) and Brenner et al. (2010) go to great lengths in seeking a framework that 
avoids the universalizing character of an idealized model, McCarthy and Prudham 
(2004) and Castree (2008a; 2008b) are considerably more pragmatic, utilizing the 
idealized model for what it is worth without fully embracing the uniformity that it 
presents.
At the same time, however, Bakker (2009) argues that this approach falls short.  She 
suggests that the discipline of geography is wary of universalizing interpretations of 
phenomena like neoliberalism and anticipates refusals among geographers to take-up 
Castree's formulation, offering instead a typological characterization of neoliberalism
(Bakker 2010).  The fear is that comparative analyses (and frameworks that articulate
a level of coherence in neoliberal ideology) have the tendency of highlighting 
similarities, rather than differences, between neoliberal projects, the result of which 
can be reification and the reversal of “intellectually and politically useful [disruptions
to] current understandings of neoliberalism” (Larner 2003).  But Castree cautions 
that “a return to idiography” might be an equally perilous turn, as the inability to 
identify neoliberalism “in its perplexingly diverse and shifting forms” will render us 
unable to say anything meaningful about “neoliberal nature” in the first place (2009, 
1792).  Castree resists the idea that the world is “a patchwork of qualitatively distinct
parts that are relatively incommensurable” (2008b, 155) and seeks some means of 
steering “between the 'dead-end' of idiographic analysis and the perils of overly 
universal understandings of how nature is neoliberalised” (ibid., 161).  By 
interrogating its specific (local) forms it is possible to offer up resistance and counter 
its dominance, but by retaining the generalized, abstract, and idealized conception it 
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is possible to explore more the general consequences of governance in this 
“neoliberal era”.
The conceptual positions that motivate Bakker's (2009) resistance to Castree (2008a; 
2008b) are the same ones that have inspired Peck (2004) and Brenner et al. (2010) to 
formulate their hybrid and variegated alternatives.  They all follow Larner's (2003) 
call to “give neoliberalism an identity crisis” (2003, 510) and resist the idea of that 
there can be a coherent overarching and generalized neoliberal ideology.  However, 
these efforts might be viewed as a somewhat purist (and possibly excessive) attempt 
to remain true to the postmodern conviction that such universalizing ideas are 
untenable.  Certainly it is important to maintain the critical geographical skepticism 
towards “spatially totalizing claims” (Peck 2004, 396), but embracing an ideal-type 
conception does not have to be seen as a betrayal of important critical traditions.
As Castree (2006; 2008b) has contended, another deeply rooted tradition in critical 
geography – critical realism (see Proctor 1998) – permits appeals to such idealized 
conceptions without betraying the position that the “real world” is far more 
fragmented and disorderly.  Castree's “thought abstraction” might conceive of 
generalized characteristics of neoliberalism, but the model that results is not intended
to replace or diminish the position that “actually existing” neoliberalisms will always
be historically and geographically contingent.  Castree's approach resists “the habit of
confusing epistemic discussions about a phenomenon abstracted from its contexts of 
operation with ontological discussions about its actual behaviour and its material 
effects” (Castree 2006, 5).  I see Castree's (2008a; 2008b) framework as the more 
direct route to the same objectives of Peck (2004) and Brenner et al. (2010).  It 
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avoids both the perils of the universalizing concept of neoliberalism and the 
idiographic tendencies of neoliberalization.  It is this framework that will guide my 
analysis of environmental governance in Costa Rica.
The Economic Valuation of Nature
The vast majority of the literature concerning “payments for ecosystem services” 
does not engage with the above critical perspectives.  Implementation-oriented 
research (see figure 2.1), by contrast, broadly accepts the economic valuation of 
nature as either favorable or inevitable and proceeds by evaluating, debating, and 
prescribing best practices.  The pages below appraise this body of literature by 
exploring the vision and underlying logics of PES, by seeking to understand the 
dominant Coasian approach to implementation, and by reviewing some of the 
alternative “best practice” debates.  The purpose is to establish the context of 
scholarly support for financialized conservation and to gain bearings in the field to 
which my critique stands in opposition.
Vision and Logics
The practice of making payments for ecosystem services is about the formation of 
new social relations between land managers (e.g. farmers, indigenous groups, 
government actors) and the human beneficiaries of functioning ecological systems.  
More specifically, it is about establishing economic relations that (theoretically) 
transfer financial resources from “users” of services to “producers” who institute 
prescribed land management practices.12  This requires, of course, the assignment of 
12 I use the qualifier “theoretically” to convey the fact that most programs intended to instate PES 
only approximate the idealized user/producer relationship.  As is the case with neoliberalism and 
neoliberalization, there is considerable distance between ideal-type conceptions of PES and 
actually-existing practices.
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monetary values to ecological functions, which is an inherently complex and 
problematic proposition.  An argument concerning how this valuation is to be 
achieved was articulated in a chapter (Goulder and Kennedy 1997) of an early 
agenda-setting book on ecosystem services (Daily 1997).
Goulder and Kennedy begin by suggesting that the question of nature's valuation 
cannot be escaped:  “whenever societies chose among alternative uses of nature, they 
indicate (at least implicitly) which alternative is deemed to be worth more” (1997, 
23).  In other words, valuation is inevitable regardless of whether or not it is done in 
explicit monetary terms.  From this position, it is then suggested that if ecosystem 
values are not made explicit, they will continue to be undervalued and overexploited 
– it is an argument that has propagated throughout the implementation-oriented 
literature (Costanza and Folke 1997; Daily 2000).  Goulder and Kennedy (1997) 
consider several frameworks and methods for ascertaining ecosystem value.  From an
anthropocentric point of view, they consider various utilitarian forms of valuation 
that are based on the derivation of human satisfaction or benefit.  These include 
direct and indirect use values (the value of fish for food and the value of plankton in 
sustaining those fish), consumptive and non-consumptive use values (the value of 
ducks for hunting and the value of ducks for watching), and “non-use” values such as
existence value (the value of knowing the Grand Canyon exists whether or not an 
individual ever visits it) (Goulder and Kennedy 1997).  They also distinguish 
between “strong” and “weak” forms of utilitarianism, which assert value based on the
benefit to society as a whole and the benefit provided to individuals, respectively.  
From a biocentric point of view, Goulder and Kennedy (1997) consider the intrinsic 
valuation of nature, which is based on the idea that “other natural things have 
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intrinsic rights to exist and prosper, independent of whether human beings derive 
satisfaction from them” (1997, 26).  They further consider valuation based on the 
“Kantian categorical imperative”, which is a choice mechanism that requires the 
removal of an individual's own stake in the outcome before consideration of potential
actions (Goulder and Kennedy 1997).  It is a virtue-based (as opposed to a money-
based) approach, to which Goulder and Kennedy (1997) devote only cursory 
attention.
Of the various forms of valuation presented, Goulder and Kennedy favor a “strong” 
form of utilitarianism which, they say, is conducive to the deployment of cost-benefit
analyses as a way “to make ethical collective decisions about the preservation of 
nature” (1997, 27).  Their assessment continues with an appraisal of the various 
methods for assigning value (e.g. avoided cost valuation, market value, contingent 
valuation, willingness-to-pay), indicating when the use of each would appropriate.  
Despite all their talk of value, however, they make no mention of exchange value or 
what might occur when nature is abstracted into service commodities “that are 
adequate to bear value in capitalist circulation” (Robertson 2012, 386).  Importantly, 
Goulder and Kennedy's (1997) analysis of ecosystem valuation never considers 
whether or not nature should be valued in economic terms, only how and on which 
conceptual grounds it can be done.  While they do acknowledge that “[f]undamental 
issues of fairness or distribution are ignored in benefit-cost assessments” (Goulder 
and Kennedy 1997, 43), they only make passing note of ethical considerations and 
the politics of “who decides”.
Costanza and Folke (1997), on the other hand, consider the valuation of nature for 
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other objectives.  While recognizing that “[c]onventional economic value is based on 
the goal of individual utility maximization”, they suggest that “other goals, and thus 
other values, are possible” (Costanza and Folke 1997, 49).  Namely, they consider 
valuation with respect to the goals of “ecological sustainability” and “distributional 
fairness”.  Operating under the assumption that these goals can be achieved through 
economic valuation, they attempt to formulate an approach within conventional 
frameworks and alongside the imperative of economic “efficiency”.  They suggest 
this can be achieved through a “two-tiered conceptual model” that “embeds both 
economic models and ecological models in a larger social process” (Costanza and 
Folke 1997, 57-58).  For valuation in “fairness” terms, Costanza and Folke (1997) 
suggest that decisions may need to be made behind a “veil of ignorance” – that is, 
without consideration of one's own stake – and with broad community involvement.  
For valuation in sustainability terms, they suggest decision making based primarily 
on scientific assessment of ecosystems “without direct reference to current human 
preferences” (Costanza and Folke 1997, 57).  Costanza and Folke (1997) advocate 
integration of alternative (social and techno-ecological) values into the economics of 
conservation in an attempt to reorient a form of social organization that has 
historically neglected such concerns.
Other implementation-oriented contributions to the literature, however, unabashedly 
advocate economic efficiency as the primary objective in valuing nature (Sierra and 
Russman 2006; Wünscher et al. 2008; Chomitz et al. 1999; Pagiola 2008; Wunder 
2008; Wunder et al. 2008; Engel et al. 2008).  These include a cohort of scholars, 
practitioners, and specialists associated with international development organizations 
and institutions such as the World Bank.  Engel et al. (2008), for example, assert that 
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the “PES approach was conceptualized and undertaken as a mechanism to improve 
the efficiency of natural resource management, and not as a mechanism for poverty 
reduction” (2008, 671-672).  This sentiment is echoed by Pagiola (2008), Wunder et 
al. (2008), The World Bank (2006), and even governmental agencies responsible for 
implementing such practices (FONAFIFO 2005).  Commentators that hold this 
position often recognize that such programs have the potential to make a positive 
contribution to social well-being, but they are usually explicit about it being a 
secondary concern.  Wunder et al. (2008), for example, refer to poverty alleviation, 
development, and employment creation as “side objectives” that have the potential to
interfere with the efficient delivery of ecosystem services.  Pagiola et al. suggest that 
“[s]ubordinating the objective of generating services to that of poverty reduction 
risks failing to deliver on the services, … thus undermining the very basis of the 
program” (2005, 249).  Researchers that embrace this vision for PES generally hold 
the belief that social welfare is best provided through economic growth – they are 
less concerned by inequity so long as wealth is broadly increasing, and they usually 
reject redistributive measures that seek to aid the less fortunate.
Many of these views are in tension with one another, but contributors to the 
implementation-oriented literature broadly accept PES as the future of ecological 
management.  Their disagreements become mere variations on the approach to 
actually carrying out these programs, whether it be through a state-centered, market-
oriented, or hybrid model.  The dominant approach to making these “payments for 
ecosystem services”, however, embraces markets as the most efficient and effective 
way of carrying out transactions (Muradian et al. 2010).
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Coase
The market approach is largely based on the Coase Theorem, which says that given 
low transaction costs and enforceable property rights, bargaining will lead to 
“socially optimal” conservation outcomes, regardless of the initial distribution of 
property rights (Coase 1960; Muradian et al. 2010; Tacconi 2012).  Coase developed 
his theory in a critique of Pigouvian economics, which relied on government 
interventions (such as taxes) to correct externality problems (Tacconi 2012).  Coase, 
by contrast, claimed that intervention by the state was unnecessary because 
externalities were actually a reciprocal problem (Tacconi 2012) – the polluter and the
polluted both have a stake in the polluting.  Coase believed that regardless of who 
held the property rights, voluntary negotiations could resolve the pollution problem 
in an efficient manner – that is, a “socially optimal” level of pollution would be 
determined through monetary exchange.13
Illustrating this, Regan (2012) uses the hypothetical example of a farmer and a 
refinery located on along a river:
According to the Coase theorem, as long as property rights to the use of the 
river are clearly defined and the costs of transacting with one another are zero,
the amount of effluent disposed in the river by the refinery will be the same 
regardless of who has the property right. If the farmer had the right to have 
the river’s water free of the refinery’s waste, the refinery could compensate 
him in exchange for a partial right to discharge effluent into the river. If the 
refinery had the right to use the river for effluent discharge, the farmer could 
compensate the refinery in exchange for less effluent released into the river.
The Coasian approach has become influential in conceptualizing PES and is routinely
deployed in scholarship (Wunder et al. 2008; Engel et al. 2008; Muradian et al. 
13 The dubious logic and many assumptions of this theorem (e.g. equal bargaining power, rational 
economic actors) will be critiqued below.
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2010), even if it is usually imperfectly implemented in practice (Schomers and 
Matzdorf 2013).  In particular, Coasian ideals have informed the World Bank's 
intervention into several national-scale PES schemes (World Bank 2006; World Bank
2007).  Under the influence of Coasian economics, the narrative of ecosystem service
conservation shifts from questions about the role ecosystems play in maintaining 
human well-being to questions of maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their provision (Farley and Costanza 2010).  Wunder (2005), for example, articulates 
a (widely-cited) definition of PES that endorses these priorities (see figure 2.3).  
Most proponents of this approach hold a preference for private sector schemes 
(Wunder et al. 2008) and believe that the government's role should primarily be 
enforcement of property rights and minimization of transaction costs (Farley and 
Costanza 2010, 2063).  These prescriptive understandings of what constitutes PES 
(e.g. Wunder's definition) leads to the pursuit of “best practices” without careful 
consideration of the broader implications.  Caution and critical assessment are 
characteristically absent, and implementation moves forward under the assumption 
that schemes are benign.
Wunder's definition of PES
(2005, 3, emphasis original):
           PES is:
1. a voluntary transaction where
2. a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure 
that service)
3. is being 'bought' by a (minimum one) ES buyer
4. from a (minimum one) ES provider





While the Coasian view remains dominant (Muradian et al. 2010), alternative 
perspectives have also been articulated.  A central debate within the implementation-
oriented literature has been over the tension between Coasian market-based schemes 
and a range of other alternatives.  This division is summarized by Farley and 
Costanza (2010) in their review of the conceptual bases of two PES-themed issues of 
Ecological Economics (Vol 65.4 and Vol 69.6).  In that review, they make a 
distinction between “environmental economics” and “ecological economics”.  The 
latter, they explain, is characterized by “the multiple goals of ecological 
sustainability, just distribution and economic efficiency” and the use of both market 
and non-market mechanisms, while the former “prioritizes economic efficiency and 
tries to force ecosystem services into the market model” (Farley and Costanza 2010, 
2060).
Clearly, the “environmental economics” approach encompasses the Coasian 
sentiments described above.  The “ecological economics” approach, on the other 
hand, retains the concern for efficiency, but explicitly introduces social justice as an 
equally important factor.  This approach is developed by Muradian et al. (2010) and 
the contributors to their special issue.  They put forward a much broader conception 
of what constitutes PES that is based on an alternative definition.  In contrast to the 
widely-cited market-oriented definition provided by Wunder (2005), Muradian et al. 
understand PES as the “transfer of resources between social actors [with the aim of 
creating] incentives to align … land use decisions with the social interest” (2010, 
1205).  It is a far less restrictive formulation that allows for “a large diversity of PES 
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initiatives” (Muradian et al. 2010, 1205), including an array of more-than-market 
implementations.  Recognizing this variability, they classify varieties of PES on a 
continuous spectrum according to three criteria:  the “importance of the economic 
incentive” in generating conservation, the “directness of the [incentive] transfer”, and
the “degree of commodification” that occurs (Muradian et al. 2010, 1205).
Depending on the institutional arrangements and the biophysical characteristics of the
services (Farley and Costanza 2010), any number of PES strategies can be imagined 
within this “ecological economics” framework, only a few of which may incorporate 
markets or even financial transactions.  As Muradian et al. (2010) suggest, market-
based schemes require a high degree of commodification, but a scheme that employs 
government monopsony, for example, may require none at all, instead achieving 
provision of services through the prescription of certain land management practices.  
The “importance of the economic incentive” may also be minimal in cases where 
“intrinsic motivations” and cultural preferences are greater (Muradian et al. 2010).  
Furthermore, intermediaries often play an important role in coordinating transactions 
between “users” and “producers” of ecosystem services, sometimes even being 
carried out through, for example, investment in public goods rather than monetary 
exchange, meaning that the transfer of incentives can be rather indirect or even 
implicit (Muradian et al. 2010).  This manner of classifying PES schemes presented 
by Muradian et al. (2010) is far less prescriptive and opens the door to a range of 
implementation possibilities.  As they assert, it “goes beyond the dichotomy between 
State-driven and private-driven schemes and does not distinguish between 'genuine' 
and 'PES-like' interventions” (Muradian et al. 2010, 1206).
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Tacconi, however, believes that “it may be useful to move beyond the 
characterization of the different approaches to PES as environmental economics or 
ecological economics driven because they present significant overlaps” (2012, 34).  
He finds reason to navigate a middle ground between the two perspectives, 
constructing something of a hybrid conceptualization.  While he provides evidence 
for the “limited applicability of true Coasian transactions” (Tacconi 2012, 35), he 
also reiterates the importance of efficiency, conditionality, additionality, and a 
preference for voluntary participation.  At the same time, however, he retains the 
concern raised by Muradian et al. (2010) that markets may lead to inequitable 
distribution of benefits and fall short of sustainable provision of services.  Tacconi 
(2012) concludes by presenting his own definition of PES and prescribing an array of
best practices.  This is characteristic of contributions to the implementation-oriented 
literature.  Each intervention (e.g. Engel et al. 2008; Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and
Costanza 2010; Tacconi 2012) re-hashes definitions and best-practices from slightly 
different perspectives.  While they differ substantially in their motivations and 
strategies, they all still accept the fundamental basis of the economic approach to 
conservation.
Fletcher and Breitling (2012) suggest that such incentive-centered management (no 
matter which conceptual variation is employed) effectively endorses a neoliberal 
environmentality.  As I explained in my review of the critically-oriented literature 
above, this is precisely the reason many remain uneasy with any sort of economic 
valuation at all.  Concerns over a departure from our current ethics-based framing of 
conservation, however, are frequently rebuffed with reassurances that the “intrinsic” 
value of nature – that is, nature's inherent value or the value it has for its own sake – 
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is entirely compatible with the new economic direction.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Valuation
The argument that intrinsic and extrinsic forms of valuation are compatible is 
frequently made on the assumption that it is possible to appreciate nature for 
aesthetic and cultural reasons, and make ethics-based management decisions, even 
while we pursue economic valuation.  Skroch and Lopez-Hoffman (2010), for 
example, argue that economic valuation is just another tool in the set and that it does 
not displace other (non-monetary) ways of valuing nature.  They make the claim that 
“the intrinsic and existence value of land and biota” can be “quantified in cultural and
social terms”, even while other services are valued in monetary terms, and though it 
remains unclear precisely how these “quantified” social and cultural values can be 
weighed against competing uses that have explicit monetary values, they hold that 
“[e]conomic arguments are not outweighing noneconomic arguments for 
conservation” and that the “intrinsic value of nature is not diminished” (Skroch and 
Lopez-Hoffman 2010, 325).  Juniper (2013), as well, goes to great lengths to reassure
his readers that we may still value nature intrinsically even as we pursue economic 
valuation.  Indeed, Juniper insists that we must maintain a moral stance in which 
nature's intrinsic, aesthetic, and spiritual value is important beyond the prices that can
be attached to it (Juniper 2013).
Adams and Redford, however, maintain that “[e]conomic calculations have always 
trumped … qualitative valuations of nature” (2010, 328), and they suggest that there 
is no reason to believe the case would be different with conservation.  Worse than 
this, Farley and Costanza contend, “conditional monetary PES … might actually 
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backfire by 'crowding out' the intrinsic motivation to do the right thing for society” 
(2010, 2063).  Vatn, for example, explains that payments made to encourage 
provision of ecosystem services may cause actors to think “in instrumental terms, 
calculating what is individually best to do” (2010, 1250), rather than basing their 
actions on assessments of what is best for society.  Ariely et al. (2009) show that 
extrinsic motivations of behavior (i.e. material rewards or benefits) may actually 
undermine and displace other motivations for prosocial behavior.  Intrinsic valuation 
of nature, therefore, may not be compatible with economic valuation, and pursuit of 
the latter could be counterproductive to long-term conservation objectives.  
Nevertheless, the argument that the two forms of valuation are compatible and, 
indeed, complementary continues to be made quite forcefully in dismissing 
dissenting views.
The compatibility argument, however, misreads the concerns raised in much of the 
critically-oriented literature.  While some of the resistance to economic valuation 
does, indeed, stem from a belief in nature's infinite intrinsic value (e.g. McCauley 
2006), much more arises from a concern for social justice.  The common thread in 
the critical literature is that economic valuation has justice implications far beyond 
any rhetorical or practical utility it may provide – something that is largely (or 
completely) ignored in mainstream accounts.  Thus, resistance frequently stems from 
the belief that economic valuation does more to promote uneven accumulation of 
wealth and extend the reach of global capitalism than it does to expand sound 
ecological management (Corson 2010; Brockington and Duffy 2010).
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Social Justice Critiques of PES
Having completed a general review, I now return to the critically-oriented literature 
to consider the segment that is directed specifically at “payments for ecosystem 
services”.  The theoretical traditions that concern the distribution of wealth and 
control over resources foster a skepticism of the monetary valuation of nature, not 
because of a belief that nature should be valued culturally, but because doing so 
economically risks introduction of the same logics that have delivered social inequity
and unchecked class power elsewhere.  From this view, the application of economic 
logic to conservation produces social and environmental injustice, making its 
extension into new realms rather problematic.  The critical literature addressing PES 
is largely directed at articulating opposition to the concept on social justice grounds.
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, Robertson (2012) explains how mainstream 
assessments of the ecosystem services concept fail to consider the implications of 
assigning exchange values to nature.  He contends that when nature is abstracted into 
service commodities “that are adequate to bear value in capitalist circulation” 
(Robertson 2012, 386) – that is, when complex ecosystem functions are reduced, for 
example, into tradeable tCO2e offsets and circulated in markets – new opportunities 
for accumulation emerge.  In other words, surplus value can increasingly be extracted
by traders in speculative markets as nature comes to be “something always already 
encountered in the commodity form” (2012, 386).  Furthermore, when mechanisms 
are developed to capitalize on abstracted service commodities, it fundamentally alters
the rationale for why conservation is undertaken.  Rather than being something that is
done because it provides social and ecological benefit to local communities, it 
becomes something that is done because it leads to economic gain, for elite 
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individuals.  These shifting management priorities present opportunities for control 
over resources to be narrowed, as conservation itself becomes an “accumulation 
strategy” (Katz 1998; Boyd et al. 2001; Smith 2007).
Beyond the opening of opportunities for uneven accumulation, there is a concern that
market-based approaches to conservation will displace other methods of resource 
governance.  As Sullivan (2009) explains, certain forms of governance, such as those 
often employed by indigenous communities, are inherently incompatible with 
economically oriented decision making.  Market strategies are, in many ways, 
antithetical to ensuring social and ecological well-being.  They are an anti-democratic
means of resource management that transfer decision making authority away from 
those most immediately affected by conservation decisions to those who are able to 
leverage the greatest capital.  In Smith's words, markets trade “any semblance of 
broad social discussion” for “narrow class control” (Smith 2007, 30), orienting 
decision-making towards profit maximization, rather than social welfare and 
biodiversity enhancement.
A third concern raised in the critical literature relates to the potential that 
financialized conservation has to encourage land grabbing (Fairhead et al. 2012) – 
that is, the dispossession of land from certain groups, as other more powerful ones 
consolidate their control over lucrative resources.  Fairhead et al. (2012), for 
example, explain that vulnerable communities (especially those with tenuous 
possession of land) are at particular risk, as familiar patterns of resource alienation 
unfold under the banner of environmentalism.  As the production of ecosystem 
services increasingly presents opportunities for monetary return, control of lands 
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suitable for their production or eligible for enrollment in PES will increasingly be 
sought after.  Communities occupying those lands, but lacking knowledge of the 
arcane legal mechanisms required to hold on to them, may find themselves under 
threat of dispossession.  The large scale (and sometimes violent) removal of local 
communities is often a direct consequence of these activities (Cavanagh and 
Benjaminsen 2014).
A fourth concern relates to the issue of uneven access to PES programs and the 
economic benefits they provide.  Navigating the complex enrollment procedures 
often requires specialist knowledge and disposable time, so it is primarily the more 
elite segments of society that are able to access them.  Zbinden and Lee (2005), for 
example, have found that those who participate in these programs are often wealthier,
more highly educated, and have greater “off farm” income than those who do not 
participate.  Porras (2010), as well, has shown how these programs can attract large 
scale (and often times foreign) corporate investment interests, allowing the greatest 
benefits to be captured by those already most privileged.  Furthermore, Porras (2010)
has shown, PES programs not only favor large landowners and investors, they may 
entirely exclude the landless – without ownership of land, individuals are unable to 
participate and, thus, receive no share of the benefit from resource conservation.
The common thread of the critically-oriented literature that engages directly with 
payments for ecosystem services is a concern for social justice.  Research that 
contributes to this segment of the literature is not satisfied by the intrinsic/extrinsic 
compatibility argument and remains unconvinced by the idea that economics is the 
solution to environmental crisis.  Following the path laid out by these social justice 
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critiques, and drawing on the theoretical framework provided by the critically-
oriented literature above, my engagement with the PES concept centers on issues of 
uneven development, the accumulation of benefits, and shifting property relations.
Conclusion
At first glance, the idea of PES seems to be a logical solution to an important 
problem.  But critical examination of PES schemes from a political ecology 
perspective reveals several concerning elements with regard to both social justice and
uneven development.  The implementation-oriented literature, however, does not 
equip scholars to explore or question such important concerns; it simply accepts the 
economic valuation of nature as favorable or inevitable and proceeds by assessing, 
evaluating, debating, and prescribing “best practices”.
As I showed above, the implementation-oriented literature often takes as its starting 
point the assumption that nature's valuation cannot be escaped.  The claim is that 
whichever way nature is used – whether it is consumed or protected – society makes 
a value judgment as to its worth.  The observation that nature is being degraded, 
despite all of the important life-sustaining functions that it has, then leads to the 
conclusion that nature must be undervalued.  From here a significant leap is then 
made to say that valuing nature in explicit monetary terms will reveal its “hidden” 
value, facilitate the internalization of positive environmental externalities, and lead to
expanded conservation.  Constrained by this framing, debates within the 
implementation-oriented literature are reduced to practical choices between market, 
non-market, and other monetary-based designs, all of which fundamentally accept the
extension of economic logic into the environmental realm.
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Understanding how valuation is linked to the uneven processes of capitalist 
development, on the other hand, requires challenging assumptions about the 
suitability of economics in guiding environmental management decisions.  As I 
explained above, the critically-oriented literature provides a framework for 
questioning such logic and, thus, I draw upon it to inform my engagement with PES 
in this thesis.  The critically-oriented segment of the literature takes as its starting 
point an understanding that capitalism is both self-contradictory in its reliance on 
nature and surprisingly adaptive under the constraints of its (capitalistically 
produced) “natural” limits.  The concept of neoliberalism captures the ideological 
breed of capitalism that is increasingly applied to the conservation of nature, even if 
it does not perfectly correspond to actually-existing practices.  Neoliberalization, I 
showed, provides a much better way of conceptualizing the phenomenon.
Within the critically-oriented literature there are several other theoretical framings – 
such as Peck's (2004) “hybrids-in-connection” and the “variegated neoliberalization” 
of Brenner et al. (2010) – but these unnecessarily complicate the infrastructure of 
analysis.  Instead of getting bogged down in conceptual equivocation, I follow 
Castree (2008a; 2008b) and appeal to an ideal-type neoliberalism, even while 
conducting my research with the understanding that I will only ever encounter 
incomplete and ever-adapting neoliberalizations.  The purpose is to open space for 
analysis guided by social and environmental justice.  Rather than re-hash debates 
over subtle differences in epistemology, I approach my research from the position 
that is shared broadly across the critically-oriented literature – that is, from the 
position that resource management is inescapably an issue of justice – and I place my
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emphasis on uncovering the “real world” implications of neoliberal ideology.
The service this provides, of course, goes beyond simple exemplification 
neoliberalism-in-action to converse with the broader literature and place my 
conceptual tools in a new light.  In demonstrating how the imperfect deployment of 
neoliberal policies does little to stem their adverse consequences, I aim to temper 
growing emphasis on the ways that PES deviates from neoliberal doctrine (e.g. 
Dempsey and Robertson 2012; Fletcher and Breitling 2012; Shapiro-Garza 2013).  
While efforts to de-reify neoliberalism (Fletcher and Breitling 2012) and illuminate 
its practical contestations (Shapiro-Garza 2013) are admirable, they direct the critical 
gaze away from pressing justice considerations at crucial junctures where neoliberal 
policies push through ostensibly non-neoliberal practices.  Rather than emphasize the
ways in which neoliberalization has failed to influence conservation policy, my 
handling of the concepts places attention on the ways it has taken root despite all of 
its apparent contradictions.  Where other authors have overlooked the material effects
of neoliberal policies, I uncover its active manifestations.  My aim is not simply to 
identify examples of neoliberalization, but rather to reveal something about the 
deceptively ambiguous way in which it operates, the way it defies classification and, 
as a result, is able to evade scrutiny.
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CHAPTER III
Methodology and Analysis Techniques
This thesis is based on a combined approach of semi-structured interviews and 
critical analysis of policy and project documents.  The primary group of documents 
analyzed were those associated with two World Bank projects targeted at Costa 
Rica's PSA, but also included are those produced by FONAFIFO, its agents, and 
consultants (see figure 3.1).  A total of 41 interviews with 33 people were conducted, 
in person and via Skype, during a 5 month period at the end of 2011 and beginning of
2012 (see figure 3.3).14  They included key figures in the administration, operation, 
and policy formulation, such as government officials, development specialists, 
forestry engineers, landowners, and organization representatives from institutions 
such as FONAFIFO, the World Bank, Colegio de Ingenieros Agronomos, Instituto 
Tecnológico de Costa Rica, FUNDECOR, Conservation International, ASANA, 
ASIREA, ATAL, CEDARENA, and IngeoFor (see figures 3.2 and 3.3).
This work draws on over 10 years of contact with Costa Rican conservation and 
environmentalism, in both academic and professional capacities.  I have traveled to 
Costa Rica on eight separate occasions as a student, a teaching assistant, a volunteer, 
a tour coordinator, and a researcher (Masters and PhD).  During that time I have 
established contacts in local communities, non-governmental conservation networks, 
the National Park Service, the Ministry of Environment, the private tourism industry, 
and at four Costa Rican universities.
14 This entails 34 formal and 7 informal interviews.  Of these 41, eight were “call back” interviews 
with key figures, resulting in N=33.
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In this chapter, I discuss my methodological and analytical approach.  The purpose is 
to lay out my theoretical stance on information gathering, detail the specific 
techniques I used for data collection, and explain how that information was analyzed.
First, I engage with several of the broader methodological philosophies for the 
research that was undertaken.  Then I outline my approach to the field and my 
techniques for gathering information, providing specific details on the methods 
employed.  This includes detail on the the selection and analysis of textual materials, 
techniques for interviewing and analyzing audio data, an explanation of the role of 
observation, and a discussion of ethical considerations.  Finally, I will also explain 
why the analysis techniques employed are the most suitable for the type of research 
that is being conducted.
Methodological Framework
My stance on information gathering is rooted in a perspective that understands 
knowledge as unavoidably mediated by culture and social relations.  Regardless of 
whether or not “truth” exists outside of human perception, it is never possible to 
access it directly (even by applying supposed “unbiased” methods that isolate the 
researcher from “contaminating” data).  This is not, however, to embrace a form of 
relativism and claim that all methodological approaches therefore stand on equal 
footing.  As Proctor explains, “some (social) explanations are more adequate 
representations of reality than others”, even if “all are … always 'partial truths'” 
(1998, 361).  While accepting that there are differing accuracies in the representation 
of “truth”, I remain firm on the human inability to “really know”.  This position has 
reaching implications with regard to my approach to information gathering.
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Concerning human sources, for instance, I recognize that no method of collecting 
information can afford a direct window into the “inner being” of the subjects – 
nothing can reveal the underlying truth about who the people are.  In an interview, for
example, subjects choose how they represent themselves and the world around them, 
carefully crafting a message about what they want the interviewer to know.  What is 
articulated in an interview is largely a reflection of the relationship between 
interviewee and interviewer, rather than a reflection of true identity.  I do not, 
however, interpret this as somehow concealing the reality of the situation.  Rather, I 
understand it as an important process of articulating identity.  It is not as though the 
information a respondent communicates is completely irrelevant or unrepresentative 
of who they are.  I interpret the interview process as an individual's construction of 
identity in relation to me, as the researcher.  For this reason, it is essential to be aware
of and to reflect upon how my identity is at play (Rose 1997).  The relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee is something that must be factored into analysis,
but I do not view it as something that confounds access to “truth”.  The “truth” is 
always right there; identity can not be faked.  Even an outright lie is indicative of 
some characteristic of the respondent's identity, in relation to me.  The problem of 
interpreting information collected in an interview, then, becomes one of 
understanding how an interviewee relates to me, and why.
There are, of course, an array of methods for collecting information from human 
subjects that is much broader than just interviews.  Silverman (2007), for example, 
questions the assumption that interviews should be the default method of qualitative 
research.  He argues that too often “researchers prefer to 'manufacture' their data 
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rather than to 'find' it” (2007, 37), which is a somewhat provocative way of saying 
that researchers neglect rich sources of information, opting instead to set up 
interviews that, too often, produce contrived responses to predetermined research 
questions.  Part of the problem, he explains, is “the conventional assumption … that 
interviews give us direct access to people's perceptions” and that other techniques 
merely serve to test “if such perceptions and meanings are 'distorted'” (2007, 51).  
One key source of information that Silverman identifies as neglected by qualitative 
researchers is observations.  Instead of intervening, a researcher can watch what 
subjects do in their “natural” settings, interpreting the meaning of actions and what 
they say about who the person is and what they believe.  This is especially useful in 
situations where the identity of the researcher is particularly influential of the 
subjects actions (i.e. when the subject wishes to represent things in a particular way 
for political purposes).  Additionally, textual sources of information can serve as a 
record of culture, reflecting the identities and perceptions of the people or 
organizations who created them.
A methodology that uses a single approach (i.e. interviews or observations or textual 
analysis) risks overlooking important aspects of the subject being researched and 
missing the broader picture of the situation on the ground.  For this reason, I am 
integrating all three into my technique for gathering information.  The hope is that 





Textual materials documenting the conception, implementation, and evolution of the 
PSA are abundant.  Costa Rica, being one of the first to implement such a scheme, 
has received a great deal of attention from conservation and development 
organizations.  As a result, the scheme is extensively documented in agency reports, 
assessments by non-governmental organizations, institutional and legal documents, 
interest group publications, and periodicals, as well as in written histories of 
conservation.
The primary set of documents analyzed for this research are those associated with 
two World Bank projects:  the Ecomarkets Project and the follow-on Mainstreaming 
Market-based Instruments for Environmental Management Project (MMBI), 
frequently referred to as Ecomarkets II.  These projects constitute the World Bank's 
intervention to Costa Rica's national program, and they represent how the institution 
has attempted to influence and direct the program's trajectory.  Of all the actors with 
an interest in Costa Rica's PSA, the World Bank is by far the most influential, since 
much of the program's funds are tied to World Bank financing and there are close 
personal relationships between Bank agents and the management at FONAFIFO.
The World Bank project documents articulate clear objectives that have played an 
important role in the program's trend towards more neoliberal forms of governance.  
In my analysis, I considered the entirety of the documents made publicly available by
the Bank for these two projects.  Those that are the most important to this analysis 
are the two Project Appraisal Documents for the Ecomarkets and MMBI projects 
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(World Bank 2000a; World Bank 2006), the Implementation Completion and Results 
Report for Ecomarkets (World Bank 2007), the Project Restructuring Document for 
MMBI (World Bank 2012a), and a series of Implementation Status and Results 
Reports for MMBI (World Bank 2011a, 2011b, 2012b, 2012c).  See figure 3.1 for a 
complete accounting of the documents consulted.
My requests for access to other internal World Bank documents stalled in the Bank's 
review process.  In hope of attaining a fuller picture of reasoning, motivations, 
strategy, politics, debates, and ideologies, I placed a request with the Bank archivist 
for access to internal memos, meeting minutes, reports, and any other associated 
materials.  After delays and repeated requests, I was informed that such requests for 
recent and ongoing projects was unusual and would require a lengthy review process 
before they could be released.  Nothing has yet been received.
The second, equally important, set of documents are those that have been produced 
by FONAFIFO, its agents, and consultants.  As the Costa Rican agency responsible 
for implementing the PSA program, FONAFIFO produces many reports and studies 
that have documented the program's evolution (and neoliberalization) over time.  
These include a report that articulated an important early vision for the program, 
authored by FONAFIFO's PSA Chief and a consultant (Sage and Sánchez 2002); a 
report on the social and environmental impact of the PSA in the Huetar Norte region, 
produced by FONAFIFO's lead consultant (Ortiz 2011); a paper that promotes the 
Costa Rican strategy, authored by FONAFIFO's Executive Director (Rodríguez 
2003); a paper that recounts the Costa Rican experience with the payments scheme, 
authored by FONAFIFO's Executive Director and Natural Resources Management 
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Coordinator (Rodríguez and Sáenz 2002); an assessment of FONAFIFO's first 
decade of existence (FONAFIFO 2005); and various periodic reports on enrollment, 
contract distributions, payment levels, and financing (FONAFIFO 2010; FONAFIFO
2011a; FONAFIFO 2011b; FONAFIFO 2011c; FONAFIFO 2011d; FONAFIFO 
2011e; FONAFIFO 2011f; FONAFIFO 2012).
A third set of documents considered are those connected to various legal and policy 
actions relevant to the PSA.  They include the actual forest legislation (Ley Forestal 
7575; Ley Forestal 7174; Ley Forestal 7032; Ley Forestal 4465), the executive 
decrees that concern implementation (MINAET 2013; MINAET 2012; MINAET 
2011; MINAET 2010; MINAET 2009; MINAET 2008), the operations manuals 
issued to regentes (MINAET 2010b; MINAET 2009b; MINAET 2008b; MINAET 
2007b), and documents that concern important shifts in policy such as the Canon de 
Agua (MINAE 2006).  I also reviewed documents from other governmental agencies 
that are relevant to the PSA.  These include a report by the Ministerio de 
Planificación Nacional y Política Económica on the Social Development Index 
(MIDEPLAN 2007), which is used in the PSA's prioritization scheme, and the 
National Forest Development Plan (MINAET 2011b).
Finally, a fourth set of documents are those produced by non-governmental 
organizations and professional associations that are integral to the PSA's operation 
and evolution.  They include reports produced by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (Watson et al. 1998; Rojas and Aylward 2003; Porras 
and Neves 2006; Porras 2010; Miranda et al. 2004; Miranda et al. 2003; Hope et al. 
2007) and by Conservation International, authored in part by former Costa Rican 
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Environment Minister, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez (CI 2011).  These also include 
documents from the Colegio de Ingenieros Agronomos that concern compensation 
rates for regentes (Colegio 2011a; Colegio 2011b).
The primary method that I used to locate these sources was to trace citations, 
beginning with other academic works.  Looking at what materials were referenced in 
academic sources concerned with the PSA helped to identify key agencies and 
interest groups involved in the conception and implementation of the program.  Once
they were identified, I was able to broaden my search from previously cited materials
to other documents those agencies and interest groups had produced and to other 
institutions with which they are affiliated.  Abundant original material was located in 
this way.  For instance, Pagiola (2008) was the initial publication that revealed the 
deep involvement of the World Bank in the PSA.  I was then able to identify the 
many World Bank project documents identified above that are associated with their 
involvement.  Also Sierra and Russman (2006), for example, reference a document 
produced by the IIED (Rojas and Aylward 2003).  The IIED website, then, led me to 
several more of their reports and assessments of the PSA, most of which have never 
been analyzed in the academic literature.
A secondary method that I employed to locate these materials was to examine the 
links between various actors that have played key roles in development of the PSA.  I
identified the documents produced by Conservation International, for example, by 
tracking the associations of one of the most central figures in Costa Rican PES, 
Carlos Manual Rodriguez.  Rodriguez was central to the formation of the PSA from 
its inception – as a member of the Legislative Assembly's Special Forestry 
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Commission, as Vice-Minister of Environment, and as Minister of Environment.  
Now, as a Vice President of Conservation International (CI), he is a driving force 
behind the organization's prominence in promoting PES around the world.  Through 
these associations, I identified a document (CI 2011) proposing collaboration 
between CI and the government of Costa Rica that is integral to understanding recent
policy shifts on hydrological services.
Analysis Techniques
I applied the techniques of critical discourse analysis to these materials in order to 
draw out the information related to the themes of my research.  This required, of 
course, understanding the position of the institutions and individuals producing each 
document as well as the position of the bodies funding the study, as the information 
they present is inevitably oriented towards their objectives (e.g. development, 
conservation, social justice, a combination).  The importance of this for me is in what
these documents record about how the concept of “making payments” has been 
understood over time and how the present day scheme has come to be.  These 
documents provide a record of important contextual information and factors 
motivating actions.
Figure 3.1, below, shows the documents arranged analytically, reflecting the way in 
which they were handled.  They are grouped by their utility to my research.  They are
split, first, into policy documents and technical documents.  The policy documents 
contain information about program objectives, strategies, practices, and impacts, 
while the technical documents are considerably more “objective” and data-oriented.15
15 This should not be taken to suggest that the technical documents are strictly reporting unbiased 
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These two groups are further sub-divided.  The former is broken into “policy vision 
documents”, “policy context documents”, and “policy assessment documents”, which
lay out what various actors would like to achieve through the PSA, review the 
conditions and circumstances in which the PSA was implemented, and report the 
effects and outcomes of ongoing and completed efforts, respectively.  The technical 
documents contain data about program participation and financing, operational 




These documents lay out what various actors would like to acheive and the steps that they plan to 
take to acheive them.
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Explains the continuing vision the 
World Bank has for Costa Rica's PSA. 
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term adjustments to 
the MMBI project.
Reviews the project status, explains 
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and World Bank's 
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conservation support 
project.
Explains the early vision the GEF and 
World Bank had for conservation-
development in Costa Rica.
factual information.  All knowledge is situated, and what is reported inevitably reflects the position
of the people and institutions that produced it (Rose 1997).  Indeed, what the reported data says 
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should support environmentally related 
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coming decade.
Strengthening the 
Water Payments for 
the Environmental 







for strengthening the 
water payments 
scheme.
Lays out the vision for cooperation 
between FONAFIFO and CI on 
activities relating to hydrological 
services.
Policy Context Documents
These documents review conditions and circumstances in which the PSA was implemented.
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World Bank report on 
Costa Rica's forest 
sector.
A pre-PSA Bank document concerning 
forest management and development in 
Costa Rica. Provides context for the 
World Bank's involvement in Costa 
Rican forest activities.
“Costa Rica: Forest 
Strategy and the 
Evolution of Land 
Use”
de Camino et al.
2000
World Bank report on 
Costa Rica's PSA.
Provides an overview of World Bank 
involvment in Costa Rican forestry from
the Bank's perspective.
Making Space for 
Better Forestry
Watson et al. 
1998
IIED's review of forest
conservation policy in 
Costa Rica.
Provides context at the very start of the 
PSA. Shows an institution in transition.
Policy Assessment Documents
These documents review the acheivements, effects, and outcomes of projects that completed or 
ongoing.
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Ecomarkets project.
Reiterates the vision the World Bank has
for Costa Rica's PSA. Assesses how 
well its objectives were acheived. 




Sills et al. 2005
World Bank 
commissioned 
external review of the 
Ecomarkets project.
Carried out by an external (non-Bank) 
panel. Assesses how well objectives 
were achieved and the effect of the 
project on the PSA.
MMBI 
Implementation 




MMBI project status 
report.
Provides a mid-term assessment of the 
project's status and explains delays.
MMBI 
Implementation 




MMBI project status 
report.
Provides a mid-term assessment of the 
project's status and explains delays.
MMBI 
Implementation 




MMBI project status 
report.
Provides a mid-term assessment of the 
project's status and explains delays.
MMBI 
Implementation 




MMBI project status 
report.
Provides a mid-term assessment of the 










Official World Bank 




Reiterates the early vision the GEF and 
World Bank had for conservation-
development in Costa Rica. Assesses 
how well its objectives were acheived. 
Presents the "lessons learned".






Assesses the social and environmental 
impact of the PSA in the Huetar Norte 
region. Reveals FONAFIFO's 
interpretation "social impact"









Provides insight on how FONAFIFO 
views its own forest activities.





Recounts the Costa 
Rican experience with







Provides insight on how FONAFIFO 
views its own forest activities.







Thorough review of FONAFIFO's 
activities, achievements, and outcomes. 
Provides insight on how FONAFIFO 
views its own activities.









IIED's review of PSA 
markets.
Provides an assessment of the PSA's 
experiments with developing markets 
for ecosystem services.
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Costa Rica's PSA - 
A Financial 






IIED's review of the 
PSA in the context of 
markets for watershed 
services.
Assesses the development of markets 
under the PSA.
Fair and Green? Porras 2010
IIED's review of the 
social implications of 
the PSA.
Assesses the social impacts and equity 
implications of the PSA
The Social Impacts 
of Carbon Markets 
in Costa Rica
Miranda et al. 
2004
IIED's review of 
carbon markets in the 
Huetar Norte region of
Costa Rica.
Assesses the social impacts of carbon 
markets under the PSA.
The Social Impacts 
of Payments for 
Environmental 
Services in Costa 
Rica
Miranda et al. 
2003
IIED's review of the 
PSA's impact in the 
Virilla watershed.
Assesses the social impacts of the PSA.
Negotiating 
Watershed Services
Hope et al. 
2007
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These documents specify the legal frameworks in which the PSA is being carried out.
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which the PSA was built.
Canon de Agua MINAE 2006
Canon de Agua - 
establishes the water 
tariff and articulates 
regulations
Specifies the legal changes to program 




These are technical documents that present operational guidelines.
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Documentation of the year-to-year 
program practices.
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Regente Fees Colegio 2011a
Sets compensation 
rates for regente visits
Reveals how the professional 





rates for regente visits
Reveals how the professional 
association represents its regentes.
Participation Data
These documents present participation and financing data.
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region.





Presents all of the 
institutions that have 
agreements with 
FONAFIFO.
Provides an understanding of program 
activity.
Figure 3.1:  Textual Sources
With the documents classified by type and issue, the task of identifying key themes, 
strategies, and actions was greatly simplified and could be carried out in a systematic 
fashion.  Within the policy vision documents, for example, I was able to identify 
themes such as market-based and user financing that cut across the discourses of 
various agencies.  I contrasted varying visions, practices, and policies and identified 
their origin by tracing their propagation through the documents.
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These documents, of course, are not an exhaustive source of the information relevant 
to understanding the neoliberalization of Costa Rica's PSA.  I filled the remaining 
gaps from this textual analysis by way of interviews in the field portion of this 
research.  Having gained a firm grasp of the politics, history, and context of the PSA 
through the review of these materials, I was well-prepared to target key individuals in
the field that held the remaining specialized knowledge to develop a fuller picture of 
the evolving policy landscape.
Interviews
Methods
As with the textual sources, the primary method for identifying key actors in the field
was to trace them from the documented evidence.  My first step was to map the 
institutional relationships that are most central to the PSA.  I was then able to expand 
the map with connections to other important bodies (see figure 3.2).16  While this is, 
by no means, an exhaustive mapping of the players involved or of the connections 
between them, it represents several of the most important ones and those that I 
considered in this study.  As depicted in figure 3.2, there are certain institutions 
(FONAFIFO, the World Bank, and MINAET) that exist within the inner-most sphere 
of influence.  They connect outward to various other organizations in a variety of 
capacities.
16 This is, by no means, an exhaustive mapping of the players involved or of the connections between
them.  It simply represents the institutions and relations that I considered.
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Figure 3.2:  Map of Connections
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The World Bank is placed inside of the inner-most sphere because of the unique 
relationship it has to the program, afforded by the substantial financing that it 
provides.  Given that this relationship is of particular interest to my research, I 
interviewed a number of individuals that have been involved in the Bank projects.  I 
also used project documents to identify other organizations tied to the Bank's 
activities.  ASANA and ASIREA, for example, received institutional development 
funds and provided consulting to the Bank under the Ecomarkets project.  As such, I 
sought interviews with representatives at each organization to better understand the 
nature of the relationship and the activities undertaken.  Additionally, I identified 
CEDARENA and Conservation International as collaborating with the Bank and 
FONAFIFO on an MMBI sponsored effort to establish a Biodiversity Trust Fund.  
See Appendix 1 for an index and description of each of the organizations included in 
the interview portion of my research.
Using the documents produced by FONAFIFO, I identified connections to the 
Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica (or simply “Tec”), whose instructors frequently 
act as consultants to the agency.  Interviews with representatives at Tec afforded 
insight into the institutional relationships behind PSA contracting and the regente 
profession.  This drew my attention to the role of the Colegio de Ingenieros 
Agronomos in advocating the interests of professional regentes.  Through connections
at the Colegio, I then made further contacts to regentes and a private forestry 
engineering firm, IngeoFor.  Using this “snowball” method, I was able to make 
connections to key figures that were well positioned to address the questions that I 
had.
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A secondary method, in which I traced associations between individual actors 
associated with key developments in the PSA's history, was used to identify further 
institutions and contacts.  This led me, for example, to contacts at FUNDECOR and, 
again, at Conservation International, as individuals at each of these organizations 
were instrumental in important developments of the program.
The roles that these institutions play in Costa Rica's PSA are diverse and 
multifaceted.  They include the provision of contracting services, policy innovation 
and experimentation, policy implementation, program assessment and research, and 
program governance.  Appendix 2 contains a classification of institutions by role, 
which I used to understand their relationships to other institutions and inform my 
questioning in the interviews.  In all, I conducted 41 interviews with 33 people.  
Eight “call back” interviews were carried out with key figures in particularly 
important positions.  Thirty four of the interviews were conducted formally with a 
semi-structured format.  The remaining 7 were informal, carried out, for example, at 
a high level meeting of PSA officials and on PSA forest site visits.  Figure 3.3 
contains a list of the individuals interviewed.
Interviewee Affiliation Individual's Role Institution's Role
Jane Segleau ASIREA Manager, Regente ASIREA is a registered Costa Rican NGO
that provides regente services. The 
organization received support under the 
World Bank projects for their contracting 
activities.
Jose Gonzalez ASIREA Regente
Roberto Salas ASIREA Regente
Jack Ewing ASANA President ASANA is a registered Costa Rican NGO 
that works to ensure conservation of a 
regional biological corridor.  The 
organization previously received support 
under the World Bank's Ecomarkets 
project to coordinate local contracting 
activities.
Steve Stroud ASANA Founder
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Interviewee Affiliation Individual's Role Institution's Role
Andrea Herrera CEDARENA Regente CEDARENA is an NGO that is involved 
in several conservation activities, 
including the PSA.  The organization has 
been working with the World Bank, 
FONAFIFO, and Conservation 
International in development of the PSA's 
Biodiversity Trust Fund.
Igor Zuñiga IngeoFor Regente IngeoFor is a private environmental 
engineering company.  It provides regente 





Regente The Talamanca Caribe Biological 
Corridor Association is an NGO that 
promotes the sustainable management of 
natural resources in the southern 
Caribbean region of Costa Rica.
Stefano Pagiola World Bank Senior Economist The World Bank is a development 
organization that provides loans and 
grants to governments for development 
projects.  It's stated objective is poverty 
reduction.  The Bank's involvement in 
Costa Rica's PSA takes the form of two 
projects:  “Ecomarkets” and 
“Mainstreaming Market-Based 











George Ledec World Bank Lead Ecologist
Dinesh Aryal World Bank Operations Analyst
Nadim Khouri World Bank Task Team Leader
(MMBI Project
Appraisal)
Gunars Platais World Bank Task Team Leader
(MMBI)











Conservation International is a prominent 
NGO that has embraced the use of PES in 
its activities.  MINAE is the government 
ministry responsible for environment and 









The Technological Institute of Costa Rica 
is one of two educational institutions that 
trains regentes.
Oscar Sanchez FONAFIFO PSA Chief FONAFIFO is the quasi-autonomous 




FONAFIFO Head of Limon
Regional Office
Luis Gonzales Colegio de
Ingenieros
Agronomos
Forestry Lawyer The Colegio is the professional 
association responsible for licensing 
regentes and advocating for their interests.
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Interviewee Affiliation Individual's Role Institution's Role
They establish minimum rates that 










FUNDECOR Executive Director FUNDECOR is a Costa Rican based 
international NGO.  The organization was 
instrumental in developing Costa Rica's 
PSA and has continued to be involved.  
FUNDECOR has played a unique role in 
assisting FONAFIFO to develop 










The IIED is a non-profit development 
organization that has conducted several 
studies of Costa Rica's PSA, several of 
which concern the social and 
distributional impacts of the program.
Alberto Herrera Unaffiliated Conservationist Alberto is a plant ecologist and has been 
involved in Costa Rican conservation for 
many years.




Unaffiliated Regente Christian is a licensed independent 
regente.  He was previously contracted by 
ASANA to coordinate PSA enrollment 
during that organization's involvement 
with the World Bank.
Giovanni
Matamoros
Unaffiliated Participant Giovanni is a private landowner currently 
enrolled in the PSA under the agroforestry
modality.
Leiner Vargas UNA / CINPE Professor The Centro Internacional de Politicas 
Economicas (CINPE) is a research 




UNA / CINPE Researcher
Confidential
Informant #1




FONAFIFO Consultant FONAFIFO is the quasi-autonomous 




ATAL17 Regente ATAL (a pseudonym) is an NGO that 
promotes conservation and provides 
regente services.
Figure 3.3:  Interview Dataset
Analysis Techniques
Conventional approaches to interview analysis typically utilize direct transcription – 
17 “ATAL” is a pseudonym to protect the identify and reputation of those associated with it.  Specific 
names and descriptive characteristics have been fictionalized to ensure anonymity.
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that is, the conversion of audio data into textual data – so that it may be coded and 
analyzed more rigorously.  However, this conversion of data from a dynamic form 
into a static form results in the loss of information that is routinely discerned in the 
interpretation of spoken word.  Even when efforts are taken to record this information
(e.g. through standardized symbols for hesitations, pauses, and false starts, or by 
noting tone and other verbal cues), the textual version will never perfectly represent 
the original audio.  Humans have the ability to decipher meaning on many more 
levels than could ever be recorded in text.
Furthermore, if the original intention of direct transcription was to allow for non-
linear analysis and the emergence of themes across interviews and interviewees, 
advancements in technology have made this intermediate step obsolete.  In the past, 
recording was done using metallic tape, and review required laborious and imprecise 
cuing to evaluate non-sequential segments.  The linearity of this process complicated 
workflows and made direct analysis of audio impractical.  Today, however, 
recordings are digital, and clip indexing has been reduced to a matter of a few 
keystrokes.  High-tech software packages such as Nvivo now even allow direct 
coding of audio clips.
For these reasons, my preference is to work directly with the audio data, instead of 
using transcribed textual data.  In order to do so, I devised an audio analysis 
workflow that is based on the use of what I am calling “annotation” as an 
intermediate step to coding.  These annotations constituted my first analysis of the 
audio data and included the initial indexing and coding phase.  It was done linearly, 
and effectively created a “road map” of my audio files.  The product of this allowed 
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me to then proceed with coded analysis of clips in a non-linear fashion, using the 
annotations as a guide for further data analysis.  Timestamps on the annotations 
allowed me to then bookmark the audio file for immediate on-demand cuing of clips 
for subsequent review.  At each index, an annotation comprising the topic of 
conversation, question posed, response given, analytical interpretation, and other 
pertinent information was attached so that the content of the clip could be considered 
textually.
After the entirety of the interview recordings was indexed and annotated, I performed
a review of the textual annotation sheets for a second phase of coding.  Having 
gained a clearer view of my dataset during the first complete review of the audio, I 
was able to refine and consolidate my coding.  I used topical, thematic, and 
dispositional coding categories to classify the various segments of the interviews 
under an array of codes.  They are included below in figure 3.4.  Multiple codes, in 
most cases, were attached to each annotation.
Once this phase was complete, each code corresponded to a group of annotations that
were related by a particular theme, topic, or respondent disposition.  This allowed for
connections to be drawn between interviews and for themes, trends, and ideas that 
were unanticipated to become evident.  Unlike coded analysis of transcripts, 
however, each annotation linked back to an audio clip so that the original data could 
be considered directly.  This allowed me to, for example, consider all the audio clips 
coded with “marketization” and “emphatic” alongside those coded with 
“marketization” and “dismissive” or “marketization” and “pragmatic”, helping to 
















































































Figure 3.4:  Category Codes
interview data proceeded in this way as I sought to understand the interconnections, 
tensions, and views of those I had interviewed.
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Observation
A third technique that I employed to gather information in this study was participant 
observation.  While this method is typically associated with ethnographic studies that
require lengthy field stays, I use it in a secondary way to supplement the data that has
been collected in the ways described above.  I incorporate several revealing 
encounters that have occurred during my time in Costa Rica, and I draw on them to 
inform the claims that I make.  Specifically, I employed observation techniques in 
three scenarios:  while accompanying a regente and a representative from 
FONAFIFO on an inspection of enrolled lands, while attending a high-level meeting 
of PSA officials, and in everyday interactions in local communities.
My visit to a PSA forest site provided a unique opportunity to observe the 
interactions between landowners, regentes, and FONAFIFO.  The format, of course, 
did not lend itself to conducting formal interviews.  While I did conduct some 
informal questioning, the real value of this experience was in observing the 
interactions taking place and interpreting their meaning within the context of the 
activity being performed.  This presented a revealing view of shifting social relations 
and practices as several relationship categories established by the PSA were acted 
out.  In this scenario, the landowner was being audited by the regente to ensure that 
he had been compliant with the contract he had signed (that trees had been planted, 
signs had been posted, and management procedures were being followed).  
Simultaneously, the regente was also being audited by FONAFIFO to verify the 
integrity of the reports he had been filing.  Finally, the landowner and FONAFIFO 
official were performing the conditional transaction between “buyer” and “seller”.  
The interactions between these individuals speak volumes about about shifting 
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management, control, and reward schemes that are embodied in the PSA, affording 
me an important view of the program's social and material effects.
Figure 3.5:  Inspection of enrolled land.
(Agent of FONAFIFO, landowner, regente)
The situation was similar, in terms of the constraints on my ability to conduct formal 
interviews, at the meeting of PSA officials that I was able to attend.  While I was able
to arrange some follow-up interviews at this meeting, the real value of the meeting 
itself was in observing and interpreting the interactions taking place.  This included 
discussions regarding plans for adapting the PSA to forthcoming REDD+ policies, 
reports evaluating the social dimensions of current practice, and announcements 
about actions taken by the Comptroller General that relate to the program.  Present at 
the meeting were officials responsible for implementation and management of the 
PSA, officials from other governmental departments (such as the AyA, CNFL, and 
MINAE) whose activities concern the PSA, and representatives from several 
organizations, including CATIE, NINA, and IIED.
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The third setting in which I employed participant observation techniques was in the 
everyday life of ordinary Costa Ricans.  This has proven critically important to my 
understanding of the PSA and its effects.  For this I was able to draw on my more-
than-a-decade of experience in Costa Rica.  In particular, a nuanced understanding of 
cultural practices and social norms concerning property helped me to make sense of 
PSA-induced “privatization”.  Observations that I made of how Costa Ricans 
navigate the (flexible) boundaries around private possessions informs my 
understanding of shifting patterns of access to land and resources.  Specifically, this 
draws on a revealing encounter that I had with a Costa Rican colleague and an 
unattended vehicle.  The encounter and its utility is explained in detail in chapter 7.
Notes and Records
Each of the methods employed in this study required its own form of note-taking and 
record-making.  For observations, the primary means of doing so was through written
field notes.  I carried a notepad with me at all times and recorded events as quickly as
possible after they had taken place.  In addition, I took time at the end of each day to 
review those notes, reflect on them, and record additional thoughts.  This process 
served not only to fill the gaps that remained at the end of the day, but also to re-
center my focus and prepare me for the following day's data collection.
For the interviews, digital audio recording was the obvious best choice.  Audio 
recording greatly simplified the note taking process during the interview and allowed
me to remain engaged with the interviewee.  This freed me to devote greater attention
to things such as expression, gestures, and posture.  Written notes, however, still 
99
supplemented the audio in interview settings as it allowed me to record important 
information about context, environment, and non-verbal communication.  As with 
notes taken of my participant observations, I reflected on my interview records on a 
nightly basis and recorded additional thoughts.  These included initial impressions, 
evolving understandings, and new/unanswered questions.  Again, these reflections 
were useful not only for recording what occurred on a daily basis, but for processing 
and synthesizing the new information to which I had been exposed.  It constituted an 
on-going process of analysis and evaluation and was central to my data collection 
methods.
Ethical Considerations
Research that includes human subjects has many ethical concerns surrounding the 
issue of data protection, as well as representing others' views.  Both notes and audio 
records have the potential to contain sensitive or private information, including that 
which may not obviously appear to be such.  For that reason, all recordings and notes
have been kept secure and private.  Disclosures of personal communications and 
information within this thesis have been done in accordance with the ethical 
guidelines outlined below and with informed consent of my research participants.
In my case, I am dealing with political matters that are potentially sensitive for 
individuals, their careers, and their institutions.  The characterizations that I put 
forward and the arguments that I make will represent various actors in ways that 
reflect my perceptions.  My evaluations will not necessarily correspond perfectly to 
the way in which an individual might represent matters him- or herself (even if that 
were my objective).  While I intend to protect my research participants by not 
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divulging information that is sensitive or has the potential to put them at risk, I 
cannot always be certain I will know what material could cause harm.  For that 
reason, I decided against covert data collection and provided full disclosure of my 
research activities – specifically, I explained the general themes and intent of my 
research and obtained consent to use interview data from every subject involved.  A 
sample of the consent form that was used is included in Appendix 3.  The form 
detailed my activities, explained their rights, and requested their involvement.  It also
explained that, by agreeing to participate, they were allowing me to divulge the 
material discussed, but that they retained the right to withdraw at anytime.  The form 
also asked participants to indicate whether or not they agreed to participate, whether 
or not they would like to have their identity concealed, and whether or not they 
required review of the material.
With regard to observations, it may not always have been clear to subjects when I 
was in “researcher mode”.  For this reason, permission to utilize observations was 
sought at a later time.  In situations where observations were made in public settings 




A History of Costa Rican Conservation and
the Emergence of Payments for Ecosystem Services
Costa Rica is now world famous for environmental conservation.  It has become a 
pioneer in conservation policy and a testing ground for experimental new concepts.  
Indeed, “ecosystem services” became the foundation of Costa Rican forest policy in 
1996, a full year before Daily's (1997) seminal framework and nearly a decade before
the concept settled into the mainstream global policy arena with the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005).  The country's leading role in conservation is the 
product of a unique social, natural, political, and economic history, in which Costa 
Rica has not always featured as the greatest environmental steward.  In the pages that
follow, I will detail Costa Rica's conservation and development history, placing 
particular emphasis on its well-known and widely studied Payments for 
Environmental Services (PSA) scheme.  The purpose is to provide context for a 
discussion of the current efforts to bring about neoliberal reform of the program.
In this chapter I detail the historical conditions that gave rise to the PSA program.  I 
begin with the period prior to Costa Rica's ecological fame in which the country held 
a contradictory reputation for extensive environmental devastation.  Then I present 
the emergent state-centered conservation of public lands and period of direct 
incentives for “responsible management” of forests on private lands.  Following that, 
I explain the various internal and external pressures for change in private forestry, 
and I provide an account of Costa Rica's new economically-oriented approach to 
conservation-development.  In the final sections I turn to the PSA specifically, to 
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Figure 4.1
Public service announcement reminds Costa Ricans what it takes to maintain their reputation for
progressive environmentalism:  “Think of an idea to improve our world and put it into practice!”
explain the vision that various factions had for the program and to summarize how 
things have played out on the ground in early practice.  I explain that the vision laid 
down by program architects was solidly in line with neoliberal ideals, but that early 
PSA practice has failed to realize many of their objectives.  This will set the stage for 
Part II of this thesis, in which I address the onset of neoliberalization and explore the 
social and ecological consequences of it.
Before Ecological Fame
The international reputation that Costa Rica enjoys with regard to environmental 
conservation today is rather remarkable and fairly surprising given the country's 
historical record.  Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time that Costa Rica was 
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creating one of the most extensive systems of parks and protected areas in the world, 
it was also experiencing one of the highest rates of deforestation domestically (Evans
1999).  Until recently, Costa Rica's economic system was heavily based on 
agricultural production, and land use policies were designed to encourage those 
activities.  Export-oriented production of coffee, bananas, beef, timber, palm oil, and 
other crops drove the conversion of forest into plantations, pastures, and farmlands.  
And Costa Rican forests rapidly declined.  In just 40 years, forest cover went from 
90% to an alarming 25% (Evans 1999, 40), with barely any old-growth forest 
remaining on private lands.
Costa Rica's “first wave of deforestation” began with coffee production, shortly after 
gaining independence from Spain in 1821 (Carriere 1991).  The country had been one
of the poorest Spanish colonies, and the political focus during this era was on 
emerging from colonial poverty through agricultural development (Wilson 1998).  
The cooler climates of the mountainous Central Valley provided ideal conditions for 
coffee production, and settlers eagerly removed forest to expand production.  At this 
stage, however, the impact remained quite limited, as population was low, about 
60,000 in the 1820s, and concentrated, occupying only two percent of the landmass 
(Wilson 1998, 25).  Nevertheless, it was significant in terms of being the first time in 
Costa Rican history that the systematic conversion of forest was linked to economic 
growth and driven by external demand for goods (Evans 1999, 35).
Costa Rica's second major export-crop, bananas, was vastly more devastating to 
forests than coffee had been.  The banana industry, which has been called the 
“accidental by-product of the government's attempts to facilitate the exportation of 
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coffee” (Wilson 1998, 26), grew out of a deal with U.S. railroad tycoon Minor C. 
Keith to build a freight line from the Central Valley to the port city of Limón in 1883.
In exchange for construction of the railroad, Keith's company was given a truly 
enormous land grant – nearly 7 percent of the national landmass – on a 99 year lease. 
In order to defray the costs of building the railroad, Keith began to grow and export 
bananas through his Tropical Trading Company, predecessor to the infamous United 
Fruit Company (Wilson 1998).  Development of the banana industry came at an 
extreme environmental cost, as it drove more widespread and rapid landscape 
conversion, particularly because the productive life of a banana field is generally 
about seven years (Evans 1999).  Disease plagued monocultural banana production in
Costa Rica, rendering soil infertile and driving the continual need to clear forest for 
new plantation land.  In the late 1800s and for most of the 1900s, forest was viewed 
as a barrier to development, and management was based more on a concern for “a 
good return on … investment than in ecologically sensible agriculture” (Evans 1999, 
36).
Each time disease struck the banana plantations, producers shifted their operations 
and fields were abandoned.  Often plantation workers, most of whom had been 
imported from afar, were simply left behind (Wilson 1998).  The popular reading of 
this is that these workers constituted a lasting threat to landscape ecology.  As Evans 
puts it, “when the plantations were abandoned, … banana workers flocked to the 
countryside to settle, farm, and eke out a living in the forest” (1999, 37).  While 
banana production is seen as having been a serious but temporary threat to the 
environment, campesino colonization is viewed as an equally serious but persistent 
threat.  The rural poor “have been widely projected as the main culprits in [Costa 
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Rica's] rapid deforestation” (Vivanco 2003, 65).  This image of campesinos as 
“destroyers of nature”, however, is rather problematic.  The idea that they were (or 
still are) at the root of environmental degradation overlooks the broader political 
circumstances in which economic policy has encouraged the expansion of export-
oriented agricultural development, and it overlooks historical conditions in which 
possession of land was only legally recognized if it had been “improved” (i.e. cleared
of forest and brought into production).  The 1961 Law of Lands and Colonization, for
example, went as far as to impose sanctions on landowners with uncultivated lands 
(Evans 1999, 42), impelling rural settlers to be conspicuous in their use of the 
landscape.
Despite the perception that individual peasants were a major factor in forest decline, 
big industry has been the primary force behind deforestation throughout Costa Rican 
history.  The exponential growth of industrial fast-food in North America, for 
example, propelled demand for cheap Costa Rican beef to unprecedented levels and 
led to a third major wave of deforestation.  Rapid conversion of forest (and old 
plantation land) to pastures quickly followed.  In all, about one-third of the country's 
landmass came under cattle production by 1980 (Evans 1999, 39).  Efforts were 
made to diversify agriculture during this period – with expanded palm oil, timber, 
sugar, and cacao production – but each of these only contributed to the decline of 
forests.  The accelerated rate of deforestation in the latter half of the 20th century was 
cause for great alarm, as the effects on the landscape were drastic within a single 
lifetime (figure 4.2).  For a small group of well-connected conservationists, these 
were the conditions that prompted urgent action.
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Figure 4.2
Costa Rican Forest Cover Over Time (Evans 1999, 40).
Emergent Conservation
The earliest efforts to protect the Costa Rican environment arguably began before 
colonial independence.  As Evans notes, as early as 1775 the Spanish governor of 
Costa Rica took measures to discourage forest burning in order to slow the rate of 
deforestation and prevent soil sterility (1999, 35).  After independence, decrees were 
also made to preserve forests around cities and in important watersheds, and hunting 
laws were put in place to protect wildlife (Evans 1999).  Even on productive lands, 
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Evans claims that Costa Ricans had “enough ecological sense” to utilize lands that 
were sufficiently fertile and capable of sustaining agriculture (unlike the foreign 
banana interests that came later).  While this leads Evans to suggest that “an incipient
conservation awareness was already starting to emerge” in Costa Rica as early as the 
mid-19th century (1999, 35), it was not until environmental conditions reached crisis 
point in the mid-20th century that more significant actions were taken.
Costa Rica's transformation to ecological celebrity began small, with an elite class of 
well-connected conservationists.  Against all odds, they re-directed the country's 
development trajectory and solidified its current environmental reputation.  This 
conservationist class had grown out of important links to the scientific communities 
of North America, which had been established in large part due to Costa Rica's 
reputation for democratic rule and political stability.
After the 1948 civil war, the new constitution of Costa Rica included a broad array of
provisions that limited executive power, divided the branches of government, 
guaranteed many social reforms, ensured personal liberties, and most famously, 
abolished the Costa Rican army (Booth 1998; Wilson 1998).  The security forces that
Costa Rica did retain operated with safeguards that limited the executive's ability to 
exercise coercive power – they lacked a central command structure and required the 
reappointment of unit heads every four years without the possibility of a second term 
(Evans 1999).  Importantly, this has meant that the government has not been able to 
use security forces to “assert undue influence over civilian society” as has so often 
been the case elsewhere in Latin America (Evans 1999, 2).
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The resulting peace and political stability played a significant role in creating the 
conditions for positive social development and the emergent conservationist class.  In
particular, education became a priority in national budgets that did not require 
maintenance of a standing military (Evans 1999).  At the same time, political stability
attracted many foreign researchers to the country (Honey 2004).  One famed 
American scientist, Alexander Skutch, for example, explained that “the naturalist 
working in some remote spot was not likely to have his studies suddenly interrupted 
or his thin lines of communication cut by a violent upheaval, as has happened to 
many in Latin America” (1971, 8).
Costa Rica had actively recruited scholars to the country as far back as the mid-1800s
to fill a need for university professors (Evans 1999), and higher education in the 
country benefited greatly from the connections formed with foreign academics.  
Many Costa Ricans became prominent figures themselves.  One such figure was José
Zeledón who was sent to study at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C. in 
the early 1900s.  While there, Zeledón “established important connections with 
American scientists”, opening the “floodgates … for U.S. researchers to start pouring
into Costa Rica – a flow that never waned” (Evans 1999, 20).  By 1914, “Costa Rica 
had become the center of scientific research in tropical America” (Evans 1999, 20).
Only a small segment of the Costa Rican population, however, was involved in this 
part of the country's history, since “field research was viewed by many as a pastime 
for the eccentric or the rich” (Evans 1999, 21).  A disparity existed between those 
who were highly educated and those who labored in the fields.  What was 
characterized as a “total indifference to environmental problems on the part of the 
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general public” (Boza quoted in Evans 1999, 79) is actually evidence that a gap was 
forming between the classes.  On the one hand, there was a highly educated class of 
conservation-oriented intellectuals and, on the other, a class that remained closer to 
their humble campesino roots.  Though they were an extreme minority, the new 
conservationist class derived the power to steer Costa Rican policies towards 
conservation by aligning themselves with influential and well-connected individuals.
Two of the most prominent figures in Costa Rica's emergent conservationist class 
during the 1970s were Mario Boza and Alvaro Ugalde, who played critical roles in 
the establishment of Costa Rica's national parks.  Both were scholars in fields related 
to the environment, both had received training with the United States National Park 
Service, and both were well integrated with the Costa Rican political establishment.  
Boza and Ugalde, for example, had traveled with former President José Figueres and 
his family on an expedition to view a sea turtle conservation project in Tortuguero.  
Former First Lady Karen Olsen de Figueres, in particular, was “deeply interested in 
conservation issues” and the potential for Costa Rican national parks (Evans 1999, 
74).  Both José Figueres and his son, José María Figueres, later held the office of 
president – the elder being re-elected to a non-consecutive term (1970-1974) and the 
younger being elected in 1994 – ensuring strong political allies for parks 
development.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Boza and Ugalde, supported by the 
Figueres family, led the drive to protect the remaining vestiges of Costa Rica's once 
extensive forests.  By the end of the period of rapid parks expansion, 25% of the 
Costa Rican landmass had come under some form of legal protection, constituting 
one of the most extensive, and now most famous, systems of protected areas in the 
entire world (Roberts and Thanos 2003).
111
Costa Rica's equally famous ecotourism industry, which led to a broadening of those 
with an interest in expanded conservation, is also a product of the country's scientific 
legacy and political stability.  Academic tourism may have been one of the first forms
of ecotourism that emerged.  Evans notes that scientists “may not have started 
coming to Costa Rica … for fun or entertainment, but their dollars added to the 
foreign tourist trade and helped to launch a thriving academic tourism business” 
(1999, 219).  Operations that were developed to accommodate foreign scientists soon
found that they could be marketed to nature tourists (Evans 1999).  Once the 
economic potential of Costa Rica's nascent tourism industry was understood by the 
political and business establishment, conservation became a strategy for economic 
development and, thus, gained support across the political spectrum.  The country's 
positive reputation fed on itself.  As international recognition of conservation 
successes grew, international praise was heaped on Costa Rica and its people, and a 
sense of environmental pride has, to an extent, become rooted in the national identity.
Martha Honey, for example, contends that while “environmentalism was confined to 
a small cadre of scientists and national parks offices” in the early 1980s, “a decade 
later, ecotourism and environmental ethics had become part of Costa Rica's national 
consciousness” (1999, 132).
Despite this, however, much of the country remained quite distant to the ongoing 
environmental revolution.  Ecotourism, and the economic benefits from it, were 
concentrated in particular hotspots – Monte Verde, Manuel Antonio, Jaco, 
Tamarindo, Arenal, Punta Uva – while much of the rest of the country continued with
traditional forms of agricultural production.  As the Parks Department raced to bring 
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the remaining vestiges of forest under official protection, Costa Rica was quickly 
running out of suitable land.  Lands outside of the parks were largely degraded, and 
the displacement of existing communities was becoming more politically difficult.  A
fear emerged that the protected areas would become “ecological islands” separated 
by degraded wastelands where extractive industry reigned supreme.  As Franz 
Tattenbach, an important figure in early Costa Rican conservation, explained, there 
was a “need to include the private sector forest owners [in conservation efforts], to go
beyond the national park model that Costa Rica had been following” (Tattenbach, 
interview, 30 Jan 2012).  Conservation on private lands, using buffer zones and 
“biological corridors”, became the next priority for the conservation elite.  To control 
environmental decline outside of the protected areas, the government first intervened 
in private forestry operations, primarily through the provision of incentives and direct
payments for more responsible extraction.
Intervention and Incentives
As is the case with many initiatives in Costa Rica, the first effort to curb 
deforestation on private lands was made early relative to other parts of Latin 
America.  In 1969 the country passed its first Ley Forestal (Forest Law No. 4465), 
which promoted plantation forestry and supported “reforestation” of commercially 
important timber species.  While this was not aimed at “conservation” in the terms 
we understand today, it was an attempt to alleviate deforestation pressures by 
establishing a system of sustainable yield timber plantations.  Incentives for these 
activities were provided by making the cost of establishing new plantations tax-
deductible.  This approach, however, was widely criticized as benefiting large scale 
operations.  Since deductions were only relevant to corporations and individuals with
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significant tax liability, the incentives were effectively unavailable to the poorest and 
smallest landowners (Bennett and Henninger 2008).
Further incentives for plantation forestry came with the Reforestation Act of 1977 
(Law No. 6184), which made (relatively) low interest loans available from state 
banks for establishment of plantations (Bennett and Henninger 2008).  In the same 
year, the government also abolished a longstanding tax on uncultivated lands (Brown 
and Bird 2011), which had been a throwback to an earlier period when forested land 
was understood as an obstacle to development.  Throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, state intervention in forestry increased in response to the accelerating rate of 
deforestation.  Policies continued to follow the subsidies model, which, with 
revisions to Ley Forestal in 1986 (Forest Law No. 7032), began to offer direct 
incentives in the form of “certificates” or transferable state bonds.
The Certificado de Abono Forestal (CAF or Forestry Payment Certificate) and the 
Certificado de Abono Forestal Avanzado (CAFA or Advanced Forestry Payment 
Certificate), were created as credits for landowners who invested in plantations.  
Instead of allowing plantation owners to deduct expenses from tax liabilities, the 
government began issuing these certificates as direct payments to subsidize 
operations.  This time measures were taken to ensure that more than just large-scale 
industry and wealthy landowners could participate.  Intended for poorer farmers who 
lacked capital, CAFAs paid out in advance of the timber harvest in order to cover the 
upfront cost of investment (Rojas and Aylward 2003).
The second Ley Forestal, however, became the subject of controversy due to the 
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constraints it placed on forestry operations on privately held lands (Watson et al. 
1998).  With law 7032, the government introduced strong controls over a landowner's
ability to harvest trees on their property (de Camino et al. 2000).  All cutting, 
henceforth, required a management plan from a registered forester and a municipal 
permit (de Camino et al. 2000).  Eventually, in 1990, a case was brought before the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in a dispute over private property 
rights.18  The Court annulled the law on the grounds that it had not passed with 
sufficient majority to allow restrictions on private land use.19  The Legislative 
Assembly responded quickly by passing (with broad support) a third version of the 
law (Forest Law No. 7174).  It was operationally very similar to the second, raising 
concerns that it too could be deemed unconstitutional.  But the new law was seen 
primarily as a stopgap measure until a more comprehensively revised version could 
be passed (Evans 1999, 166-167).
Ostensibly a setback, the Supreme Court's reversal of Forest Law 7032 provided the 
impetus for action at a critically important time.  As they were instituting the stopgap 
Forest Law 7174, the Legislative Assembly also established a Special Forestry 
Commission with the purpose of finding a new direction and long-term solution 
(Watson et al. 1998).  This was taking place just as the concept of “ecosystem 
services” was starting to migrate out of academia and into the policy realm.  The 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) was the first major forum in which the 
concept gained actionable support (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz Pérez 2011).  Costa 
Rica seized on this experimental new concept and aimed to be the first to implement 
18 Historical land tenure, ownership, and the meaning of “private property” in Costa Rica will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
19 The law had passed one vote short of the two-thirds majority required to take such measures 
(Evans 1999, 166).
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it.  Indeed, it would become the foundation of new forest legislation in 1996.  This 
example of Costa Rica's foresight and ambition on environmental matters is part of 
the reason it has earned the reputation it has for progressive environmentalism (in 
spite of a history of intense deforestation).
The dispute over the government's right to regulate environmental matters on private 
land spawned a debate that ultimately resulted in a fairly drastic measure to ensure 
the judiciary considers environmental factors in the future.  In 1994 a constitutional 
amendment was passed guaranteeing the “right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment” and authorizing the State to “guarantee, defend and preserve 
that right” (Constitution, Article 50, author's translation).  While this does not directly
resolve the issue of regulating forest management on private lands, it does require 
that the Supreme Court factor in environmental concerns in any future deliberations.  
Most of all, though, it signified just how far legislators were willing to go in asserting
their authority to govern environmental practices.
In the meantime, the stopgap law stipulated a measure for encouraging the 
“sustainable management” (i.e. selective cutting) of “natural growth” forests.  This 
led to the creation of a third forestry payment certificate, the Certificado de Abono 
Forestal por el Manejo de Bosque (CAFMA or Forestry Payment Certificate for 
Forest Management) (Camacho et al. 2000, 39, note 47).  CAFMA worked much like
the earlier certificates, but it targeted primary growth forests instead of plantations 
and sought to make sustainable management economically competitive with 
conventional clear-cutting methods.  The trend in the forest sector throughout this 
period was clearly in the direction of responsible management; however, at a 
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fundamental level, these policies and incentives remained in support of resource 
extraction.
It was not until 1995 that a new certificate, the Certificado para el Proteccion del 
Bosque (CPB or Certificate of Forest Protection), was introduced and policy began to
move away from timber production.  With the CPB, for the first time, incentives were
offered for forest conservation (Rojas and Aylward 2003).  The move was stimulated 
in part by developments in the international arena like Agenda 21 and the Convention
on Biological Diversity (Camacho et al. 2000, ii), but it signaled a change of course 
for Costa Rican forest management policy internally.  It marked the beginning of a 
new era in Costa Rica, in which private forests could receive government support for 
conservation, not just “responsible” extraction.
The forestry certificates schemes as a whole, however, can be viewed in rather mixed
terms from a historical perspective.  While the schemes were far in advance of other 
Latin American countries (in terms of an effort to stem resource depletion and in 
terms of developing institutions to control forestry activities), they lagged behind 
Costa Rica's own efforts to protect forests on public lands.  For years after the push to
establish the national parks, government policy was still encouraging the treatment of
private forests as agricultural stocks to be consumed, re-planted, and consumed 
again.  While the intention of this approach was to alleviate pressure on primary 
growth forests by ensuring a reliable supply of timber, these policies were not 
directly advancing conservation.  In fact, they were sometimes counter-productive.  
The CAF, CAFA, and CAFMA certificates are often blamed for creating “perverse 
incentives” that actually encouraged deforestation (Morell 1997).  Many timber 
117
companies had found it economically advantageous to clear existing “natural” forest 
and then apply for credits to establish monoculture plantations (Pagiola et al. 2002).
The way in which the government sought to support conservation on private lands 
during the 1980s and early 1990s was clearly troubled.  It was based on an outdated 
mindset that understood agricultural production as the path to economic development
and “conservation” as sustainable yield management.  Forests, however, were already
coming to be seen as a resource for tourism development and the source of many 
important “services”.  At the same time, macroeconomic trends and international 
financial agreements were complicating the government's ability to maintain the 
forest subsidies.  Both internally and externally, pressures were mounting for a shift 
in Costa Rican forest policy.
Internal and External Pressures for Change
Shifting social and economic priorities within Costa Rica demanded a revised 
strategy for forest management.  Growing environmental awareness, increasing 
economic dependence on nature tourism, and an enhanced geopolitical stature 
derived from a reputation for environmentalism all factored into the need for a 
different approach.  The transformation of Costa Rica into a destination for nature 
tourism re-centered the way in which many Costa Ricans viewed and valued the 
environment (Vivanco 2006).  As livelihoods shifted away from agriculture, nature 
was decreasingly viewed as an impediment to development (Watson et al. 1998, 55).  
Additionally (recognizing that Costa Ricans are not solely motivated by economics) 
environmentalism diffused throughout the Costa Rican populace by way of 
educational campaigns, particularly those aimed at youth.  A pride in their national 
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reputation for environmentalism emerged as the country became known for 
leadership in conservation action.  Foreign visitors held Costa Rica's (almost mythic) 
environmentalism in reverence, reinforcing their pride and enhancing their desire to 
foster that reputation.
Changes took place at the government level as well.  Politicians and administrators 
began to see conservation as an important political asset and the source of 
international influence.  Recognition of Costa Rica's leadership on environmental 
issues gained it credibility and authority in international forums such as the Earth 
Summits in Rio and Johannesburg and the various international climate talks: a 
significant achievement for a small developing nation that would otherwise be 
inconsequential on the world stage.  The fact that the country greatly derives its 
influence from continued environmental action led to broad cross-party support for 
environmental policy that has spanned several changes of administration.  In order to 
maintain its reputation (and the political, economic, and social benefits that come 
with it), the Costa Rican government has engaged in a constant search for innovative 
and experimental new conservation strategies (e.g. payments for ecosystem services, 
bio-prospecting, carbon markets).  With regard to forest management policy, it meant
a need to revise the “status quo” extractive policies.
At the same time, external pressure was mounting to restructure Costa Rica's 
approach to economic development, including its support for forest management 
activities.  Like much of Latin America, Costa Rica experienced chronic debt crises 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and came under pressure by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) to eliminate subsidies and liberalize economic activities.  These 
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measures were highly controversial throughout Latin America and are the source of 
persistent animosity, distrust of capitalism, and accusations of foreign meddling in 
national affairs.  In Costa Rica, the International Monetary Fund seized the 
opportunity in these crises to deliver loan readjustment conditional upon the 
elimination of subsidies (Porras 2010), and the World Bank negotiated a series of 
structural adjustment plans (Rojas and Aylward 2003) that would liberalize trade and 
dismantle welfare activities.
Support for conservation internally, however, meant that forest management could 
not simply be abandoned.20  The Special Forestry Commission that was established 
by the Legislative Assembly in 1990 was faced with this tension when tasked to find 
a way forward for national forest policy.  The situation came to a head when, towards
the end of 1995, the third structural adjustment plan targeted the forestry certificate 
schemes (CAF, CAFA, CAFMA, and CPB) for elimination (de Camino et al. 2000, 
17).  Facing the impending removal of this support, the environmental lobby was 
forced to revise its tactics and accept an alternative approach to financing 
conservation incentives (Porras and Neves 2006).  The internal and external demands
for change culminated in a third revision of forestry legislation.
New Directions
The first measure to reform Costa Rican forest policy was brought before the 
Legislative Assembly by Diputado Otton Solis in 1995.  The Cortar Unicamente lo 
Producido Ahora Bill (CULPA or “Cut Only What is Produced Now” Bill) was 
20 Here it is possible to observe how political circumstances work to constrain the institution of 
purely neoliberal frameworks.  Rather than resulting in a pure idealized neoliberalism, the result is 
a partial and incomplete neoliberalization.
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proposed as a drastic measure to end timber harvesting in “natural” forests (Watson 
et al. 1998).  Among several things, the Bill proposed that all Costa Rican timber 
should be produced on plantations or in agroforestry systems, that an outright ban on 
logging in “natural” forests be imposed, that the existing certificates scheme 
responsible for the perverse incentives be eliminated, and that a new “CULPA 
Certificate” be offered to smallholders (of no more than 25 hectares) who protect 
“natural” forest on their land (Watson et al. 1998).  The Bill represented a clear 
commitment to strong state support of conservation and smallholder interests, and 
was flagrantly antagonistic to industry, large landowners, and the international 
financial institutions that were demanding liberalization.  While such a controversial 
approach was unlikely to succeed given the power of entrenched interests, it may 
have set the terms of debate for the bill that would follow.  Watson et al., for 
example, suggest that CULPA was deliberately excessive in its aims “to allow 
somewhat less extreme measures to be more easily approved subsequently” (Watson 
et al. 1998, 47).  Indeed, the law that ultimately passed included some of CULPA's 
positions “whilst appearing relatively uncontroversial” (Wastson et al. 1998, 47) – 
namely, it instated a ban on land use conversion, even though industry was able to 
maintain their ability to conduct “sustainable forestry management” (SFM) in 
primary-growth forests where it had already been taking place.
The bill that eventually did pass, in 1996, is the current incarnation of Ley Forestal 
(Forest Law No. 7575), which made the most sweeping changes to Costa Rican 
forest policy since it was first introduced.  Though quite different to CULPA, it 
represented a dramatic reorientation of Costa Rican forestry and the way government 
supports and regulates private forest conservation.  As Franz Tattenbach describes it:
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What we had [in 1996] was a significant paradigm shift.  The idea of fiscal 
incentives for a fledgling reforestation [i.e. plantation forestry] industry was 
replaced by a very different concept:  the idea that forests provide 
environmental services (quoted in FONAFIFO 2005, 19).
Most immediately, institution of this law meant that the focus of forest policy shifted 
from extraction to conservation (though, as I indicated, minor support for plantation 
forestry and SFM remains).  It also meant, however, a re-framing of how incentives 
for conservation are delivered (Bennett and Henninger 2008).  As required by the 
World Bank's structural adjustment plan, the new law eliminated all existing 
certificates (Watson et al. 1998, 74), so the government would (theoretically) no 
longer directly subsidize any forest management activities.  Instead, the law made 
provisions for a system that would encourage particular land uses through 
establishment of financial links between individual users and producers of ecosystem
services; it instated the national Payments for Environmental Services (PSA) scheme.
As identified by Blackman and Woodward, a “major motive for creating the PSA 
program was to recast reforestation and conservation subsidies as payments for 
environmental services” (2010, 1628).  Support for conservation was not, any longer,
supposed to be a liability on the government's balance sheets.  Instead, conservation 
was to be funded by the sale of ecosystems services to service users.  This, of course, 
stands in stark contrast to the tack taken by CULPA and represents an important 
struggle between ideologies.  On the one hand, CULPA aimed to extend traditional 
government-centered financing of conservation, and on the other, the PSA aimed to 
reduce direct government involvement and rely on economics to finance the program.
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Neoliberal Vision
When it was first rolled-out, Costa Rica's “payments” scheme came with grand 
neoliberal ambitions.  Sage and Sánchez (2002), for example, envisioned radical 
possibilities that would realize marketization and facilitate state withdrawal.  In a 
short paper, the two employees21 at FONAFIFO (the Costa Rican agency 
implementing the PSA) laid out the program's potential.  Beginning with the initial 
form of the new program, they re-conceptualized the PSA not as a subsidy, but rather 
as government “purchases” of “service rights” (figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3.  Reproduced from Sage and Sánchez (2002).
They then envisioned the program's evolution through several iterations that would 
first link producers with users in a government-sustained quasi-market (figure 4.4), 
then create a tradeable “certificate” of environmental services (essentially a packaged
commodity representing an abstract ecosystem service) (figure 4.5), then facilitate 
the formation of an investment market for the exchange of those certificates (figure 
4.6), and finally culminate in the withdrawal of government from the program and in 
idealized direct financial transactions between users and producers taking place in 
21 Sánchez is listed as “Environmental Services Section Chief”, and Sage is listed as “Consultant in 
charge of the FONAFIFO project”.
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open markets (figure 4.7; Sage and Sánchez 2002, 73).
Figure 4.4-4.7.  Reproduced from Sage and Sánchez (2002).
The vision laid out by the two is somewhat idealistic, offering almost no commentary
on how this vision was to be achieved or how, for instance, direct agreements 
between users and producers could be sustained without some sort of coordinating 
body.  Although, as will be discussed below, several of their ideas do indeed come to 
fruition (e.g. the negotiation of contracts with private users of services and the 
creation of tradeable CSAs).22  What their paper illustrates is that the concept of PES 
was being understood in neoliberal terms by (at least some of) those working to carry
it out.  It was not being treated as a mere change of name for direct subsidization 
(Sage and Sánchez 2002).  Even though the early stages of the PSA resembled 
previous modes of supporting conservation, a fundamental change in the ideology 
22 CSA stands for Certificado de Servicios Ambientales, or Certificate of Environmental Services.  
They should not be confused with the earlier system of certificates, as they represent a 
commodified “service” that can be sold or traded.  The earlier subsidy certificates represented a 
payment from government and held nominal value.
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underlying the practice had taken place.  The initial system for providing “payments”
to “service providers”, then, could be understood as “an intermediary stage in the 
formation of true markets for environmental services” (Sierra and Russman 2006, 
133).
Early commentaries from outside the implementing agency were also interpreting 
these changes in decidedly neoliberal terms.  Fletcher and Breitling (2012) indicate 
that such a vision was presented by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), a development agency contracted by the Costa Rican government to assess 
the PSA soon after its passage.  Heindrichs, writing for the GTZ, understood the 
establishment of PES as an explicit move “away from deficit-plagued, subsidized 
operations that are only able to survive with the aid of state 'alms' and toward a form 
of profitable, competitive land use based on sound business principles” (1997, 2).  
For Heindrichs, the PSA was not, as Rojas and Aylward (2003) suggest, a cover for 
continuing subsidies in the face of pressure to remove them, but rather a fundamental
transition to market-based conservation.  The basis of this understanding is the 
perception that the PSA succeeded in “decentralization of the administration, 
participation of the private sector and the general public, reduction of public 
subsidies, and introduction of the 'consumer pays' principle” (Heindrichs 1997, 35).
Fundamentally, the new program altered the rationale for support of forest 
management.  What had been aid for prescribed land uses was re-conceptualized as 
compensation for service provision.  Interpretation shifted to cast earlier forms of 
conservation support as assistance for practices that were not economically viable, 
while new approaches are framed as remuneration for astute asset management.  This
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meant landowners that were supported by these new conservation regimes could be 
regarded as “deserving” resource managers at the same time that previous approaches
were being recast as welfare dependency.  The shift also meant, however, that such 
support could only be justified if it made rational economic sense, a situation that has
yet to reveal its full implications.  It is clear that the very core of how conservation 
support is delivered in Costa Rica shifted with the passage of the 1996 Forest Law, 
and that the underlying ideology of the new approach is largely rooted in a neoliberal
worldview.  But while the idea of PES may represent a new direction for socio-
environmental organization, the practice of it has proven to be far more resistant to 
such changes.
Actual Practice
Despite the interpretation by analysts such as Heindrichs (1997), and despite the 
vision laid out by institutional insiders like Sage and Sánchez (2002), the practice of 
PES in Costa Rica has been anything but true to its vision.  Fletcher and Breitling, for
example, have identified a “significant gap between vision and execution” in several 
aspects of Costa Rica's implementation (2012, 408).  Indeed, as we would expect, 
many of the actual practices of making payments for environmental services in Costa
Rica do not map neatly onto a neoliberal model.
First, there was a level of continuity from the previous management regime to the 
current one, in that the new regime initially supported all the same land-use practices 
(i.e. conservation, “reforestation”, sustainable management)23 and carried over the 
23 Conservation was previously supported by the CPB.  “Reforestation” (or plantation forestry) was 
previously supported by the CAF and CAFAs.  Sustainable forest management (i.e. selective 
cutting) was previously supported by CAFMA.
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same payment levels from the certificates scheme (Pagiola 2008).  Moreover, several 
aspects actually extended previous approaches to conservation, particularly with 
regard to program financing.  Initially, the PSA was funded almost entirely by a new 
tax on fossil fuels (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007), not user fees or revenues from 
ecosystem service sales.  As Fletcher and Breitling (2012) point out, the tax was 
intended to be a temporary measure that would be replaced by revenue generated on 
international carbon markets, but when those markets failed to materialize, the tax 
remained.  Even as the program has progressed, the proportion of financing that 
could be regarded as market-based remains wholly insignificant, amounting to 0.5% 
since the start of payments (FONAFIFO 2011c).24
In fact, the involvement of markets has failed to materialize on several fronts, which 
has resulted in an undifferentiated payment schedule.  Instead of being determined by
demand on an open market, payment levels are set at fixed-rates by presidential 
decree (Pagiola 2008).  This means that a single payment level exists for each 
contract modality so that each PSA participant receives the same per-hectare rate for 
equivalent management.  Payments do not, therefore, reflect the variability of 
opportunity costs or the market value of productive land.  This has led to claims that 
the PSA is “overpaying” in some cases and offering inadequate incentives in others 
(World Bank 2007).  Despite criticism of this “inefficiency” (Wünscher et al. 2008; 
World Bank 2007), the political will to implement market-oriented valuation 
techniques such as reverse auctions (Chomitz et al. 1999), contingent valuation 
(Whittington and Pagiola 2011), or other mechanisms for price differentiation (Sills 
24 This was calculated using the sum of revenues generated from contracts with Florida Ice and Farm,
various hydroelectric companies, and CSA sales and the total FONAFIFO budget for PSAs:  100 * 
₡ 507,539,487 / ₡ 99,797,775,525.
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et al. 2005) has been insufficient among government actors.
A consequence of fixed-rate payments is that supply and demand do not come to a 
“natural” balance.  For the PSA, this has meant that demand for participation 
routinely outstrips the availability of financing (Pagiola et al. 2005).  As a result, a 
prioritization scheme and applicant selection process has been required.  This has 
meant further government involvement and distancing from the idealized vision.  
Operation guidelines (also set through presidential decree) have consistently 
identified priority areas based on ecological and social criteria.  Priority “biological 
corridors” have been identified through a series of ecological studies, and high 
poverty zones have been targeted through use of the Social Development Index 
(Zhang and Pagiola 2011).  These measures indicate that the Costa Rican government
(broadly speaking) is concerned with pursuing a particular socio-ecological vision 
over unrestrained market-rule.25
The Costa Rican system is further distanced from the market model by the way in 
which the actual payments are carried out.  Instead of representing direct purchases 
of services, the PSA operates by providing incentives for particular management 
practices.  In other words, there is no direct correspondence between the payments 
made and services delivered.  For example, if the objective is to reduce sedimentation
caused by run-off, then a management plan may be drawn up that stipulates forest 
protection or regeneration on relevant lands.  It is largely assumed that these practices
25 While these priority areas appear to be the product of state-level planning intended to promote a 
particular socio-ecological vision, further investigation is warranted to determine if the principles 
of “economic efficiency” are a factor in their formation.  If, for example, biological corridors are 
formed with the intention of directing scarce resources to areas that provide greater services, rather
than areas of particular biological importance, this could actually be an example of emergent 
neoliberalization.
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will generate the desired ecosystem services, as no measurements are taken to 
determine the quantity or quality of the services delivered (Daniels et al. 2010).26  
Without such information, it can hardly be said that a discrete “service” has been 
purchased.  And since the incentives that are provided (most often) do not come from
willing buyers, it is inaccurate to claim that the program represents direct transactions
between users and providers.  This disconnect between payments made and services 
delivered results in a system that is conceptually quite different from the idealized 
form, wherein actors exchange services in mutual self-interest to achieve 
economically optimal outcomes.
Furthermore, the “nature” of nature itself renders ecosystems uncooperative with the 
concept of selling their services.  In the idealized model, a service (e.g. carbon 
sequestration) can be bought and sold as a discrete commodity in an open market.  
However, in practice, such a service cannot be separated from the various other 
ecosystem functions – a forest simultaneously provides carbon sequestration, water 
filtration, flow control, biodiversity, and many other services.  Conceptually, the “de-
bundling” of services may be possible (Wunder 2005), but practically speaking it 
does not represent “a realistic understanding of how ecosystems and their processes 
operate” (Kosoy and Cobera 2010, 1232).  Reflecting this, Costa Rica's PSA pays for 
particular land management practices, rather than delivery of discrete services, more 
closely approximating the concept of bundling than the establishment of service 
markets.  Stefano Pagiola, an analyst at the World Bank, for example, complains that 
even in cases where a direct agreement is made with a buyer of a service, the PSA 
26 The language used here should not be taken to imply doubt that such land management practices 
do, indeed, deliver ecosystem services.  Rather, it is being used to elucidate the disconnect between
payments made and services delivered and problematize the assumption that PSA represents direct 
transactions between service users and providers.
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generally charges the user for “all conservation payments in the area of interest” 
(2008, 716, emphasis original), meaning that a buyer of hydrological services is also 
paying for biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, and all the others.  In 
other words, the PSA forces buyers to purchase bundles of services and, effectively, 
redistributes financial resources between the various services that ecosystems 
provide.  This is in stark contrast, of course, to a strict model that would install 
markets, encourage differentiated pricing, and require each service to generate its 
own financing.
The strictest government regulation that accompanied the development of the PSA, 
and the one that most directly conflicts with liberal conceptions of governance, is the 
outright ban on land-use conversion.  As Fletching and Breitling point out, this 
regulation makes the new forest law “something of a paradox” that simultaneously 
promotes neoliberalization and state intervention (2012, 407).  When the law was 
passed, it was done in the context of the existing perverse incentives described above,
which encouraged the removal of primary-growth growth forest for the purpose of 
accessing reforestation funds (Watson et al. 1998; Morell 1997).  So along with the 
measures to reform the conservation incentive scheme came provisions that restricted
industry's ability (and an owner's right) to convert forested land to other uses – it 
became illegal to cut “natural” forest for the purposes of harvesting timber, producing
agricultural or pastoral lands, or bringing about any other form of development.27  It 
effectively extends state (and restricts private) control of resources.  As a result, 
opposition to the new law was (at least initially) quite strong by some environmental 
27 A mechanism for “sustainable forest management” remained in place until 2003, wherein selective 
cutting was permitted under strict management plans (World Bank 2007).
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economists.  For example, Bruce Aylward noted that the measure “effectively 
expropriates land use rights on forested terrain” and is “both ecologically and 
economically flawed” (quoted in Watson et al. 1998).  This ban on land-use 
conversion shows that, in certain ways, Costa Rica's implementation of PES is 
strongly contradictory to fundamental features of neoliberalism.
Clearly, there exists a disconnect between the PSA concept and actual practice, as the
new program bears great resemblance to the one it replaced.  Though the PSA 
represents a fundamentally new way of carrying out conservation activities, the 
endurance of overtly state-centered practices render it almost unidentifiable as 
neoliberal against the idealized model.  Understandably, this has led some (eg. Rojas 
and Aylward 2003; Watson et al. 1998) to characterize the PSA as little more than a 
continuation of older subsidy-based policies.  However, the work of critical scholars 
is emphatic about the tendency of states to expand, in their efforts to enact and 
sustain neoliberal policies (Peck 2010; Peck 2004; Larner and Craig 2005).  Thus, it 
is possible that the shift in ideology embodied by the PSA can represent the onset of 
the neoliberalization process, despite the many overtly non-neoliberal practices that 
have endured.  As recognized by von Platen, the “economic implications of the 
change” to conservation policy are such that “there is indeed more to it than a simple 
change of name” (1999, 23).
Encroaching Neoliberalization
While Fletcher and Breitling rightly cast doubt on the “neoliberalness” of Costa 
Rica's PSA, their conclusion – that the program “could equally be described as a 
subsidy in disguise” (2012, 408) – does not adequately appreciate the unfinished and 
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ever-adapting nature of the neoliberalization process.  As I laid out in Chapter 2, 
there is no point at which the process of neoliberalization is complete.  When 
neoliberalism exists, it is always to varying degrees according to the success of its 
promotion, its confluence with existing regimes, and the resistance mounted against 
it.  It can even exist in cases that deviate substantially from the idealized conception.  
It is a mistake, therefore, to conclude that the PSA has no neoliberal characteristics 
simply because it lacks certain “ideal” elements (e.g. markets) or includes other 
antithetical ones (e.g. government involvement).
Looking Back
As I set out above, Costa Rica's transition to the existing regime of natural resource 
management was long and contradictory.  The environmental reputation that the 
country holds today stands in stark contrast to its historical record.  Long before 
conservation became a top national priority, and long before neoliberal ideology 
emerged as a driving force in political and economic organization, Costa Rica 
underwent successive waves of deforestation that rivaled the world's most rapid rates 
of ecological decline.  Driven first by coffee then banana and beef production, the 
majority of the country's forest cover was consumed by an export-heavy agricultural 
industry.  With each successive development, the rate of deforestation accelerated 
and the urgency of the environmental situation increased.
The response to the alarming state of Costa Rican forests came rapidly and was 
equally as exceptional as the decline had been.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a 
small group of well-connected conservationists succeeded in creating one of the most
extensive systems of parks and protected areas worldwide.  They drew on 
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international scientific and political alliances to place conservation at the forefront of 
the domestic policy agenda and, thereby, solidified Costa Rica's reputation for 
progressive environmentalism.
Despite their successes, however, lands outside of the parks continued to decline, 
giving rise to concerns that protected areas would become “ecological islands”.  
Beginning in the 1980s and increasing through the 1990s, the focus of Costa Rican 
conservation shifted to forests on private land, where buffer zones and biological 
corridors were developed to bolster the country's isolated parks.  At first, strong 
government support in the form of tax credits, subsidies, and direct payments was 
offered to private timber producers to alleviate pressure on remaining “natural” 
forests.  Gradually, these supports began to be oriented towards conservation rather 
than “responsible” extraction.  By the time this occurred, however, the government 
was under heavy pressure from international financial institutions to change its 
interventionist policies.  Ultimately, these pressures resulted in the development of 
the PSA, which was intended to replace direct government subsidization of private 
forest conservation with a self-financed system in which “ecosystem services” would
be sold to private buyers.
As I explained, the vision articulated for the PSA came with grand neoliberal 
ambitions.  The program's architects laid out a series of stages that first recast the 
scheme not as a subsidy, but rather as government purchases of service rights, which 
could then be sold to private service users.  They further envisioned the development 
of abstracted service-commodity certificates and mechanisms for the circulation of 
those commodities in markets.  The final stage of this plan was ultimately the 
133
complete withdrawal of government involvement.
While elements of the vision (such as the Certificado de Servicios Ambientales and 
the sale of services to private buyers) have indeed been realized, the program as a 
whole does not map neatly onto the neoliberal model – market financing remains 
insignificant, the government's role has expanded not contracted, and the scheme was
accompanied by strict regulation.  Even though early practice of the PSA does not 
perfectly (or even closely) correspond to idealized neoliberalism, the program has a 
definite trajectory towards neoliberalization.  It is in this way that the case of PSA in 
Costa Rica links up to the conceptual elements of this thesis.
Looking Forward
Despite the characterization of the program as a continuation of older conservation 
subsidies, the re-orientation of policy embodied by the PSA points to the possibility 
of a neoliberal future.  This thesis is an exploration of the efforts being made to 
realize that possibility.  In the following chapters, I present empirical evidence of 
how this process is unfolding in actual practice.  Specifically, I investigate the tactics 
being deployed by the World Bank and economically-oriented government actors to 
neoliberalize Costa Rica's new approach to conservation.  The purpose is twofold:  i) 
to demonstrate how the neoliberalization process is applied in partial and incomplete 
ways, and ii) to show how, despite this, the effect is still uneven development and 
inequitable distribution.
As I explained in Chapter 2, the reason for doing this goes beyond simply 
exemplifying neoliberalism-in-action to converse with the broader literature and 
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place my conceptual tools in a new light.  I wish to show how, by directing the 
critical gaze on pressing justice considerations, it is possible to identify the crucial 
junctures at which neoliberal policies push through ostensibly non-neoliberal 
practices.  This constitutes a different usage of the neoliberalism and 
neoliberalization concepts to much of the other literature, which has emphasized the 
ways that PES deviates from neoliberal doctrine.  Rather than emphasize the ways in 
which neoliberalization has failed to influence conservation policy, my handling of 
the concepts places attention on the ways it has taken root despite all of its apparent 
contradictions.
As I have articulated already, there is an important difference between neoliberalism 
and neoliberalization.  The concept of neoliberalism is an abstraction that never 
actually exists in a pure idealized form.  If such an idealized model is used to assess 
the “neoliberalness” of a project, the conclusion will always be the same:  it does not 
correspond perfectly and, therefore, it is not actually neoliberal.  A consequence of 
this is that important instances where neoliberal policies have begun to enter practice 
are likely to be overlooked.  In order to discern the effects of encroaching 
neoliberalization, it is essential to adopt a conceptualization that frames neoliberalism
as a perpetually unfinished project.  This can be found in the concept of 
neoliberalization, which understands neoliberalism not as a monolithic force that 
displaces previous modes of economic governance, but rather as a process that is 
incomplete and ever-adapting (Peck and Tickell 2002).
Understood from the perspective that there is no finished product, neoliberalism can 
exist even in cases that deviate substantially from the idealized conception.  When it 
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is present, it is always to varying degrees according to the success of its promotion, 
its confluence with existing regimes, and the resistance mounted against it.  That is 
why, in the case of Costa Rica's PSA, no matter how misaligned actual practice is 
with idealized neoliberalism, there is still the possibility of encroaching 
neoliberalization.  It is important, therefore, to uncover and assess even the most 
subtle instances of neoliberal influence, in order to understand the serious 
consequences that can often still exist.  Bearing this conceptualization in mind, it is 
possible to identify several areas where the process has already begun to take hold.
Evidence of Neoliberalization
Notwithstanding the important challenges to its characterization as a 
“paradigmatically neoliberal 'market-based' conservation mechanism” (Fletcher and 
Breitling, 2012, 402), the PSA is being neoliberalized in (at least) three important 
ways:  through World Bank and FONAFIFO efforts to recast program financing as 
user-fees; through the efforts of market-oriented officials within the Ministry of 
Environment to introduce competitive and decentralized forest management; and 
through legal requirements that alter property relations between PSA participants and
their surrounding communities.  These three cases of neoliberalization comprise the 
three empirical chapters of this thesis.  They emerged from data analysis and were 
selected because of their significance to recent changes in PSA practice and Costa 
Rican forestry more generally.  The first represents the primary outcome of nearly a 
decade of World Bank influence over the program.  The second concerns a 
foundational shift in administrative organization.  And the third corresponds to a 
complete inversion of the historical valence of power between property owners and 
the landless.  Each is introduced briefly below.
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First, a trend towards neoliberal financing mechanisms is evident in the various 
revenue streams that sustain the PSA program, despite the fact that market financing 
has largely failed to develop.  Specifically, this shift is embodied in the differences 
between the fuel tax and water tariff.  The fuel tax was established under the same 
law that initially instituted the PSA (Ley Forestal No. 7575) and levies a charge on 
gasoline sales to finance PSA activities.  The water tariff, on the other hand, was 
developed later, in 2006, as the Ministry of Environment (MINAE)28 sought to 
expand the program.  It generates PSA financing from water concession holders.  The
difference between the two may seem trivial – both are state-mandated forfeitures of 
private capital and, indeed, have been characterized as being cut from the same cloth 
(Fletcher and Breitling 2012).  However, they are conceptually quite different.  
Firstly, the fuel tax allows collection of revenues for use in making payments for 
any/all of the services identified under the program, and it allows for the 
prioritization of highly important biological areas as well as regions with low social 
development.  In other words, it is redistributive.  This is, of course, the nature of a 
tax; revenues are collected and then redistributed to achieve particular objectives.  
The water tariff, on the other hand, operates much more like a user-fee.29  Though it 
is still non-voluntary, revenues are collected from holders of water concessions and 
transferred to the PSA for use within the watershed in which the revenues were 
generated (Decree 32868-MINAE, Chapter IV, Article 14).30  This stipulation on how
28 The full name of the agency that established the water tariff is the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, abbreviated “MINAE”.  It has since become the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and 
Telecommunications, or “MINAET”.
29 The tariff is an attempt to approximate the concept of user fees.  While it is, perhaps, an imperfect 
attempt (in that it is still non-voluntary), the World Bank appears to consider the tariff as progress 
towards the ultimate objective of direct user/provider transactions (World Bank 2006, 12).
30 The decree states that tariff revenues are to be used to finance payments on “terrenos privados 
dentro de la cuenca donde se genere el servicio ambiental de protección del agua y se ubiquen en 
zonas de importancia para la sostenibilidad comprobada del régimen hídrico”, or “private lands 
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tariff revenues may be used institutes the logic espoused by neoliberal technocrats 
that believe nobody should be obliged to pay for services unless they are deriving 
direct personal benefit.  There are obviously important social and ecological 
implications to this anti-redistributive approach to PSA financing.  Namely, the tariff 
is unable to finance conservation in areas of high biological importance if they fall 
outside of watersheds with concession holders and it cannot prioritize impoverished 
areas if no concession-holding industry is located there.  The consequence of this, I 
will elaborate in Chapter 5, is geographically uneven patterns of conservation-
development.
Second, dramatic restructuring of the forestry industry has altered both the conduct of
forestry work and landowner participation in the PSA.  This re-organization 
constitutes a highly political shift in the scale at which the tensions between 
competition and cooperation are mediated.  Specifically, the decentralization and 
privatization of labor has encouraged competition between foresters, and the 
individualization of participation has undermined cooperation among landowners.  
Much of this can be traced to institution of the regente system, which replaced the 
General Forestry Directorate, a government office, with a network of individual 
private foresters, or regentes.31  These regentes – the only agents licensed to prepare 
forest management plans – play a critical role in the program.  The idea behind the 
privatization of the profession was that it would promote competition and result in 
lower fees.  Met with measured “success”, this competitive system has in fact seen 
within the watershed that generates the environmental service of water protection and that are 
located in zones of proven importance for the sustainability of the water regime”.
31 Regentes forestales, literally “forestry regents”, are professional forestry engineers that are 
responsible for the on-the-ground implementation of most aspects of forest management in Costa 
Rica.
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the decline of the cost of contract preparation (Valenciano, pers. comm., 7 Feb 2012; 
Zuñiga, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2012).  As I will show in Chapter 6, however, not 
everybody benefits from this competition equally.  In fact, the result has primarily 
been lower per-hectare costs for large landowners, not across-the-board lower rates 
for all participants.  Further to this, I will also show in Chapter 6, how the 
competitive system undermines the coherence of collective participation.  
FONAFIFO developed a form of cooperation through group contracting early in the 
PSA as a way to level transaction costs and make it no more expensive for small 
landowners to participate than it is for large ones.  It was developed in direct 
recognition of the high fixed costs of contract preparation and the comparative 
disadvantage for small landowners (Pagiola et al. 2005).  The idea was that 
landowners could pool their resources under a single contract and, thus, reduce the 
per-hectare rate for all involved.  The mechanism, however, met with several 
administrative problems, including how to manage instances of individual non-
compliance and ownership change within the groups.  In response, FOFNAFIFO 
revised the mechanism to culminate in individual contracts (Pagiola 2008).  This 
individualization of participation shifted the scale at which landowners are able to 
cooperate, further compounding the problem of large landowner advantage and 
substantially diminishing access for the poor.  As the balance of participation shifts 
from groups to individuals and corporations, an increasing share of PSA benefits is 
being captured by larger, wealthier (and often foreign) landowners (Porras 2010).  It 
is a troubling prospect that I will demonstrate is directly correlated with the turn 
towards neoliberal policies.
The third juncture at which I have observed the PSA's neoliberalization is presented 
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in Chapter 7 and concerns the effect of the program on property relations, specifically
with regard to the expansion of exclusionary land management practices.  Although 
Costa Rica has a long tradition of (ostensibly) private property ownership (Chomitz 
et al. 1999), exclusive access has not historically been the norm.  While lands “under 
conspicuous use” are usually respected as being the property of the individual that 
labored to bring them into production (Evans 1999, 42), other marginal lands have 
been treated informally with broad usufruct access.  Property boundaries in rural 
Costa Rica have historically been far more fluid, allowing those who lacked legal 
title or possession of land to access many important resources.  However, with 
introduction of the PSA, these management practices are changing dramatically.  
Participants in the PSA are obligated to manage their lands in ways that contrast 
sharply with the practices that have long existed.  This includes the obvious transition
from extraction-oriented management to conservation-oriented management, but it 
also includes the rise of exclusionary practices that re-define many rural social 
relations.  Participation in the PSA requires, for example, that landowners monitor 
and report extraction violations, transforming neighbors into forest guards and 
patrollers of their exclusive domains.  Whereas “unused” lands have historically 
allowed broad access to the wider community, management under the PSA 
consolidates access under the control of the legal owner.  And, thus, the benefits from
this form of land management are accumulated by a narrower segment of the 
population, having particularly harmful consequences for the landless.
Each of these three cases serves to illustrate the (sometimes subtle) ways in which 
Costa Rica's PSA is being neoliberalized.  The intention is to demonstrate that, even 
though the program may have an imperfect correspondence to the idealized model of 
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neoliberalism, it is still possible that neoliberal policies are starting to emerge.  And, 
importantly, that they can still have detrimental social and ecological consequences.  
In the chapters that follow, I develop my critique of each of these neoliberalizations 
further.  In doing so, I provide concrete evidence of uneven accumulation and reveal 
the distributional implications of carrying out conservation within the frameworks of 
neoliberal capitalism.  In each case, I argue that neoliberalization leads to undesirable
and unjust social and ecological outcomes.  In the conclusion, I return to some of the 
conceptual aspects in order to explain the ways that my handling of the empirical 





Neoliberalization of PSA Financing
In the year 2000, FONAFIFO began a partnership with the World Bank that would 
transform the face of Costa Rica's national Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) 
program.  At the time, the program's finances were in a state of flux, as the Ministry 
of Finance withheld full budgetary allocations earmarked for PSA operations.  In 
need of institutional development funds, FONAFIFO approached the World Bank for
assistance in preparing a proposal to the Global Environment Facility (GEF).  The 
initial objective was to secure a $750,000 “medium-sized project” grant (Kellenberg, 
interview, 18 Nov 2011).  Upon consultation with Bank agents, however, 
FONAFIFO was persuaded to aim higher.  By the end of negotiations, the deal 
topped $40 million, 80% of which took the form of loans.  This constituted a major 
victory for the World Bank and a reversal of policy for the government of Costa Rica,
as the Bank had been denied the ability to lend in the country for more than a decade.
With this agreement, the World Bank was firmly re-established as a player in Costa 
Rica's development agenda, and dependence on foreign debt was re-normalized in 
domestic policy.  Before this initial project was even complete, FONAFIFO and the 
Bank had already begun to design its successor, which would bring an additional $40 
million to FONAFIFO's budget, again predominately in the form of loans.
Of course, the “Ecomarkets” projects, as they are called, were not simply financial 
agreements that supported an existing program.32  The World Bank's monetary 
32 The initial project was titled “Ecomarkets”.  The successor is officially titled “Mainstreaming 
Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Management” (MMBIEM), but is usually referred to
as simply “Ecomarkets II”.
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Figure 5.1:  FONAFIFO central office, San Jose, CR.
Figure 5.2:  The World Bank, Washington DC, USA.
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contributions gained it a great deal of influence over PSA activities and the program's
ultimate direction.  In particular, the Bank's influence is evident in the evolution of 
the program's financing mechanisms, which have shifted towards direct financialized 
transactions between “users” and “providers” of ecosystem services.  While the 
distinction between the initial PSA financing mechanism (a fuel tax) and the new 
financing mechanism established during Ecomarkets (a water tariff) is subtle, the 
effect is extremely important, as it has significant implications for both social and 
ecological outcomes.  In the creation of new financial arrangements, opportunities for
the re-allocation and consolidation of benefits arise, producing the conditions for 
uneven development.  This chapter is an analysis of the shifting policy formations 
that present such conditions for expanded inequity.  I find that the changes to 
program financing have fundamentally transformed the way in which resources are 
allocated and have deeply altered the underlying rationale for why payments for 
ecosystem services are being made.
In the pages that follow, I explain how changes to PSA financing constitute an 
ongoing process of neoliberalization.  I do so by providing a detailed historical 
account of program financing and an understanding of the influence held by outside 
forces.  This includes:  a summary of how the program was initially funded through a
tax on fossil fuels; an explanation of the vision articulated for the future of PSA 
financing, including FONAFIFO's role in that agenda; an understanding of how the 
World Bank re-entered Costa Rican affairs and gained influence over the PSA; and 
an assessment of the water tariff as a new revenue stream designed to approximate 
market transactions.  After providing this empirical context, I step back to situate 
Costa Rica's new approach to conservation financing in the conceptual frameworks 
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critiquing capitalist development and provide the basis for interpreting it as a form of
state-led neoliberalization.  Finally, I anticipate some of the social and ecological 
implications of these changes, by exposing the uneven patterns of conservation-
development that have already emerged with the mechanism's precursor.33
The Evolution of PSA Financing
A Tax on Fossil Fuels
When the PSA began, it was financed through a tax on fossil fuels.  This tax was 
established under the same law that created the PSA (Ley Forestal 7575).  Originally,
the law earmarked one-third of a 15% tax on fossil fuels (in other words, 5% of fuel 
sales) to make payments to forest owners through the PSA.  The idea was that these 
funds would be used to compensate landowners “for the environmental services to 
mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases and for the protection and development of 
biodiversity” (Article 69).34
These revenues, however, were not initially forthcoming.  In fact, the Ministry of 
Finance transferred only a portion of these funds to FONAFIFO because of 
competing fiscal obligations and a limited national budget (Heindrichs 1997).  
Despite the language earmarking fossil fuel revenues in the forestry law, Finance is 
beholden only to the annual budget passed by the Legislative Assembly, and without 
specification there (or in other budgetary legislation), the Minister retains great 
33 As I will explain in greater detail below, it is still too early to observe the distributive effects of the 
water tariff itself, as it has not yet been fully implemented.
34 The text of Article 69 reads:  “De los montos recaudados por el impuesto selectivo de consumo de 
los combustibles y otros hidrocarburos, anualmente se destinará un tercio a los programas de 
compensación a los propietarios de bosques y plantaciones forestales, por los servicios ambientales
de mitigación de las emisiones de gases con efecto invernadero y por la protección y el desarrollo 
de la biodiversidad, que generan las actividades de protección, conservación y manejo de bosques 
naturales y plantaciones forestales. Estos programas serán promovidos por el Ministerio del 
Ambiente y Energía.”
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power over the allocation of funds.  As Franz Tattenbach, an individual who was 
closely involved in FONAFIFO's early budgetary concerns, explained, if the 
Assembly does not set the money aside “the Finance Minister will steamroll you” 
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  The language in the original forestry law, he 
explains, was merely “an enabling condition”, not a binding earmark (Tattenbach, 
interview, 30 Jan 2012).
In 1997, the program's first year of operation, a suit was filed by JUNAFORCA (an 
organization representing small timber producers) and the Costa Rican Chamber of 
Forestry against the Ministry of Finance, and an agreement that transferred $7 
million for use within the PSA was reached (Watson et al. 1998).  Concerns 
remained, however, that Finance was not bound by the court injunction for future 
years as the allocation was not an act of Congress – Tattenbach explained that even if
Finance continued to provide the funds in the short term, without congressional 
action the PSA “would not survive a fiscal crisis” (30 Jan 2012).  Indeed, the actual 
transfer of funds remained haphazard for several years, coming at unpredictable 
times and in unpredictable amounts.  It was not until 2001, when the Legislative 
Assembly enacted the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (No. 8114), that a 
binding mandate was issued.  That law ultimately designated 3.5% of fuel sales to the
PSA annually (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007).  Though this was technically a 
reduction from the 5% initially identified, it was more than had ever actually been 
received to that point.
The intent of the fuel tax was to establish a level of correspondence between the 
source of conservation revenues and the conservation activity being undertaken – in 
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essence, it was to realize a financial relationship between “users” and “providers” of 
ecosystem services.  In this case, the users are carbon emitters and the providers are 
landowners whose management practices provide carbon sequestration.  It is 
possible, therefore, to interpret the tax as a “payment” by users of carbon 
sequestration, since they are being charged to counterbalance their emissions with 
forest expansion.  Many analysts, however, reject this interpretation.  Pagiola, for 
example, insists such a revenue stream can “only tenuously be regarded as a payment
by service users” because it is non-voluntary and funds are “not used solely to 
generate carbon sequestration” (2008, 715-716).  This, of course, is the nature of a 
tax; revenues are collected and then redistributed to achieve particular social and 
ecological objectives.
Others, however, saw the mechanism as more than just a “tax and spend” government
program.  Heindrichs (1997), for example, casts it as an innovative mechanism for 
application of the “consumer pays” principle, not an anti-market subsidy.  From his 
point of view, the tax “represents a very important step forward in the management of
forest resources – away from deficit-plagued, subsidized operations that are only able
to survive with the aid of state 'alms' and toward a form of profitable, competitive 
land use based on sound business principles” (Heindrichs 1997, 2).
Regardless of the particular framing used to describe the tax, its redistributive 
flexibility has allowed targeting of priority conservation areas identified through 
various ecological studies (e.g. the GRUAS reports; see Zhang and Pagiola 2011) and
the prioritization of lesser developed communities through use of the Social 
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Development Index (Porras 2010).  Existing issues notwithstanding,35 the ability to 
target the program is critically important to protecting the interests of vulnerable 
communities and ensuring that the most ecologically important areas receive first 
preference.
Key actors within the networks of the PSA program, such as Franz Tattenbach and 
John Kellenberg, however, were eager to find a replacement to tax revenue since the 
Ministry of Finance was seen to be unreliable.  In interviews with each (30 Jan 2012; 
18 Nov 2011), they reflected on how involvement of the World Bank was, in part, 
motivated by a desire to resolve this issue (explained in more detail below).  After all,
the tax was originally intended only to kickstart the program and then give way to 
market financing (Fletching and Breitling 2012; Sage and Sanchez 2002).  Indeed, 
Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, former Minister of Environment, has indicated that he saw
“the government as a temporary supplier of [financial] resources” for the program 
(Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  The National Forestry Financing Fund 
(FONAFIFO), the implementing agency for the PSA, was tasked with the realization 
of such alternative private funding sources.
Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal
In addition to carrying out the day-to-day management of the program, FONAFIFO 
is tasked with the expansion and diversification of its operating budget.  The agency 
is empowered under the 1996 Forestry Law to pursue a range of other revenue 
streams for use within the PSA program (Ley Forestal 7575, Article 47).  The law 
35 Prioritization based on regional, instead of individual, social criteria may be aiding the capture of 
benefits by the elite and exacerbating the potential for dispossession.  Use of the Social 
Development Index gives a slight preference to the poorer regions of Costa Rica, but it does 
nothing to ensure it is the poor within those regions who benefit.
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grants FONAFIFO broad “powers to obtain financing, enter into all kinds of forest-
conservation and related transactions, and develop the forestry sector” (Granados 
quoted in FONAFIFO 2005, 17).  Designed “under the 'maximum decentralization' 
model” (FONAFIFO 2005, 17), FONAFIFO has the authority to pursue a host of 
financing mechanisms, including securities, bonds, grants, loans, trust funds, “short-
term investments”, and the sale of ecosystem services (Article 47).
Figure 5.3:  “Offering resources for the development of the forestry subsector”.
While the forestry law explicitly states that FONAFIFO's fund raising activities must 
be “non-speculative” (Article 49), the agency is designed in such a way that it 
remains bound to the profit motive.  Since FONAFIFO's administrative budget is tied
to the revenue it generates for the program through a 5% internalization of funds 
(Fletcher and Breitling 2012), it has “a vital interest in identifying and developing 
new sources of funding” (Heindrichs 1997, 22).  In other words, FONAFIFO's work 
is “performance-oriented” (Heindrichs 1997, iv), which replicates the imperative of 
profit maximization.
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Beyond that, FONAFIFO's fund raising activities are aimed at realizing the radical 
market vision articulated by key actors within the institution's hierarchy.  As 
explained in Chapter 4, two agents of FONAFIFO laid out a vision for the PSA in 
which it evolves from a tax-supported, government-mediated conservation program 
into direct financial transactions between “users” and “providers” of ecosystem 
services (Sage and Sanchez 2002).  Beginning with the initial form of the new 
program, they re-conceptualized the PSA not as a subsidy, but rather as government 
“purchases” of “service rights” (Sage and Sanchez 2002).  They then envisioned the 
program's evolution through several iterations that would culminate in government 
withdrawal and idealized direct financial transactions in open markets (Sage and 
Sánchez 2002, 73).  As the former Environment Minister explains, the “ultimate goal 
is to create institutional, policy, economic, and social conditions for direct 
transactions between a provider and a user” of ecosystem services (Rodriguez, 
interview, 2 Feb 2012).
FONAFIFO's role in realizing this imagined future is in facilitating the establishment
of market transactions, thereby enabling state withdrawal.  It has pursued this 
objective in a number of ways.  From its first year of existence, the agency began to 
develop private contracts with buyers of ecosystem services (FONAFIFO 2005).  
These entailed, for example, the sale of hydrological services (e.g. filtration, flow 
control, sediment retention) to hydropower producers, municipal water suppliers, 
bottlers, and agribusiness (FONAFIFO 2005; Pagiola 2008).  Revenue generated 
from these purchases was then directed through the PSA to finance forest 
conservation.  Negotiation of buyer-contracts, however, had to be done on an 
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individual basis, thus proving costly.  In response, FONAFIFO developed the 
Certificado de Servicos Ambientales (CSA), an instrument to simplify private buyer 
involvement.36  Each CSA represents one hectare of PSA-protected forest, so instead 
of negotiating a separate contract with each new buyer, FONAFIFO could simply sell
the appropriate number of certificates.  Importantly, these CSAs may also be traded, 
which creates the mechanism by which abstracted “service commodities” may be 
circulated in markets, just as originally envisioned by Sage and Sanchez (2002).
Notably, however, these market-based sources of revenue remain fairly insignificant 
to the overall PSA budget.  More substantial supplements to the ordinary (tax) budget
have come in the form of grants and loans from international development banks and 
donor organizations.  The German development bank, Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), for example, donated €10.25 million in the year 2000 to 
support PSA payments in the Huetar Norte region of Costa Rica as an extension of a 
previous conservation project supported by the German government.  Further 
initiatives have also been negotiated by FONAFIFO with the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, and the Government of Japan, 
specifically for “reforestation” (i.e. plantation forestry) activities, though these have 
involved considerably less substantial funds (e.g. $300,000 from Japan for support of
the Reforesta project) (FONAFIFO 2005).
Most significantly, FONAFIFO has negotiated the two large-scale projects with the 
World Bank and Global Environment Facility (GEF) mentioned above.  This is a 
36 These certificates should not be confused with Costa Rica's earlier system of forestry certificates, 
as they represent an abstracted “service commodity”, not (as previously) a bond issued as direct 
government payment.
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notable achievement for several reasons.  For one, the projects have concerned over 
$80 million dollars.  For another, these projects were the first time that the Bank had 
been able to lend money to Costa Rica in a decade (World Bank 2007), since the 
controversial and intensely unpopular Structural Adjustment Plans deeply tarnished 
the institution's reputation throughout much of Latin America.
The World Bank negotiates re-entry to Costa Rica
At the time that the Ecomarkets project was being negotiated, the World Bank had no
permanent presence in Costa Rica as the San Jose field office had closed in the 1990s
due to an unwelcoming political climate.  With Structural Adjustment still ongoing, 
the government of Costa Rica was reluctant to get involved in anything that would 
“significantly increase an already heavy loan portfolio” (de Camino et al. 2000, 74).  
Not long before the Ecomarkets proposal, the government had declined to approve a 
separate project (the Conservation Area Management or “CAM” project) in an effort 
to “curtail external loans” (de Camino et al. 2000, 74).37  Bank involvement in the 
country had only recently been re-established through a grant – unveiled to much 
fanfare during a high profile visit to Costa Rica by the World Bank President himself 
(Chavez 1998).38  As such, preparation of Ecomarkets relied heavily on personal 
relationships between key actors (such as John Kellenberg, Luis Constantino, Franz 
Tattenbach, and Edgar Ortiz) at the Bank and within the Costa Rican forestry sector 
(Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).  Relationships that were established under the 
initial small-grant project opened doors and lines of communication for further 
37 As de Camino et al. (2000) indicate, an exception had been made to allow the CAM proposal, but 
it ultimately failed when the proposed project grew beyond an acceptable size.
38 The grant was $500,000 (small by Bank standards) to support the Oficina Costarricense de 
Implementación Conjunta (OCIC), which oversaw Joint Implementation projects initiated under 
the Kyoto Protocol (World Bank 2007).
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collaboration and World Bank integration.
It was from these personal connections that FONAFIFO's partnership with the World 
Bank emerged.  As explained above, this partnership began with a request for 
assistance in preparing a “medium-sized project” grant application to the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF).  “Seeing the potential for greater impact”, however, 
“the Bank recommended the [proposal] be scaled up and blended with an IBRD 
loan” (World Bank 2007, 1).39  It was an interesting development because, as John 
Kellenberg reflects, Costa Rica did not actually need to borrow the money since 
“they were in relatively good shape financially” (Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 
2011).  The case was similar to that of the failed CAM project proposal, in which 
“the Bank [had] pressed the government to support a large project that would be 
interesting to the Bank” (de Camino et al. 2000, 74).  This time, however, the loans 
were integrated into the proposal, and the project was ultimately approved.
Given its relative financial stability, a history of institutional mistrust, and no real 
need for a World Bank loan, how is it that Costa Rica found itself entering into such 
an agreement?  And for what reasons did this relationship begin?
In the eyes of Kellenberg, who was Task Team Leader for the Bank in the early days 
of the project, Costa Rica borrowed the money “because they wanted something else 
– they wanted stability, they wanted oversight, … they wanted to bring in … ideas 
from our side” (Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).  More specifically, it was 
39 IBRD stands for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the official name of 
the World Bank.
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FONAFIFO and key actors within MINAE and the forestry sector that wanted these 
things, not necessarily all elements of the Costa Rican government and certainly not 
all Costa Rican people.  To the operatives at FONAFIFO (whose mandate was to 
expand the PSA budget and whose tensions with the Ministry of Finance meant 
financial uncertainty) this relationship certainly would provide “stability”, 
“oversight”, and “ideas”.  To the average citizen (who had borne the brunt of 
austerity under Structural Adjustment) or to the segments of government hesitant to 
relinquish sovereignty to foreign debt, on the other hand, this relationship would 
provide quite the opposite:  instability, loss of oversight, and ideas that were in direct 
competition with their own.
As Edgar Ortiz recalled, however, the general public “wasn't very aware” of the 
Ecomarkets proposal, and its architects were “able to sell the project like a pretty 
good deal for the country” (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  By drawing on influential 
connections, such as Vice President Elizabeth Odio, they were able to place the loan 
agreement on the Executive agenda in the Legislative Assembly, which obliged the 
Deputies to consider the project.  Reflecting on the process, Ortiz recalled “we had 
very strong power” (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  In other words, negotiation of the 
loan provided a means for FONAFIFO to increase its political influence and advance 
its institutional objectives by way of leveraging external World Bank money.
For the Bank, on the other hand, the benefits of being involved in Costa Rica are far 
more straightforward.  First, there is the obvious return on investment – by lending to
Costa Rica the Bank will profit from interest paid.  Despite its “development” 
mission, the Bank is managed according to profit maximization orthodoxies.  Being 
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shut out from the country meant that lending and profit generation were decreased 
(albeit by a rather insignificant amount given the size of Costa Rica and the scale of 
World Bank operations).  As Tattenbach explains, “they had not been able to lend to 
Costa Rica in 10 years, [and] it was not speaking well for the World Bank, so it was 
their interest to get back in Costa Rica” (Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  As the 
high profile 1998 visit by the Bank president suggests, re-establishing a presence in 
the country was an important priority.  Second, attaching itself to Costa Rican affairs 
affords the Bank certain green credentials through “progressive” support of 
conservation.40  As John Kellenberg notes, “the GEF benefited because they were 
able to hook into” Costa Rican initiatives (Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).  
Indeed, World Bank documents celebrate Ecomarkets as “one of the first fully 
blended IBRD/GEF operations to support an ongoing conservation program” (2007, 
1).
The initial $750,000 proposal, however, would not have measured-up against the 
scale on which the World Bank normally operates.  The Bank-driven expansion of the
project (by more than 53x) reflects the ambition of certain operatives to see grand 
outcomes.  John Kellenberg, who worked on Ecomarkets, reflected on how the 
negotiations unfolded.  He recalled that “in our conversations we gradually got 
around to the point that we could do something much much bigger” than the agents 
of FONAFIFO had in mind (Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).  As he explained,
I had worked on Global Environment Facility projects in the past, and I said 
you guys could get a lot more money than you're asking for.  And so what we 
did then was we figured out roughly how much they could get from the GEF 
– we came up with the $8 million figure – and then we had to work out a co-
40 Tattenbach explains, “there was a lot of interest in this kind of climate change forestry”, and the 
World Bank President, “a good friend of President Figueres”, “was quite interested in these things”
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).
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financing arrangement to meet the requirements of the GEF (Kellenberg, 
interview, 18 Nov 2011).
Essentially, the project was designed around the availability of financial resources, 
rather than specific needs for financial assistance.  Despite assurances that Bank 
projects are “not supply driven” (Aryal, interview, 20 Dec 2011), the Bank (or at least
Bank agents) certainly have objectives of their own.  Success in negotiating large-
scale boundary-pushing deals, for example, is no doubt a factor in career 
advancement.  Indeed, Kellenberg was later promoted to Sector Leader, before 
moving to the International Finance Corporation where he holds a high-power 
management position on the Global Leadership Team of the Sustainable Business 
Advisory.
FONAFIFO was, of course, very interested in what was being proposed, as the $8 
million grant would provide windfall resources and constitute a huge success in 
terms of the agency's budgetary expansion directive.  The availability of GEF funds, 
however, came with strings attached, as the institution has many strict requirements 
regarding government partnership, especially concerning the stability of counterpart 
funding.  Given that the “Tax Simplification Law” (No. 8114) had not yet passed, the
financial stability of FONAFIFO remained in question.41  If FONAFIFO could not 
guarantee their contribution to the project, the GEF would not be willing to make the 
grant.  And so, Kellenberg explains, “that's how … we started talking about the loan” 
(Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).42
41 Despite the initial dispute with Finance, the fuel tax should not be viewed as an unreliable source 
of financing.  Indeed, when the Legislative Assembly considered removing the tax at a time of high
fuel prices, public outcry prevented it (Rodriguez, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  The fuel tax revenues 
for the PSA are quite secure given that the legislature is being held accountable for continuing the 
budget appropriation.
42 This demonstrates how the GEF, ostensibly a donor organization, actually facilitates World Bank 
lending and the integration of reluctant borrowers into the global capitalist system.
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A loan from the World Bank could provide the budgetary assurance that the GEF 
required because such an agreement would need to be ratified by the Legislative 
Assembly, thus obliging the Ministry of Finance to make its allocations.  Such 
legislative action would then compel the Ministry of Finance to make its allocations 
to FONAFIFO and guarantee its contribution to the project.  For this reason, 
FONAFIFO was also very amenable to the idea of the loan, since it would provide 
(at least temporarily) a level of fiscal security that it had never yet enjoyed.  During 
the 5-year term of the loan, the ratified agreement would provide a mandate for 
budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Finance (with or without a resolution to 
the tax question).  Essentially, FONAFIFO was acting on two fronts to sure-up its 
operating budget – resolving its dispute with the Ministry of Finance over tax 
revenue allocations through legislative action (i.e. Law 8114) and seeking temporary 
budget security through the World Bank loan.  Both actions would provide a binding 
commitment to the original “enabling conditions” outlined in Forest Law 7575.
Before the loan agreement could be brought before the Legislative Assembly, 
however, FONAFIFO still had to convince the Ministry of Finance that it was in the 
national interest, as it was the Finance Minister, not the Environment Minister, who 
would sign the agreement.  The Finance Minister, however, had to weigh many 
competing interests, concerns over the national debt load, and issues of conditionality
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012), which have historically accompanied such 
lending (as had been the case with Structural Adjustment).  Therefore, the Ministry of
Finance did not initially support the Ecomarkets project.
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In order to persuade the Finance Minister that the Ecomarkets project should be 
approved, the Environment Minister deployed the economic valuation of nature 
concept.  As he explained, “I knew that [the Finance Minister] perceived me … as 
something [of] a nice guy who has a very noble responsibility, but he tended to be 
believe that I [did not] generate progress because I [did not] generate jobs or incomes
or a lot of things” (Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  So the Environment Minister
started to “speak the language” of Finance, putting conservation in terms of the 
benefits it provided to the economy and to society:
At that time, still, [from the perspective of Finance] forests didn't contribute 
to those political targets, which [were] economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.  So we were forced to … frame our initiative in terms of the 
economics.  … And when we started talking the same language [as] the 
Minister of Finance, he understood that [the Ecomarkets project] made a lot 
of sense (Rodriguez, interview,  2 Feb 2012).43
It was an effective and persuasive strategy, but it was only one of (and not even the 
most important) reason the loan was ultimately approved, as the Finance Minister 
was primarily concerned with immediate budgetary issues (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 
2012).
The Finance Minster's primary concern was that the loan should not constitute 
additional revenue for FONAFIFO and the PSA.  The Ministry of Finance (as the 
fiduciary representative of the government of Costa Rica) would be responsible for 
repaying the loan to the World Bank.  In other words, the loan would need to be 
repaid from the national budget, not the FONAFIFO budget or future collections of 
the fuel tax (cf. Fletcher and Breitling 2012, 408).  If the loan did not replace 
FONAFIFO's tax earmark, it would effectively be increasing the government's 
43 This approach is exemplary of the wider processes of how conservationists end up articulating 
goals in financial language and how the hegemonic logic of neoliberal economics becomes 
embedded in practices that, at first glance, have rather little to do with traditional development.
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liabilities and doubling the PSA budget.  Thus it was agreed that the loan allocation 
would be a replacement of the tax earmark during the 5-year term of the project 
(Ortiz, interview, 12 Dec 2011).  It was a concession acceptable to FONAFIFO since 
the agreement would still provide assured budgetary allocations for those 5 years and
the additional $8 million GEF grant.
The primary reason the Minister of Finance approved the loan, however, was 
“because it made financial sense to him” (Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  The 
government of Costa Rica was already borrowing money to finance its operations, 
but it was doing so internally at a high rate of interest.  By taking the loan from the 
World Bank, the Ministry of Finance could substitute internal debt with external debt 
and decrease the borrowing rate from 10% to 1.5% (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  
As long as Finance did not also have to pay FONAFIFO its share of the fuel tax 
during the term of the loan, taking the money would actually result in savings for the 
government.  This was ultimately the reason the Minister relented and agreed to 
support the project (Kellenberg, interview, 18 Nov 2011).
In addition to the backing from Finance, however, the project still required support 
from key individuals in the government for its ratification.  Several “sweeteners” 
were therefore integrated into the deal.  Vice President Elizabeth Odio (the person 
who would ultimately place the loan agreement on the legislative agenda), for 
example, was an important proponent of women's empowerment, and so a measure to
increase the involvement of women was integrated into the Ecomarkets proposal 
(Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  In fact, one of the primary activities of the project 
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became increasing the enrollment of women in the PSA.44
Further support for the project was built on the prospect of receiving the $8 million 
grant from the GEF.  Considered as a whole, the Ecomarkets package (i.e. loans plus 
grant) could be interpreted as an interest-free or net-positive transaction for Costa 
Rica.45  Both FONAFIFO and MINAE viewed the Ecomarkets package as “a pretty 
good deal” (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2013).  Considering the grant alongside the loan, 
Franz Tattenbach asserts that “the truth of the matter was that the loan was [not a] 
loan” (Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012), since the grant more than made up for the
cost of interest.  In fact, he explained that some have even interpreted it as a 
“purchase” of biodiversity by global “service users” (Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 
2012).
Even still, some reluctance to approve the loan remained at the Legislative Assembly 
hearings.  As Edgar Ortiz explains, however, FONAFIFO “did a very good job in the 
National Assembly”.  He continues:
We did the analysis of comparing what it would cost having internal debt 
versus external debt, and also the whole interest rate that you are going to pay 
for having the loan and the grant (Ortiz, interview, 2 Feb 2012).
In the end, the loan agreement “was passed almost unanimously”, even receiving 
tacit support from the Libertarian Party, which “promised not to oppose it” 
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  Reflecting on this, Tattenbach explained “that 
is the extent to which there is a consensus on this in Costa Rica” (Tattenbach, 
44 Project Development Objective Indicator #2 of the Ecomarkets project is a “30% increase in the 
participation of women land owners and women's organizations” (World Bank 2000, 2).
45 The World Bank's willingness to offer such a disadvantageous loan in this instance needs to be 
understood in the context of its wider objectives, which include gaining re-entry to the country and
a broader shift towards involvement in conservation.
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interview, 30 Jan 2012).
The popularity of this arrangement at the highest levels did not wane through the 
term of the first project.  Indeed, by the time the second Ecomarkets loan (known 
formally as the “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for Environmental 
Management” project) came around, it passed through bureaucratic channels with 
considerable ease.  Relative to the first project, far fewer barriers and far less 
reluctance to borrow from the Bank stood in its way.  As Tattenbach recalled, even 
the libertarians voted in favor when it came before the Legislative Assembly 
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  Libertarian support in this instance was even 
more significant, given that the second loan differed from the first in one major way: 
it did not replace FONAFIFO's portion of the fuel tax (Ortiz, interview, 12 Dec 
2011).  In other words, the second loan is not simply swapping internal debt for 
external debt – rather, it is additional debt for the nation and additional revenue for 
the PSA.  The $30 million dollars approved by the legislature will be added to the 
Costa Rican government's total debt load.  This shows the political commitment that 
Costa Rica has to the PSA and environmental projects, but it also represents a major 
victory for the World Bank, in that it has not only achieved re-entry to Costa Rica but
also re-normalized a dependency on foreign lending to advance domestic programs.
The re-normalized relationship with the World Bank, of course, is about much more 
than simply a financial relationship.  Certainly, the Bank will generate revenue by 
lending to Costa Rica, but the real significance is in how this relationship affords the 
Bank influence over Costa Rican affairs.  Because the Bank is providing 
“assistance”, it can expect to have some say over how resources are used and how 
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initiatives evolve.  In fact, such a guarantee is explicitly written into the forestry law: 
Article 46 says that FONAFIFO will be the “instrumental legal entity, unless the 
cooperating agency or the donor establishes different conditions for the 
beneficiaries” (Ley Forestal 7575, my emphasis).46
This has played out, for example, in the case of the GEF grant.  As Tattenbach 
explains, the GEF was allowed to set the standards for prioritization and select the 
areas that would be targeted for biodiversity conservation because of the view that it 
was acting as the “buyer” of “biodiversity services” (Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 
2012).  It did so through use of the GRUAS reports, prioritizing areas within the 
Meso-American Biological Corridor.  While prioritization based on ecological 
criteria is rather sensible, the transferal of sovereignty over domestic conservation 
decisions to foreign technocrats is rather disconcerting.  The GEF is many degrees 
separated from, and not directly accountable to, the people who will actually be 
affected by their decisions.
This sort of one-off purchase of influence is certainly significant, but it is less 
important than some of the more fundamental alterations to the PSA that the Bank 
has been able to encourage.  Specifically, formulation of a new permanent revenue 
stream for the PSA bears the marks of the neoliberal ideology that is integral to 
World Bank influence.  The Canon de Aprovechamiento de Agua, or “Water Use 
Tariff”, is imbued with the ideals of direct financial transactions between “users” and 
“providers” of ecosystem services.
46 The text of the law reads:  “El Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal contará con personería 
jurídica instrumental; salvo que el cooperante o el donante establezca condiciones diferentes para 
los beneficiarios” (Article 46).
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Creation of the Water Tariff
The water tariff, as it exists today, was established by Executive Decree (32868-
MINAE) in 2006 after a long period of scientific assessment and political 
maneuvering (Rodriguez, interview, 13 Dec 2011).  The authority to do so was 
derived from the 1942 Water Law (No. 276), which stipulated that all water users 
must hold a concession and pay a fee to use the state-owned commodity.  Until the 
2006 decree, those fees were nominal, representing little more than administrative 
costs (Rodriguez, interview, 13 Dec 2011).
Beginning in 2002, the Ministry of Environment sought to expand conservation 
under the PSA by internalizing the “true cost” of nature's hydrological functions.  
When the idea of generating new revenue from water was first proposed, however, it 
was not well received, as there were concerns over the effect it would have on the 
economy.  The Environment Minister recalled, “I wanted to put a tax on water 
pollution, and everybody said 'No, are you crazy, we are going to lose 
competitiveness!'” (Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  Undeterred, the Minister 
prepared reports on the cost of degraded ecosystems to the various sectors of the 
economy (e.g. tourism, agriculture, fisheries, healthcare, energy).  One of the studies 
undertaken was an assessment of the “ecological price of water”, which was 
determined to be $2 per cubic meter (Rodriguez, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  “So,” the 
Minister explained, “that was the political baseline [where] I began negotiating” 
(Rodriguez, interview, 2 Feb 2012).  Enacting actual policy from this information, 
however, proved a formidable task, as significant questions – regarding who was 
going to pay and how new resources would be allocated – still remained.
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The tariff ultimately placed a fee on water usage rather than water pollution, being 
designed upon the existing private-buyer contracts described above.  It is a 
significant distinction that not only carries important conceptual and material 
implications, but also framed the field of support and resistance to the initiative.  
Using the information he was generating about “ecosystem services”, the Minister 
promoted the tariff to industry as an investment in “water factories” (Rodriguez, 
interview, 14 Feb 2012).  Such a framing was readily accepted by industries that had 
relatively low water consumption in the production of high value goods.  The 
national brewing company, which has annual sales of $250 million (Rodriguez, 
interview, 2 Feb 2012), for example, embraced the concept as a way of ensuring a 
clean supply of water for its operations, since the tariff would increase their 
concession fees by a mere $24,000 (Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  On the 
other hand, industries such as agriculture, which has relatively high water 
consumption in the production of low value goods, found the idea objectionable.  
Indeed, it was the agricultural sector that led resistance to institution of the tariff.  As 
the Environment Minister explained, they are “very inefficient in using water” so 
they were “not at all willing to pay” (Rodriguez, interview, 13 Dec 2011).  The 
campaign to resist the tariff centered on the argument that the Ministry of 
Environment was attempting to increase charges by an unacceptable 10000% 
(Rodriguez, interview, 13 Dec 2011).  In the end, a differentiated fee schedule was 
agreed upon (FONAFIFO n.d.) and the overall increase in water fees was 2500%, 
considerably lower than anticipated though still substantial.
Conceptually, the decision to design the tariff as a usage fee represents an important 
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shift from the “polluter pays” principle to the “beneficiary pays” principle – whereas 
the fuel tax collects revenues from carbon emitters (i.e. polluters of functioning 
ecosystems), the tariff collects revenues from water users (i.e. beneficiaries of 
functioning ecosystems).47  The distinction between the two has important 
distributive implications.  If the polluter pays, there is not necessarily a correlation 
between the contribution made and the benefits received (the burden  may be 
concentrated, but the benefits are distributed).  On the other hand, if the beneficiary 
pays, the link between the user and the provider is direct and immediate.
It is a situation similar to that which Bakker (2001; 2005) has identified in England 
and Wales, in which management of water supply has shifted away from assuring 
social equity towards achievement of economic efficiency.  It is based on the 
transformation of “consumers' entitlements” into “utility services” (Bakker 2001, 
143).  The focus of water provision in Costa Rica, however, differs slightly from the 
example in England and Wales, where the issue is privatized water supply and the 
marketization of water consumption.  In Costa Rica, the state has retained ownership 
of water, but is introducing a market-like mechanism for financing water treatment 
infrastructure (i.e. forests).  Nevertheless, by charging users of water rather than 
polluters, the tariff is being brought into greater alignment with the ideals of 
neoliberal environmental economics, regardless of how partially it might be 
implemented.  As Bakker points out, the various elements of neoliberalization “are 
not necessarily concomitant; one may privatize without deregulating; deregulate 
47 It is possible to interpret payers of the fuel tax as beneficiaries of climate mitigation from carbon 
sequestration, but since the Forest Law casts it as an impuesto de consumo, or consumption tax, 
this is a dubious understanding (Ley Forestal 7575, Article 69).  Moreover, given that revenues are 
re-purposed for provision of other services, most analysts conclude that the fuel tax “can only 
tenuously be regarded as a payment by service users” (Pagiola 2008, 716).
166
without marketizing; and commercialize without privatizing, etc” (2007, 434).
The ideological basis of this transition to usage fees and direct financial relationships 
is articulated in a range of publications by World Bank analysts (e.g. Pagiola 2008; 
Zhang and Pagiola 2011; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005; Pagiola 2007; Pagiola 
and Platais 2002; Chomitz et al. 1999).  While these perspectives are anything but 
monolithic, they generally subscribe to a characterization of PES as:
a market-based approach to conservation financing based on the twin 
principles that those who benefit from environmental services … should pay 
for them, and that those who contribute to generating these services … should
be compensated for providing them (Zhang and Pagiola 2011, 406).
Achievement of this particular framing of PES has been central to the World Bank's 
activities in Costa Rica.  As Nadim Khouri (“task team leader” for the Bank during 
the proposal phase of the second project) explains, Costa Rica had succeeded in 
instituting half of Zhang and Pagiola's equation – the PSA realizes the objective that 
“you do something good, you get payment”.  But it had not yet achieved the other – 
that is, “the beneficiary of the good deed is the one paying you” (Khouri, interview, 5
Dec 2011).  In his words, the PSA had not yet “reached nirvana” (Khouri, interview, 
5 Dec 2011).  Indeed, this was the justification used in the preparation of the second 
Ecomarkets project.
While the initial idea to expand PSA financing through water may have originated on
the Costa Rican side, the influence of the Bank on its development is particularly 
significant.  In fact, from the perspective of Dinesh Aryal, FONAFIFO's relationship 
with the Bank had been established (in part) to gain access to “some of the respected 
names” in PES development worldwide (Aryal, interview, 30 Dec 2011).  And, as 
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Tattenbach indicates, “the water legislation had a lot to do with their push” 
(Tattenbach, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  Khouri, as well, hesitates in attributing the 
final policy entirely to Costa Rican initiative.  Once an idea is on the table, he 
explains, “you get your specialists on both sides to just work together and it's really a 
joint idea very quickly” (Khouri, interview, 6 Dec 2011).
Gunars Platais, a member of the Bank team, explains that they had “many many 
conversations” with the Environment Minister, telling him “you need to be able to 
channel money back” into the places from which it was collected (Platais, interview, 
23 Feb 2012).  By doing so, the system would function much more like a user-fee, 
since there would be more direct correspondence between the “users” and 
“providers” of ecosystem services.  Platais explains that the Minister “took [this idea]
and really went with it” (Platais, interview, 23 Feb 2012).  Indeed, the final mandate 
contains language stipulating that fees collected from the tariff must be used within 
the watershed in which the revenues were generated (Decree 32868-MINAE, Chapter
IV, Article 14).48
Furthermore, the tariff contains a provision that allows water users to opt-out of 
paying the tariff directly by, instead, entering into a voluntary agreement for service 
provision (Decree 32868-MINAE) – the idea being that this will encourage reluctant 
buyers (or “free riders”) to enter the market.  As Khouri indicates, “you get all these 
little gimmicks … that show you're getting a bit closer to the ideal payment for 
48 The decree states that tariff revenues are to be used to finance payments on “terrenos privados 
dentro de la cuenca donde se genere el servicio ambiental de protección del agua y se ubiquen en 
zonas de importancia para la sostenibilidad comprobada del régimen hídrico”, or “private lands 
within the watershed that generates the environmental service of water protection and that are 
located in zones of proven importance for the sustainability of the water regime”.
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environmental service” (Khouri, interview, 6 Dec 2011).  The tariff, he explains, is “a
bit better than a general tax on one thing or the other” because “if eventually this 
thing can be privatized, it makes a lot of sense” to have such frameworks in place 
(Khouri, interview, 6 Dec 2011).  Even if it does not achieve the ideal model, “you're 
getting a bit closer” (Khouri, interview, 6 Dec 2011).  While a compulsory water 
tariff hardly realizes the pure market transactions envisioned by the program's 
architects, the World Bank appears to consider it progress towards that ultimate 
objective.  Documents from the second Ecomarkets project, for example, cast the 
tariff in a favorable light, praising its ability to generate finances “which directly 
correspond to users of the services” (World Bank 2006, 12).  Pagiola explains that 
even though a “real market” may be out of reach, “we try to get as close as we can”.  
Certainly, he explains, the tariff is “a much closer approximation … than the carbon 
tax” (Pagiola, interview, 23 Feb 2012).  Short of the ability to create actual markets 
for the sale of ecosystem services, public financing is being re-designed to behave 
according to the logics of markets.
The difference between the “tax” and the “tariff” is more than just semantics.  Rather 
than representing an expansion of taxation, as Fletcher and Breitling (2012, 408) 
suggest, the water tariff is, in certain ways, a step away from it.  Unlike the fuel tax, 
the tariff is limited in how revenues may be used in targeting important ecosystems 
or assisting lesser developed communities.  The design of the tariff re-orients the 
PSA under the logics of neoliberal economics, rather than the objectives of 
conservation or social development – payments are being made to realize (or at least 
approximate) idealized financial transactions.  The implications of this are extensive. 
Most importantly, those who reside in “wealthy” watersheds (i.e. those with 
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significant water concession holders) receive a disproportionately greater share of the
benefits of the PSA.  The consequence of the tariff, I will elaborate below, is the 
expansion of geographically uneven patterns of conservation-development.  First, 
however, I will step back to situate this empirical content in some of the theoretical 
context introduced in Chapter 2.
Conceptualizing Development and State-Led Neoliberalization
The obvious theoretical framework for exploring uneven spatial patterns of 
development is the landmark work explaining “nature, capital, and the production of 
space” – that is, of course, Neil Smith's Uneven Development (2008 [1984]).  As I 
have explained already, this framework is, in the words of Scott Prudham and Nik 
Heynen, “an attempt to fuse a conceptualisation of the uneven spatiality of capital 
accumulation with the quixotic and seemingly untenable claim that capitalism 
literally produces nature” (2011, 224).  Indeed, that book's insight into capitalism's 
production of both nature and space, and into the false dualism between nature and 
society, is integral to my analysis of the Costa Rican PSA.  Drawing on the idea that 
capitalism produces new social relations with nature that are based on the profit and 
accumulation imperatives, Smith provides the outlines for understanding how 
conservation is inextricably linked to development and the uneven distribution of 
wealth (i.e. the production of space).  What Smith's theorization enables is the re-
orientation of questions about environmental management (i.e. the conservation or 
consumption of “natural” spaces) to fundamental questions of social and ecological 
justice – who controls what resources, how, for what purposes, and to whose ultimate
benefit?
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In no uncertain terms, Smith's ideas are at play in Costa Rica; existing patterns of 
development are inseparable from the movements of capital, production, and the 
labor process.  Where conservation occurs, and what form it takes, are certainly a 
function of new productive activities such as ecotourism, bio-prospecting, carbon 
offsetting and, especially, the “sale” of ecosystem services.  Costa Rican nature is 
“increasingly a product of capitalism and, more importantly, cannot be understood 
apart from capitalist dynamics of production, circulation and exchange” (Prudham 
and Heynen 2011, 227).
The production of “natural” spaces in Costa Rica, however, as I have shown already, 
is also linked to state activities.  Indeed, private capital (currently) plays a rather 
insignificant role in Costa Rica's PSA.49  The unevenness that is the focus of this 
chapter actually arises from the decisions government has made to target limited 
financial resources for the conservation of certain areas and not others.  Rather than 
trying to design the program to break the patterns of uneven development associated 
with capitalist production, the government has chosen to emulate the market and, 
thus, reproduce familiar patterns of accumulation and inequity.  This 
neoliberalization of environmental governance in Costa Rica, as I have suggested, 
has taken place at the hand of the government and at the encouragement of World 
Bank financiers.
It is important to note, however, that involvement of the state does not foreclose on 
the existence of neoliberalization.  The work of critical scholars is emphatic about the
49 The proportion of program financing that could be regarded as market-based remains wholly 
insignificant, amounting to a mere 0.5% since the start of payments.  According to a budget report 
from FONAFIFO (2011c) revenues from private buyers amount to ₡507.5 million compared to a 
total budget of ₡99.8 billion.
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tendency of states to expand, in their efforts to form and sustain neoliberal markets 
(Peck 2010; Peck 2004; Larner and Craig 2005).  Indeed, as Fletcher and Breitling 
assert of the Costa Rican case specifically, not “all government intervention is 
inherently anti-neoliberal” (2012, 409).  Thus, the introduction of market-like 
financing to Costa Rica's PSA can be understood as the expansion of state-led 
neoliberalization, and it is possible to uncover the inequity such an agenda produces. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will investigate the consequences of Costa Rica's 
rapidly neoliberalizing approach to conservation financing and consider its effect on 
geographical patterns of conservation-development.
Uneven Conservation Development
At the encouragement of actors at the World Bank such as Stefano Pagiola, Gunars 
Platais, and Nadim Khouri, the government of Costa Rica designed the water tariff to
behave as a market-like proxy of direct financial transactions between users and 
providers of ecosystem services; the revenues generated from it must be re-invested 
in ecosystems that deliver benefits to those who have paid-in.  In other words, the 
tariff is anti-redistributive, concentrating resources in places where development is 
already established.  It will, in effect, inscribe on the landscape patterns of 
conservation that mirror existing patterns of privilege and fortune.
Thus far, however, it is still too early to observe the distributive effects of the tariff 
itself, as it has not yet been fully implemented as it was designed.  The Water 
Department is not yet equipped to track and report the source of the tariff revenues it 
collects, so FONAFIFO has been delayed in its ability to target payments in the way 
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that it is required (Pagiola, interview, 22 Nov 2011).50  It is, however, possible to 
anticipate some of the social and ecological implications it is likely to have.  Insight 
to the effect of the tariff can be drawn from what has occurred with the private 
voluntary-buyer contracts.  As the precursor and model for the tariff, these contracts 
distribute financial resources in exactly the same way – that is, payments are 
circulated from the “users” to the “providers” within the watershed in which the 
revenues were generated.  By considering the outcome of these contracts, it is 
possible to extrapolate what will happen with the tariff based on the principles and 
design of the mechanism.
The private contract established with the Compañia Nacional Fuerza y Luz (CNFL) 
is illustrative.  CNFL is a hydroelectric power producer with small “run-of-the-river” 
power stations in several locations throughout Costa Rica (Porras and Neves 2006).  
As a buyer of hydrological services, CNFL was able to specify where PSA contracts 
should be targeted, establishing spatial correspondence between its payments and the 
watersheds in which its operations are based (precisely as the tariff will do).  All of 
the revenues from the CNFL contract (approximately $5 million) were concentrated 
in four watersheds:  Aranjuez, Balsa, Cote, and Virilla (figure 5.4).
50 Importantly, this should not be interpreted as a failure of the tariff to live up to its intended design.  
All of the structures and legal frameworks are in place and the will exists, so it is only a matter of 
time before the Water Department begins generating the necessary information and revenues begin 
to be spatially targeted.  Indeed, “component 2” of the second Ecomarkets project is aimed at 
realizing this capacity (World Bank 2006, 8).
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Figure 5.4:  Watersheds in the CNFL contract (FONAFIFO 2005, 47).
The agreement stipulated that 4000ha, 6000ha, 900ha, and 4000ha from each 
watershed, respectively, were to be entered into the PSA (Porras and Neves 2006).  
These were significant concentrations of PSA contracts (see figure 5.5), particularly 
in the tiny Rio Cote watershed.  Compared with an enrollment rate of 8% nationally 
(FONAFIFO 2005), communities in these watersheds are far more densely enrolled, 
meaning that they are receiving a disproportionate share of the benefits.  Enrollment 
density is three to four times higher than the national average in the Aranjuez, Balsa, 
and Virilla watersheds and a staggering nine times higher in the Cote watershed.  
Importantly, these resources are being concentrated in these locations, not because 
174
the ecosystem has been deemed to be biologically important or because there is high 
social need, but because profitable industry is located there, ensuring expanded 













Aranjuez 15,638 ha 4,000 ha 25.58% 3.20x
Balsa 18,926 ha 6,000 ha 31.70% 3.96x
Cote 1,259 ha 900 ha 71.48% 8.94x
Virilla 14,200 ha51 4,000 ha 28.17% 3.52x
Figure 5.5:  CNFL contract targets (Porras et al. 2006)
note:  actual enrollment is currently below target, but still ongoing
The heavy concentration of conservation resources in these areas stems from the 
terms of the private agreements, which stipulate that revenues must be used to 
directly benefit the buyer.  With the tariff, these conditions are emulated through the 
spatial constraints imposed by legal mandate; tariff revenues must be used within the 
watershed in which they were generated.  Just as has been the case with the private 
buyer contracts, this will have the effect of reinforcing geographical differentiation in
two main ways.
First, conservation will become correlated with economic development rather than 
ecological diversity; the tariff will be unable to finance conservation of areas of high 
biological importance if they fall outside of any watershed with concession holders.  
While the PSA chief at FONAFIFO suggests that this is not a problem in Costa Rica 
51 Despite the being a larger watershed, payments were further concentrated in 142km2 (14,200 ha) of
the “upper part of the basin” 
(http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/aij/activities_implemented_jointly/items/1892.php).
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because no land is that far from revenue-generating water concessions (Sanchez, 
interview, 15 Feb 2012), such an assessment disregards the fact that these 
concessions are neither uniform nor correlated with the biological importance of 
adjacent ecosystems.  Indeed, early analysis has already found that much of the 
revenue generated from the tariff “must be spent in areas that are not priority 
biodiversity conservation areas” (Zhang and Pagiola 2011, 414).52  Second, the tariff 
cannot prioritize impoverished areas if no concession-holding industry is located 
there.  Early analysis has found, here as well, that “the areas to which the bulk of 
watershed payments are targeted are simply not the poorest” and that “where 
watershed payments and low social development coincide, available funding is too 
limited to have significant impact” (Zhang and Pagiola 2011, 413).
Concentrating conservation in areas that have the means of paying for it ensures only
the most privileged communities will enjoy the benefits – that is, the “services” from 
functioning ecological systems will be narrowly distributed.  This means, for 
example, the positive health effects of conservation will be delivered to communities 
that already have higher relative development.  It also means that the benefits of 
participating in the program itself (e.g. direct payments) will be captured by those 
who need them least – quite significant given the extent to which participation can 
improve a household's status.53  Furthermore, economic activities that degrade 
ecosystems (e.g. intensive agriculture and ranching) will be displaced from areas of 
52 Even though FONAFIFO lacks the data necessary to fully implement the tariff as it was designed, 
they have tried to “live up to the spirit of the law” by concentrating tariff revenues in areas of 
hydrological importance (Pagiola, interview, 22 Nov 2011).
53 A typical PSA contract pays out $5850 annually, based on an average conservation contract size of 
91.4 hectares (Zbinden and Lee 2005) and the current payment rate of $64/ha/yr.  This is a 
substantial sum in a country with average annual income of just $7640 (World Bank 2011), 
particularly since payments are usually just supplementary to “off farm” income (Zbinden and Lee 
2005).
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greater conservation-development and concentrated around poorer communities.  At 
the same time, activities that rely on diverse ecosystems (e.g. ecotourism) will 
concentrate around wealthier communities, affording not only “services” such as 
clean water and air, but also new economic opportunities.
While the tariff's design will clearly, indeed intentionally, constrain revenues in ways 
that lead to uneven conservation-development, Pagiola contends that this actually 
maximizes the PSA's benefits by helping to “ensure that [financial] resources are 
used where water needs are greatest” (Pagiola 2008, 715).  The assumption is that 
market demand reflects social need and that, by constraining the use of tariff 
revenues to those places where it was collected, limited resources can be 
concentrated where they deliver the greatest good.  Market demand, however, does 
not reflect where social need is greatest, but rather where the value of hydrological 
services is highest.  In this way, PSA financing is being reoriented towards capitalist 
logics of economic efficiency, despite the consequences of accumulation.  The result, 
given the principles and design of the new financing mechanism, is likely to be the 
uneven accumulation of conservation benefits and the related concern that “policy 
based on optimization of ecosystem-service values will not necessarily lead to the 
conservation of biodiversity” (Reford and Adams 2009, 786).
Conclusion
The neoliberalization of a program like the PSA does not simply arise out of the 
immanent processes of capitalist development, it is actively and deliberately fostered 
through an intentional development agenda.  In this case, I showed that it was 
promoted by a (quasi-autonomous) government agency, FONAFIFO, as a means of 
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accessing substantial financial resources and bolstering institutional influence, and 
that it was encouraged by an external development agency, the World Bank, driven 
by its own capitalist lending rationalities.  I emphasized the marketization element of 
neoliberalism, which is central to conceptions of payments for ecosystem services,54 
and I showed that, to bring the PSA into greater alignment with this conception, the 
program's new financing mechanism was designed to approximate market 
transactions.  Namely, the tariff establishes direct correspondence between users and 
providers of ecosystem services through a stipulation that tariff revenues must be 
used within the watershed in which they were generated.  In other words, the tariff 
emulates a market relationship by ensuring that money is exchanged as compensation
for the provision of hydrological services.  Short of the ability to create actual 
markets, public financing is being re-designed to behave according to market logic.  
Rather than trying to break the patterns of uneven development associated with 
capitalist production, the government has chosen to reproduce the conditions that 
drive it.
This, of course, is in contrast to the fuel tax, the original PSA financing mechanism, 
which enabled redistribution of revenues based on social and ecological criteria.  In 
other words, there did not necessarily have to be a direct correspondence between 
revenues the tax collected and the “services” it generated.  While the fuel tax got the 
PSA up and running, the revenue it generated for the program was seen to be rather 
unreliable, at least initially.  Until the legislature passed the Law of Tax 
Simplification and Efficiency (No. 8114), budgetary allocations from the tax to the 
54 Zhang and Pagiola, for example, suggest that PES is “a market-based approach to conservation 
financing” that establishes a direct financial link between service providers and beneficiaries 
(2011, 406).
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PSA were haphazard and incomplete, creating an urgent sense among policy officials 
that an alternative revenue stream was needed.
I showed that FONAFIFO's budgetary expansion mandate led it to pursue a wide 
range of financing mechanisms, including private buyer agreements and a market in 
Environmental Service Certificates (CSAs), but that its most significant 
development, the water tariff, began with the $80 million partnership with the World 
Bank and Global Environment Facility.  The neoliberal ideologies that inform World 
Bank conceptions of ecosystem services (Pagiola 2008; Zhang and Pagiola 2011; 
Pagiola et al. 2005) are evident in the tariff's design.  As I explained, the Costa Rican 
Minster of Environment originally intended to place a tax on water pollution and use 
the revenues, in much the same way as the fuel tax, to generate hydrological services 
through ecosystem conservation under the PSA.  Ultimately, however, a fee was 
placed on water usage rather than water pollution, which represents an important 
shift from the “polluter pays” principle to the “beneficiary pays” principle.
The distinction between these two approaches to financing has important distributive 
implications.  If the polluter pays, there is not necessarily a correlation between the 
financial burden and the recipient of the environmental benefits from conservation 
(financial assets can be redistributed according to ecological priorities and social 
need because the polluter holds no right to directly benefit).  On the other hand, if the
beneficiary pays, the financial link between the service user and the service provider 
is made direct and immediate.  Adoption of the tariff, thus, brings PSA financing into 
greater alignment with neoliberal ideals about economic transactions in a market 
environment.  As I explained, Nadim Khouri, “task team leader” during the proposal 
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phase of Ecomarkets II, understood environmental taxes as achieving only half of the
financial equation – that is, “you do something good, you get payment”.  In his view, 
it requires going a step further to realize the “ideal” relationship – that is, “the 
beneficiary of the good deed is the one paying you” (Khouri, interview, 5 Dec 2011). 
That, I showed, is precisely what the tariff was designed to do.
While the tariff hardly realizes the pure market transactions originally envisioned by 
the program's architects (e.g. Sage and Sánchez 2002), it is considered progress 
toward that ultimate objective.  World Bank documents praise the tariff's ability to 
generate finances “which directly correspond to users of the services (World Bank 
2006, 12), and Stefano Pagiola explains that while it may not be a “real market”, it is 
certainly “a much closer approximation” than the fuel tax (Pagiola, interview, 23 Feb 
2012).
My task, of course, has been to show how this effort to approximate market 
relationships is an expansion of state-led neoliberalization, in order to anticipate the 
more-than-capitalist production of uneven geographical space.  As I explained above,
Smith's path-breaking “production of nature” thesis (2008 [1984]) provides one of 
the best articulated theoretical frameworks for understanding how conservation 
decisions are inherently linked to the geographically uneven production of space.  In 
recognizing how capitalism produces new social relations with nature according to 
the profit and accumulation imperatives, Smith provides the outlines for 
understanding how conservation is inextricably linked to development and the 
uneven distribution of wealth.  This not only enables, but also demands that questions
of environmental management are re-oriented to consider issues of social and 
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ecological justice.
Drawing on evidence from the program's precursor and basing assertions on the 
principles of their common design, I concluded that those who reside in “wealthy” 
watersheds (i.e. those with significant water concession holders) stand to gain a 
disproportionately greater share of the benefits from the PSA under its neoliberalized 
tariff financing.  This is likely to occur because of the provision in the decree that 
mandates revenues generated from the tariff must be re-invested in ecosystems that 
deliver benefits to those who have paid-in.  The result is that the tariff is unable to 
finance conservation of areas of high biological importance if they fall outside of any
watershed with water concession holders, and it cannot prioritize impoverished areas 
if no concession-holding industry is located there.  What is particularly significant in 
this case is that financial resources are being concentrated in particular watersheds, 
not because of their biological importance or the local community's social need 
(those factors are never evaluated in the expenditure of tariff revenues), but because 
they ensure the production of services for concession-holding industry.
Notionally, the tariff allows greater local control over conservation management, as 
financial resources cannot be transferred from one watershed to another.  However, 
the tariff also shifts the responsibility for targeting funds for conservation from 
government to industry actors, from being carried out in the public interest to being 
carried out according to private ones; revenues from the fuel tax could be re-
distributed to priority conservation areas, whereas revenues from the tariff must be 
used to benefit the concession-holders that paid in.  Identification of conservation 
target areas is left for the (simulated) market to determine.  While this may reveal 
181
where and which services have the greatest economic value, it does far less to 
indicate where and which are the most important.  In effect, this financing 
mechanism does more to ensure that those who have the means to pay for 
conservation are the ones who are able to enjoy the benefits of it, and less to ensure 
local communities are responsible for their local environments.
Obviously, the ecosystem services concept is a persuasive rhetorical device (it was 
used to convince the Minister of Finance that conservation should be a priority and it 
was used to justify a new financial burden to various sectors of the Costa Rican 
economy), but it is essential to look beyond the way in which the concept is used to 
communicate the importance of ecosystem conservation, to see where it is likely to 
lead.  When it is used to actually manage ecosystems according to the logics of 
neoliberal economics, I have shown, it will result in uneven conservation-
development and distributional injustice.
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CHAPTER VI
Neoliberalization of PSA Contracting
Forestry in Costa Rica has undergone a dramatic transformation over the last several 
decades.  A country once infamous for an unmatched rate of deforestation has 
become one of the most highly regarded for its conservation achievements.  In this 
transition, the work of the professional forester has shifted from overseeing 
extraction and managing timber plantations to (mainly) overseeing the conservation 
of existing forest ecosystems.  Under the PSA, it is the forester that provides the 
expertise for managing ecosystems to deliver ecosystem services.  These changes in 
professional practice, however, go beyond simply the type of work being carried out, 
to include important structural changes to how work is organized.  The 
decentralization and privatization of the labor force has re-shaped both the 
experience of work and the operation of the PSA program, which has, in turn, 
brought about an individualization of landowner participation.  These changes have 
had important effects on PSA contracting and, ultimately, on who benefits from the 
ecosystem service payments that are made.
This chapter explores how the neoliberalization of forestry work (through the 
promotion of competitive PSA contracting) has resulted in an uneven distribution of 
benefits and a comparative advantage for larger landowners.  First, I will articulate a 
conceptual frame for this chapter by drawing upon Marxist theories of the “coercive 
laws of competition” and more recent work on scalar tensions between competition 
and cooperation.  Then I will provide context for what has occurred in Costa Rica, 
through a detailed overview of the forestry industry, including its privatization and 
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decentralization.  Following that, I will discuss the effect of these actions on the 
operation of the PSA by drawing on three organizations that have been involved in 
contracting.  Specifically, I will explain how the existing system has fostered 
competition among forestry workers, and I will outline what effect this has had on 
program participation.  Then I will explore the tensions between competition and 
cooperation through an assessment of the (now defunct) group contracting 
mechanism.  Finally, I will discuss the implications of these changes to PSA 
contracting – namely, I will illustrate how competition has not decreased the cost of 
participation for all landowners, but rather has disproportionately benefited the larger
and (usually) wealthier among them.
Competition and Cooperation
Coercive Laws of Competition
“Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront 
the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him” (Marx 1976, 
381).
Competition under the PSA was introduced as a means of pursuing economic 
efficiency.  While there is evidence to suggest that the cost of participating in the 
program has declined for some landowners (explained in detail below), an 
understanding of how the “immanent laws of capitalist production” manifest through 
competitive structures and force pursuit of capital accumulation is essential to 
appreciating the wider significance of these changes.
Harvey (2010) identifies the “coercive laws of competition” as the conditions that 
impel actors within a capitalist system to pursue accumulation and profit-
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maximization, despite the destructive consequences it may bear upon nature and 
society.  As he explains, if an actor in a capitalist system does not “reinvest in 
expansion and a rival does, then after a while [he or she is] likely to be driven out of 
business” (2010, 43).  Actors within the system “need to protect and expand [their] 
market share” (Harvey 2010, 43), in order to remain viable.  Regardless of what other
motivations or desires they might have, the coercive laws of competition impel 
pursuit of actions that maximize profit and accumulate wealth.
Perhaps one of the most poignant examples of this is the Ermen & Engels Mill of 
Victorian Manchester, which was underwritten by the wealthy father of Friedrich 
Engels, Marx's closest colleague.  Somewhat incongruously with his writings, Engels
himself spent two decades working in a management position in the mill (Hunt 
2010).  The conditions of workers in Victorian Manchester were absolutely 
deplorable (Engels 1993), and the young socialist thinker, no doubt, would have 
wanted to improve them in his own mill.  But what could have been done?  While the
co-owners and even Engels' own family would not likely have permitted anything 
radical (Hunt 2010), an even greater barrier to progressive action in the interest of 
workers was presented by the coercive laws of competition.  Improvement of 
conditions and payment of fair wages would have rendered the company 
uncompetitive and ensured its failure.  If the mill failed, it would simply have been 
replaced by a rival that was willing to submit to the coercive laws.  Regardless of 
what Engels might have wanted, he was constrained by the system in which society 
operated.  While there is a degree of irony in this co-author of the The Communist 
Manifesto profiting from the labor of others and, indeed, in that those profits 
supported the work of Marx himself (Hunt 2010), there are structural barriers to what
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could have been achieved and that compel a particular relationship between actors 
within a capitalist economy.
In addition to constraining the actions of individual capitalists, these coercive laws 
cause innovations that expand profit to propagate throughout the entire system, 
regardless of the social or environmental harm they may cause.  As Cleaver points 
out, “competition acts to circulate productivity-raising technological change” (2011, 
1).  When innovation occurs and costs are reduced, the innovator gains an advantage 
and captures a greater share of the surplus value.  With expanded production, supply 
increases, driving down prices and ultimately threatening the market share of others.  
Rivals are, thus, “under pressure to adopt the same or similar productivity-raising 
innovations” (Cleaver 2011, 2), and the new technologies or practices diffuse 
throughout the system.  In other words, the coercive laws of competition also drive 
the uptake of technologies.
Marx provides greater conceptual clarity on the means by which this occurs in 
volume one of Capital, characteristically centering the origin of these “coercive 
laws” in the structural dynamics of a capitalist system.  As he explains, “a scientific 
analysis of competition is possible only if we can grasp the inner nature of capital” 
(Marx 1976, 433) – we must understand how capitalist production drives 
competition, in order to understand how competition elevates profit over social or 
environmental responsibility.  Marx explains the relationship between innovation and
the value of commodities with recourse to the labor theory of value; he says “the law 
of the determination of value by labour-time” compels “the individual capitalist who 
applies the new method of production … to sell his [sic] goods under their social 
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value” (Marx 1976, 436).  In other words, the idea that labor is the source of all value
means that the value of goods decreases when innovation reduces the labor required 
to produce them, which in turn creates a difference between the “individual value of 
the cheapened commodity” and the average value ascribed by society (Marx 1976, 
436).  The result is that the innovator captures a greater market share and surplus 
value compared to rivals whose goods require greater labor investment.  This means 
that rivals must adopt the same innovations in order to recover their shares and 
remain viable.  In this way, it is actually the same law of the determination of value 
by labor-time, “acting as a coercive law of competition”, that is forcing the 
innovator's competitors to adopt the new method of production (Marx 1976, 436).  
Ultimately, it is the structural dynamics of the capitalist system that drives the uptake 
of new technologies or practices, even if they are destructive to society or the 
environment.
Scalar Tensions between Competition and Cooperation
A question of important relevance to the material implications of this concerns the 
scales at which these coercive laws of competition operate.  The economy, after all, is
not composed of entirely disconnected actors competing in every way.  A great deal 
of cooperation occurs between rivals at particular scales.  As Neil Smith points out, 
corporations cooperate broadly within nation-states to influence the regulatory 
environment and establish common labor laws, infrastructure, communications 
networks, and national defense, even while they may compete for market share, 
product identity, and technological advantage at different scales (2003, 228-229).  It 
can be seen that the existing scalar organization of the economy emerged as “a vital 
geographical means for coordinating and arbitrating economic competition between 
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capitals” (Smith 2003, 229).
Importantly, Smith explains, “the geographical scales of human activity are not 
neutral 'givens', not fixed universals of social experience”, but rather a product of the 
very communities that operate within them (Smith 2003, 228).  Not only is scale “a 
materially real frame of social action”, it is a socially produced “platform and 
container of certain kinds of social activity” (2003, 228).  In other words, the scales 
at which particular social interactions occur are themselves produced within the 
context of social, economic, and political relationships that enable or proscribe 
particular forms of social enterprise.  “At the very least”, Smith continues, “different 
kinds of society produce different kinds of geographical scale for containing and 
enabling particular forms of social interaction” (Smith 2003, 228).
Thus, the scales at which economic actors are brought into competition or 
encouraged to cooperate are not arbitrary; they emerge from existing power relations 
and serve narrow interests (or are, otherwise, deliberately produced by powerful 
actors to achieve some specific political or economic ends).  There is a certain 
intentionality to the scalar organization of the economy that serves to elevate the 
interests of specific actors above those of others.  As such, “the demarcation of scale 
should be seen as absolutely central to the processes and politics of uneven 
geographical development” (Smith 2003, 229).
In Costa Rica, there have recently been two significant scalar shifts in the political 
and economic organization of the forestry industry:  the individualization of forestry 
work and the individualization of landowner participation.  Both have occurred in a 
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neoliberal push to dissolve collective organization and reconstitute particular power 
structures.  In the pages that follow, I will demonstrate how the coercive laws of 
competition are at play in forestry management planning, as professional foresters 
compete to provide management-planning services.  Foresters, in this case, have been
deliberately organized into a competitive system under the presumption (and pretext) 
that it will result in increased efficiency (through a process of downward bidding 
wherein prices stabilize at the lowest possible rates).  I will show, however, that the 
effect of this competition has not only been to place profit-maximization ahead of 
social or environmental responsibility, it has also resulted in the uneven distribution 
of benefits, as the savings from efficiency gains are delivered to the largest and 
wealthiest participants in the program.  Then, shifting the focus to the participants 
themselves, I will explore the tensions between competition and cooperation in the 
second scalar shift, which saw the replacement of community level contracting with 
the coordination of contracts at the individual level, further compounding the 
problem of large landowner advantage.
Forestry in Costa Rica
In moments of transition there are opportunities for political and economic 
transformation, as legal frameworks are amended and governing structures are 
renegotiated.  One such moment arose in the aforementioned reorientation of Costa 
Rica's forestry sector from extraction to conservation.
In stark contrast to its history, forestry in Costa Rica today is primarily about 
management for conservation purposes (Evans 1999).  While some timber production
still occurs, it is tightly controlled; cutting requires a permit and detailed management
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plan, activities are monitored by professional foresters, domestic timber transport 
must be certified, and exports are closely tracked (Navarro and Thiel 2007).  
Moreover, an outright ban of land-use conversion was instated under the 1996 
Forestry Law (Law 7575), meaning that lands with existing forest may no longer be 
brought into production.  Hence the timber produced in Costa Rica comes almost 
entirely from plantations.  Though it is a relatively minor aspect, the PSA actually 
continues to support these activities through three contract modalities:  
“reforestation” (i.e. plantation forestry), “forest management” (i.e. selective cutting), 
and agroforestry (i.e. integrated timber and crop production) (Decreto-37660 2013).55
The conservation modality of the PSA, however, makes up the vast majority – 
upwards of 90% (Porras 2010) – of contracts that are entered into the program.56  
This is partly because such contracts are easier to implement, both in terms of the 
management plan required from the forester (Alfaro, interview, 23 Jan 2012) and in 
terms of the actions required by the landowner (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  
But conservation is also partly more popular because there is greater profit potential 
and lower opportunity costs associated with it; forest may not legally be removed so 
one of the only ways to make land with forest “productive” is through enrollment in 
the PSA.  In other words, the conservation modality does not need to compete with 
the more lucrative land uses (such as intensive agriculture and ranching) with which 
the “reforestation” modality, for example, must.
55 Manejo de Bosque or “forest management” is occasionally referred to as  “sustainable forest 
management” (SFM).  It is the name used for a very limited form of timber harvesting from 
“natural” (i.e. non-plantation) forests.  The SFM modality is controversial and was temporarily 
eliminated from the PSA during the years that Carlos Manuel Rodriguez was Minister of 
Environment.  As he put it, “one thing I had very clear … is that sustainable logging in Costa Rica 
is not sustainable.  … If you see where [Costa Rica] gave sustainable forestry permits, today we 
don't have forest there” (Rodriguez, interview, 13 Dec 2011).
56 Recently, the conservation modality was further sub-divided into standard forest protection, forest 
protection in “conservation gaps”, protection of hydrological resources, and “natural regeneration” 
(Decreto-37660 2013).
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Presently, the PSA is managed by FONAFIFO, the quasi-governmental agency 
created originally to oversee the financial assets of national forestry programs.  
FONAFIFO has its origins in a period of broader government decentralization during
the early 1990s.  The ministry responsible for environmental policy at the time, 
MIRENEM,57 was led by René Castro, who enthusiastically pursued policies that 
relied on “cutting-edge technical and administrative skills and ideas learned abroad” 
(Silva 2003, 102).  These took a decidedly neoliberal disposition, emphasizing 
“administrative decentralization … and [relying] on market-oriented policy 
instruments for both regulation and financing” (Silva 2003, 102).  When it was 
designed, FONAFIFO was given a special hybrid public/private status to allow 
greater flexibility in managing various revenue streams, allowing it access to public 
finances, but sheltering its private revenue streams from ordinary bureaucratic 
channels.
Responsibility for forestry financing had been transferred to FONAFIFO from the 
Dirección General Forestal (DGF or “General Forestry Directorate”), which was the 
agency established under Costa Rica's first Forestry Law in 1969 (Law 4465) to 
regulate and control forestry activities (FONAFIFO 2005).  The DGF was further 
empowered by the second Forestry Law in 1986 (Law 7032) and organized around a 
traditional “top-down”, command and control model that employed professional 
foresters to oversee and monitor forestry activities (Lansing 2013).  It was also an 
important forum for peasant organizations and a champion of “social forestry” 
57 MIRENEM is the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energia, y Minas (Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy, and Mines).  Its creation moved the Forestry Directorate and the Park Service 
out from under the Ministry of Agriculture.  It was eventually succeeded by MINAE (Ministry of 
Environment and Energy).
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policies that incorporated social development into forest management.  The agency, 
however, was chronically understaffed, under-equipped, and suffered from low 
morale.  Concentration of staff in San Jose also meant that oversight of forestry 
activities was limited and corruption commonplace (Silva 2003).
Foresters employed by the DGF were responsible for a broad array of management 
activities including permitting, management of finances, oversight of resource 
extraction, forestry research, long-range planning, and formulation of industrial 
policy (Silva 2003, 103).  As its responsibilities expanded, the ill-equipped agency 
acquired a reputation for being ineffective.  Eventually a “general consensus 
developed … that the DGF had too many responsibilities and that consequently it 
was unable to accomplish any of them well” (Silva 2003, 103).  The agency's 
responsibilities were gradually stripped away so that it could focus on control and 
oversight.
Privatizing the Labor Force
The DGF resisted inter-agency moves to decrease its authority, but further 
administrative restructuring facilitated the transition over the agency's objections.  
The Environment Law of 1995 (Law 7554) transformed MIRENEM into MINAE 
(the Ministry of Environment and Energy) which then unified forest management 
under a new administrative body called SINAC, the Sistema Nacional de Areas de 
Conservación (Navarro and Theil 2007).  This re-organization allowed power 
relationships to be re-ordered and control to re-consolidated.  By appointing a single 
person to head all three departments concerned with forest management (DGF, 
National Park Service, and Wildlife Service), SINAC consolidated control of forest 
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policy under the new market-oriented faction that had been ushered in by René 
Castro.  While the move had the beneficial effect of dislodging entrenched 
extraction-oriented thinking, it simultaneously eliminated the institutional advocate 
for social development within forest policy.58
Responsibility for managing forestry finances was, at this point, transferred from the 
DGF to FONAFIFO, and the various trust funds were consolidated into a single 
account (FONAFIFO 2005).  Eventually, the foresters themselves were transferred 
out of government employment, and forest management was organized into private 
regencias (individualized supervision of forest properties by independent foresters).  
The move was, of course, precipitated by Castro's market-oriented faction and 
motivated by the idea that private independent contracting of forest management 
services would create competition and place downward pressure on service costs.  
With its financing, control, and oversight responsibilities effectively privatized, the 
DGF was a mere shell of an organization.  It was eliminated entirely after passage of 
the 1996 Forest Law (Law 7575) (Silva 2003).  At this point, forest policy took “a 
decidedly more market-friendly tack where private sector timber production was 
concerned” (Silva 2003, 105).  As Silva explains, “[c]ommand and control were out; 
liberalizing and privatizing permitting, extraction, and transportation were in” (2003, 
105).
One of the more significant effects of the DGF's demise was on the conduct of 
forestry work.  Under the regencia system, professional forestry engineers operate as 
58 N.B. extraction and social development are not necessarily conjoined.  A common misconception 
is that social development comes at the cost of environmental conservation.  In actuality, important
conservation measures can be taken alongside more equitable development strategies.
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independent contractors in the private sector.  Regentes forestales, or “forestry 
regents”, as they are called, are responsible for the on-the-ground implementation of 
most aspects of forest management in Costa Rica, including conservation under the 
PSA.  They are trained at one of two technical institutes and then licensed by their 
professional association, the Colegio de Ingenieros Agrónomos or Institute of 
Agricultural Engineers.  They are not employed by the government or FONAFIFO, 
but rather are paid directly by their client landowners (Navarro and Theil 2007).  
Apart from the submission of prepared PSA applications and the occasional 
inspection, they have little contact with official authorities.  This decentralization has 
created a private industry of professional foresters that operates independently from 
most government functions (Silva 2003).
The idea behind the regente system was that it would “free public sector personnel to 
concentrate on inspection and oversight [of regentes] instead of on the permitting 
process [itself]” and, thus, “eliminate opportunities for the corruption of public 
officials” (Silva 2003, 105).  By removing their authority to issue management 
permits, officials would (theoretically) be more honest in their compliance 
inspections, as opportunities for bribes and kickbacks would be reduced.  Regentes 
are supposedly unable to accept such temptations, since they are subject to 
inspection.  As Navarro and Theil (2007, 19) suggest, however, the verification 
system is understaffed and inadequately financed.  Additionally, the compensation 
methods of the private system have introduced a serious conflict of interest, as 
regentes are paid only when they attest that their client landowners are compliant 
with the management plans outlined in their PSA contracts (Alice, interview, 3 Nov 
2011).  Obviously, the integrity of the system is a matter of accountability, not an 
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issue of whether forest managers are publicly or privately employed.  Nevertheless, 
the ill-repute of DGF foresters contributed to the industry's ultimate privatization.
A stronger explanation of the effort to move foresters out of government employ is 
that it would “free central office personnel to devote more time to agenda setting, 
planning, and policy formulation”, which, under current administration, has meant 
pursuit of “cutting-edge market-oriented strategies to fund biodiversity conservation”
(Silva 2003, 110).  Beyond accountability and policy innovation, however, 
privatization of the forestry profession was also presumed to increase efficiency, as 
regentes would be required to compete for clients and, thus, drive down costs.  While
some regentes indicate that this has begun to occur (Valenciano, interview, 7 Feb 
2012; Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012), the benefits of the competitive system have 
not been evenly distributed.  As I will show, the result has primarily been lower per-
hectare enrollment costs for large landowners, not across-the-board lower rates for all
participants.
Operation of the PSA
Landowners wishing to do any kind of forestry-related activity must contract a 
licensed regente to prepare a management plan.  These plans are legally required in 
all circumstances for extractive activities (timber production, agroforestry, 
sustainable forest management) and for non-extractive activities (forest regeneration 
or conservation) if they are to be supported by the PSA. 
In order to participate in the PSA, a landowner must present an application to 
FONAFIFO consisting of a management plan and other supporting documents (such 
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as land title or documentation of secure possession, proof of payment of taxes, and 
evidence of good standing with the national insurance program) (Pagiola 2008).59  
Regentes are technically only required for preparation of the management plan and 
annual inspections, though they typically assist in the entire application process.  
Landowners contract regente services on the private market and compensate them 
through a percentage of the payments received from PSA enrollment (figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1:  Payment Scheme
59 Prior to 2003, the application process had been handled by SINAC (Pagiola 2008), but was 
transferred to FONAFIFO due to that agency's reputation for efficient management (Platais, 
interview, 23 Feb 2012).  Additionally, aspects such as evidence of good standing with the national




While some regentes work as salaried staff for non-governmental organizations or 
cooperatives, most are independent contractors.  The rate that independent regentes 
are paid is agreed upon with each of their client landowners and set in a contract.  
Typically, this is between 10 and 12% of the annual PSA payment (Gonzales, 
interview, 14 Feb 2012; see figure 6.2), but the percentage rate is highly contingent 
upon the size of the land enrolled.  The smallest landowners are frequently charged 
upwards of 18% (Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012).
If the application is accepted and the land is enrolled in the PSA, the landowner must 
manage the land according to the regente's plan in order to receive payment.  Routine
inspections are carried out by the regente to ensure that the contract is being 
followed, and spot checks are performed by FONAFIFO to ensure the integrity of 
regente reports.  An illustrated overview of the entire PSA contracting process is 
presented in Appendix 4.
Legally, regente fees are limited to 18% of the environmental service payment 
received by their client landowners.  The rate that is charged in practice is typically 
determined by contract size, contract modality, and ease of site access (Valenciano, 
interview, 7 Feb 2012), all factors that affect the amount of labor required on the 
regente's behalf.  Significantly, the government plays almost no role in regulating 
these agreements to ensure just outcomes.  The 18% limit is loosely enforced, and 


































































































Figure 6.2:  Payments and Fees
(derived from Decreto-37660, 2013)
Informant #1, interview, Jan 2012).  One PSA official even acknowledged being 
aware of contracts set at rates as high as 50% (Confidential Informant #2, interview, 
Feb 2012).  Those that are charged illegally high rates are almost exclusively the 
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smallest landowners.  This occurs because, on the smallest contracts, the fee is not 
great enough below the 18% limit to generate a living wage for the regente (Zuñiga, 
interview, 30 Jan 2012).
While Costa Rican law does specify minimum wages for private industry (Decree 
37784-MTSS), these are of little relevance to self-employed independent contractors 
like regentes.60  It is up to regentes themselves to decide the least they are willing to 
accept.  According to one active regente, the smallest viable conservation contract 
(without exceeding the 18% limit) is 30 hectares (Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012).61  
The administrative expenses of contracts smaller than that simply cannot be justified 
without charging more than the limit.  While the PSA officially allows contracts 
“from one hectare onward” (FONAFIFO 2005, 40), contracts smaller than 30 
hectares and below 18% will not generate a wage great enough to sustain the 
regente's livelihood.  The effect is that the smallest owners are excluded entirely or 
illegally charged more than 18%.  Only when the property is considerably larger 
(and, thus, the contract value is considerably high), is there room for competition.
Despite the exclusion of the smallest landowners that has resulted from the 
privatization and deregulation of forestry work, the removal of government 
safeguards, in this instance, was not viewed as placing a vulnerable population at 
risk.  Rather, it was interpreted as freeing the labor force into a dynamic market 
60 The Colegio de Ingenieros Agrónomos further sets a guideline professional wage of ₡20,000/hr 
(about $40/hr) that regentes should earn (Colegio 2011).  As it is an official “contact hour” rate 
(like that a lawyer would charge), however, it also bears little correspondence to actual earned 
wages.
61 Note that the cost calculations are different for other modalities (i.e. agroforestry and reforestation)
due to differences in the management plans and in terms of productivity – modalities that produce 
timber obviously generate a return from the eventual timber sale.
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where competition would drive down service fees and ultimately benefit landowners.
It is based on the assumption that competition will compel regentes to charge the 
lowest amount possible in delivering the services required of them.
Competition
If the objective of privatizing forestry work was to reduce regente compensation 
through competitive contracting, there is evidence to suggest that it has “succeeded”. 
At the start of the program, most regentes charged a standard across-the-board rate of
18% for forest management planning (Ewing, interview, 13 Jan 2012).  This was a 
matter of convention, as most were unsure of what it would cost them to provide the 
service, and the mandated maximum became “a sort of de facto standard” (Pagiola, 
interview, 23 Feb 2012).  As the program progressed, however, regentes began 
competing for the more lucrative contracts, and rates have fallen as low as 6 or 8% in
some cases (Valenciano, interview, 7 Feb 2012; Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012).
The mechanism by which this occurs relates to the coercive laws of competition.  
While these theories were formulated around the traditional production of goods, 
with competition through productivity-raising technological innovation, they are 
equally applicable to the provision of services, with competition through cost-saving 
changes to practice.  In the case of PSA contracting, regentes are compelled to lower 
rates and cut costs in order to obtain contracts and stay in business.  Constrained by 
the threat of losing market share to rivals, they must set aside social and 
environmental motivations and pursue economic efficiency.  Through an iterative 
process of downward bidding, the price stabilizes at the lowest possible rate, favoring
those regentes that are able to deliver services in the cheapest way.  According to the 
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neoliberal orthodoxy that instated this competitive system, without competition 
“rational” profit-maximizing agents would conceal information about the “true cost” 
of their services and continue to charge unnecessarily high rates.  Competition is the 
only way, dogma suggests, to align innate self-interest with downward pricing, reveal
the true cost of regente services, and eliminate “waste” in overcompensation.  Indeed,
lower regente fees are celebrated as a triumph of the free-market system, in that 
regente compensation has stabilized at the most “efficient” levels.
There are, of course, obvious benefits associated with the apparent decline in regente 
rates; lower fees for landowners participating in the program means a greater share of
the budget is being used to generate “ecosystem services”, and less for program 
administration.  Additionally, increased net-payments to landowners are arguably 
contributing to the enhanced social well-being of local communities.  Unfortunately, 
this assessment does not fully appreciate the justice implications of the declining 
rates.  In fact, closer examination reveals that competition has not caused the cost of 
participation to decline evenly for all involved.  As I've indicated already, the 
smallest landowners, whose contracts are far less lucrative, are still charged upwards 
of 18% or more (Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012; Confidential Informant #1, 
interview, Jan 2012; Confidential Informant #2, interview, Feb 2012).62  Competitive 
contracting, in other words, has created a differentiated fee schedule that 
disproportionately benefits the wealthier larger landowners, thus exacerbating 
existing inequities.
62 This information comes from two experienced regentes and a PSA official with detailed 
knowledge of contracting practices.
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Uneven Benefits
The reason for the uneven decline of regente rates concerns the cost of management 
planning.  As would be expected, it costs more to prepare a large contract than it does
to prepare a small one.  However, as there are many fixed-costs associated with the 
process (Miranda et al. 2003), large contracts are only marginally more expensive to 
prepare (figure 6.3).  This means that the per-hectare cost of preparing a large 
contract can actually be far lower than it is for a small one.  Considering that a 
regente must do the same paperwork, the same field visits, and the same billing and 
accounting procedures, regardless of contract size, it matters rather little (in terms of 
cost) if the contract is for 30 hectares or 250.63  However, since payout is a function 
of contract size (i.e. regentes receive a percentage of the per-hectare payments made 
to their client landowners), this makes large contracts vastly more lucrative.
Figure 6.3:  Cost of Contract Preparation
63 Certainly, inspections of larger properties require greater time, but the costs of such field visits are 
overwhelmingly dictated by other factors – travel to a 30 hectare site may be no less expensive 
than travel to a 250 hectare site, and administrative procedures may be identical (Zuñiga, 
interview, 30 Jan 2012).
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At the current payment rate of $64/ha/yr, the value (to the landowner) of a 250 
hectare conservation contract is $16,000/yr, minus regente fees.  Likewise, a 30 
hectare contract is worth $1920/yr, minus fees.  With only marginally more work 
required for the large contract that carries a vastly higher payout, there is obviously 
far greater potential for the regente to profit, as well as far greater potential for 
savings through regente competition.
Assuming that the regente is entitled to a living wage, there is a certain minimum rate
that must be charged for each contract, given the particular level of effort required.  If
a regente must budget, for example, one week per year to fulfill the responsibilities 
of a 30 hectare contract,64 the most that can (legally) be taken home for that week of 
work is 18% of $1920, or about $345.  However, on a 250 hectare contract, an 
equivalent wage of $345/wk can be derived from a fee as low as 6.5%, even if such a 
larger contract would require a threefold time commitment (i.e. $345 x 3 weeks / 
$16k).  This means that a regente can offer far lower rates to larger landowners and 
still generate a living wage.
Regentes will compete for 250 hectare contracts because there is great potential for 
profit even if they must significantly lower fees. On the other hand, few will compete
for a 30 hectare contract because there is little room for negotiation, given that they 
are unable to earn a living wage at rates much below the maximum 18% fee.65  The 
64 Note that, in practice, the work a regente is far less compartmentalized.  Regentes work on a 
portfolio of contracts simultaneously, and differing levels of attention are required at different 
stages in the contract cycle (e.g. when soliciting clients, when preparing the initial application, and 
when conducting the annual inspection).  Nevertheless, such time budgeting can be illustrative, and
some regentes do, indeed, budget their time in this manner.
65 These estimations of contract preparation expenses are for PSA contracts submitted under the 
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result is a two-tiered fee schedule, affirming Silva's assertion that “the regente system
privileges larger landowners over smallholders and poor peasants” (2003, 112).  
Competition has clearly given a comparative advantage to larger, wealthier 
landowners and is, thus, contributing to an expansion of wealth disparity.
Efficiency
To some, however, the uneven decline of regente rates is not a pressing concern and 
merely reflects the “true cost” of delivering ecosystem services on a case-by-case 
basis.  Pagiola et al., writing for the World Bank, for example, suggest that payments 
for ecosystem services “was conceptualized and undertaken as a mechanism to 
improve the efficiency of natural resource management, and not as a mechanism for 
poverty reduction” (2005, 239).66  Under this reasoning, the PSA should be 
concerned with efficiency in delivering ecosystem services, rather than equity in 
regente fees.  A high-level consultant for FONAFIFO, for example, dismissed the 
importance of ensuring equitable rates for small landowners, mincing no words in 
saying that “larger landowners … are the ones who are more suitable for these type 
of payments, and since Costa Rica wants [to maximize] environmental services, I 
don't see any difference to pay them” (Confidential Informant #2, interview, Feb 
2012).  In other words, if larger landowners can deliver greater services at a lower 
cost, the PSA can maximize its conservation outcomes by providing a competitive 
advantage to them.  As Porras explains, this perspective is based on a belief that 
conservation modality.  Management plans for other modalities, e.g. reforestation and forest 
management, are far more complex and require entirely different calculations.  Given that my 
primary focus is on conservation through the PSA (and that upwards of 90% of contracts are under 
the conservation modality), I have not provided analysis of other modalities here.
66 Importantly, as Miranda et al. indicate, this was not the view of the program's architects; “from the 
outset the state and various social organisations assumed [the PSA] would contribute to rural 
poverty alleviation” (2003, i).
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“[l]arge properties managed with a shrewd business perspective will always present 
better economies of scale than small, fragmented individual farms” (2010, 14).  The 
efficiency gains from favoring larger landowners are, thus, from this perspective, 
“economically and environmentally justifiable” (Porras 2010, 14-15).
In recognition that such a concern for efficiency problematically side-steps issues of 
equity, Chomitz et al. (also writing for the World Bank) identify an “alternative view 
of equity” (1999, 165) that excuses uneven per-hectare compensation.  This view 
understands equity in terms of compensating all landowners who provide services “to
some degree” (Chomitz et al. 1999, 165).  Noting that budget constraints have 
prevented universal enrollment of landowners wishing to participate in the PSA, this 
view shifts the focus onto uneven enrollment and away from uneven rates – indeed, it
sees no contradiction in suggesting that “landowners who provide more services 
should get higher payments” (Chomitz et al. 1999, 165).  If large contracts offer 
greater conservation at lowers costs per hectare, then uneven compensation is 
justified.  While not explicitly endorsing this “alternative view”, Chomitz et al. 
(1999) have offered a framing of justice that excuses the advantage that large 
landowners receive based on their more “efficient” delivery of services.
The “Cuota” – Vestige of a Bygone Era
Despite the rise of competition in forestry work, there is one important mechanism 
for non-competitive contracting that remains in place, the cuota.  Cuotas are 
designated numbers of hectares issued by FONAFIFO to organizations for 
guaranteed enrollment of landowners under a particular PSA modality (i.e. 
conservation, “reforestation”, agroforestry, etc).  While there has been a sharp decline
205
in their use in recent recent years, contracting cuotas are issued to ensure particular 
activities and particular actors are able to be sustained (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 
2012).  There are several reasons why they exist.  First, organizations have lobbied 
for cuotas because they ensure a reliable budget for the their permanent staff, 
including salaried regentes.  Second, industry groups (especially timber producers) 
insist on cuotas because they protect an industry that would have otherwise likely 
been displaced to other regions of the world.  And third, they ease the responsibilities
of FONAFIFO by outsourcing a some of the application review from the central 
authority to local actors.
Cuotas were used quite frequently in the early years of the PSA when organizations 
played a central role in promoting the program and recruiting participants.  They 
were issued to select organizations that were then expected to enroll new landowners 
(closely linked to the “group contracting” that is explained in detail below).  As 
enrollment demand began to outstrip available financing, however, recruitment was 
no longer necessary and the role of organizations became less important (at least 
from the perspective of the managing authorities).  More than this, however, the 
cuota came to be seen as a barrier to progress in the promotion of competition and, 
thus, began to be phased out.  Today, the only cuotas that remain are those that are 
protected by strong institutional advocates, such as the Oficina Nacional Forestal 
(ONF) which holds two seats on the five member board of FONAFIFO (FONAFIFO 
2005).  The future of even these, however, remains uncertain as the market gains 
prominence (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).
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The Effect of Competition – Profit, “Efficiency”, and Self-Interest
In addition to the uneven benefits derived by larger landowners, competitive 
contracting is also fostering several rather undesirable and more fundamental changes
to environmental governance in Costa Rica.  These include the erosion of alternative 
motivations, advancement of the profit imperative, and the intensification of self-
interested decision-making.  Empirical evidence of these trends are outlined here.
Edging out alternative motivations
An early mechanism for promoting participation in the PSA program was to have 
established local NGOs recruit landowners and assist them with application and 
enrollment.  One such organization selected to pilot NGO-driven recruitment was 
ASANA (Asociación Amigos de la Naturaleza del Pacífico Central y Sur), located 
near Dominical on the country's central Pacific coast.  ASANA employed a salaried 
regente to draft management plans and enroll landowning community members in the
PSA (Ewing, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  The organization charged an 18% rate, as most
independent regentes and organizations did in the early days, using the revenues to 
cover its expenses and pay its regente (Ewing, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  Any surplus 
was cycled back into the organization to carry out its conservation mission and 
support community development activities (e.g. establishment of the “Path of the 
Tapir” biological corridor, development of fresh water resources, sea turtle 
conservation, and environmental education).
By the time the first round of contracts came up for renewal, however, the PSA 
contracting landscape had changed dramatically:  many more regentes had entered 
the contracting business, landowner demand for participation far outstripped program
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resources, and independent regentes were offering significantly discounted rates (at 
least to those with the most lucrative contracts).  Moreover, FONAFIFO decided to 
remove the incentives that encouraged NGO involvement in contracting under the 
conservation modality.  Cuotas that lacked an institutional advocate like the ONF 
were phased out, and NGOs were faced with competition on the open market.  As 
Jack Ewing (an officer and founding member of ASANA) explained, “FONAFIFO 
changed all the rules … and we had to compete directly with foresters” (Ewing, 
interview, 16 Jan 2012).  Under these conditions ASANA found it difficult to keep a 
regente on staff, as the regentes could earn more money by contracting 
independently.  Ewing explained, “no forester would want to work for us if we were 
taking what [they] normally took for themselves” (Ewing, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  
Organizations like ASANA were effectively priced out of the market.  In his words, 
the changes “pretty much ended the program for organizations like ASANA” (Ewing,
interview, 16 Jan 2012).
Ostensibly, from the perspective of an outside party, this was a positive development,
as lowered rates from competition signify increasing efficiency.  On the other hand, 
the decline of NGO involvement represents a more fundamental (and troubling) shift 
in the program's operation.  Beyond the uneven distribution of benefits that I already 
explained above, the underlying motivation for PSA contracting was altered when the
emphasis shifted from NGOs to individual competitive regentes.  ASANA had 
operated under an ecological mandate and was promoting the PSA because it wanted 
to expand conservation (Ewing, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  Independent regentes, on 
the other hand, are motivated by an entirely different set of objectives. Certainly 
many (if not all) regentes are gratified by the environmental outcomes of their 
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activities, but they are agents within a framework that compels the pursuit of profit 
maximization.  As the margin between profitability and viability narrows, regentes 
cannot afford to take insufficiently lucrative contracts, regardless of their social 
contribution or ecological significance.  As one private regente explains, “it's 
business” and, if a regente is going to “keep his head above the water”, he must take 
decisions that sustain the business (Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 2012).  In other words, 
regentes are constrained by program structure and forced to base contracting 
decisions upon their impact to the bottom line.
As organizations like ASANA are edged out of PSA recruitment, the reason for 
contracting becomes oriented towards the profit motive.  The only entities that 
remain – indeed the only entities that are able to survive – are the ones that are driven
to behave as profit maximizing businesses.  Competition, in other words, leads to a 
broader, more fundamental shift towards the profit imperative and away from the 
various social and ecological imperatives of non-governmental organizations.  
Regentes themselves – even if they desire to be involved in PSA contracting for 
altruistic reasons – are compelled by circumstances to engage in the sort of 
competitive contracting that favors the elite.  There is little margin for alternative 
motivations.
Undermining resistance
Other organizations, such as ASIREA (Asociación para el Desarrollo Sostenible de 
la Región Atlántica), based in Guápiles de Limón in northeastern Costa Rica, on the 
other hand, are still hanging on, providing a community service in forest 
management.  ASIREA is able to do this because it still receives an annual cuota 
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from FONAFIFO, ensuring a number of contracts for which they are not required to 
compete (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  ASIREA is, however, by no means 
secure.  During my field visit, the organization was in crisis, dealing with a dire 
financial situation.  At the time, they were making a plea to donors so that they could 
close a budget shortfall and sustain their community forest development activities.
ASIREA is an unusual organization with relation to the PSA, in that they are heavily 
focused on the “reforestation” (i.e. plantation forestry) and agroforesty modalities.  
As Jane Segleau (the organization's Executive Director) explains, “ASIREA was first 
place … in agroforestry in the whole country” during the previous year (Segleau, 
interview, 16 Jan 2012).  This is partly because the ONF (ultimately a timber 
production advocate) has guaranteed their cuota for these modalities, but it is also 
partly because management planning for reforestation and agroforestry is far more 
complex than conservation.  Because of this complexity, such contracts are less size-
dependent, and costs are more closely proportional to the size of the land being 
enrolled (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  This means that large reforestation and 
agroforestry contracts are not necessarily more lucrative (as they are in the case of 
the conservation modality).  Since the opportunity for profit and/or savings on large 
lands is diminished, competition is less intense.  In other words, ASIREA is not being
as forcefully out-competed on the reforestation and agroforestry modalities by profit-
oriented independent regentes.  The revenues that ASIREA generates from these 
operations, and from its guaranteed cuota, enable it to hang on (even if only just) and
continue to provide its services largely independent of the profit motive.  Diminished 
competition allows ASIREA to pursue social and ecological imperatives, instead of 
just profit.
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Despite the heavy reforestation and agroforestry focus, however, ASIREA is still 
involved in enrolling lands under the conservation modality – indeed, the vast 
majority of its contracts are for conservation (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  This 
stems, in large part, from the fact that there are far more landowners wishing to enroll
under the conservation modality nationwide.67  Significantly, the conservation 
contracts that ASIREA provides are comparatively smaller in size against the national
average – as Segleau notes, “we are the organization that has had the most dedication
to small farmers …we are famous for being an organization that really works with 
small farmers” (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  In fact, many of ASIREA's client 
landowners have been referred by regentes for whom the property is too small 
(Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  When enrollment is not profitable, independent 
regentes simply pass clients along to ASIREA, which is less directly bound by the 
profit imperative.  Stated plainly, ASIREA is “a non-profit so we are not into making 
money, we are into being sustainable financially” (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  
ASIREA is able to do this because it is, in a sense, utilizing the profits it gains from 
the less competitive “reforestation” and agroforestry contracts to subsidize its small-
scale conservation contracting services.  Without ASIREA, small landowners in the 
region would lose a very important service provider that remains outside of the 
conventional logics of profit maximization.  And, in Segleau's words, “if [ASIREA] 
stopped existing, it would mean all these farmers would not have access to the PSA” 
(Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).
67 While the reason for this preference is complex, it can largely be explained by the opportunity 
costs for landowners.  There is essentially zero opportunity cost to enrolling forested land under 
the conservation modality since forest conversion is banned.  On the other hand, land that may be 
used for timber plantations and enrolled under the reforestation modality, may alternatively be used
for agriculture or ranching.  Thus, the opportunity cost of reforestation is equal to the foregone 
profit from those activities.  The result is that landowners are far more eager to enroll under 
conservation than they are under reforestation.
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Small landowner enrolled 2.5 hectares in the PSA through ASIREA
It is unusual for private regentes to contract with landowners that have even 10x this amount.
Given the uncertain future of the cuota and the increasing competition by 
independent regentes, however, it is unclear how much longer ASIREA will continue 
to operate.  The organization may succumb to competitive forces, either by 
internalizing the competitive drive and contracting with larger landowners or by 
simply being priced out of the game.  Steadfast, Segleau explained “we're not going 
to stop being ASIREA because other people are competing in that way” (Segleau, 
interview, 16 Jan 2012).  “As long as we have enough money to survive each year”, 
she added, the organization will continue to provide small landowners with access to 
the PSA (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  The stark reality, however, is that 
competition may simply make ASIREA's operations unviable.
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Fostering self-interest
A third organization, ATAL, has also experienced setbacks related to the rise of 
competitive contracting.68  Similar to the case with ASANA, ATAL has had difficulty 
retaining their salaried regentes due to the enhanced opportunity for personal gain 
derived from independent contracting (Confidential Informant #3, interview, Jan 
2012).  New regentes are often willing to work at lower-than-average rates, in order 
to establish their reputation and build their professional networks (Zuñiga, interview, 
30 Jan 2012).  Once they have secured a portfolio of contracts, however, they are 
able to more freely and directly compete in the contracting market.  The experience 
of ATAL has been that their trained regentes eventually move on and enter the 
competitive independent system where they are able to make greater profit 
(Confidential Informant #3, interview, Jan 2012).
Recently, ATAL's regente left the organization under some rather contentious 
circumstances.  ATAL had held several large PSA contracts with local landowners, 
which helped to sustain the organization's contracting program and support its other 
conservation and development activities.  Since these contracts were registered in the
regente's name, however, he was able to retain these contracts when he left the 
organization (Confidential Informant #3, interview, Jan 2012).  Now, instead of 
receiving a salary from the organization, the regente receives payment from the 
enrolled landowners directly – a considerably greater sum than his former salary, 
given the size of the properties.  ATAL was left in a problematic situation because, 
without the revenues from their large contracts, their operations are severely under 
68 “ATAL” is a pseudonym to protect the identify and reputation of those involved.  Specific names 
and descriptive characteristics have been fictionalized to ensure anonymity.
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funded.  It is yet unclear whether matters will (or can) be settled through legal action.
By operating independently, the regente is deriving immense personal benefit, while 
the organization (and the community that depends on it) is being deprived of 
important resources.  The transferal of these contracts from ATAL to the independent 
regente constitutes the transformation of shared development resources into private 
profit.  Not only does the competitive contracting system enable this sort of self-
interested behavior, it actually encourages it (on the grounds that the independent 
regente will be able to provide contracting services more efficiently and, thus, extend
a limited budget).  The system is designed to align (what is believed to be) the innate 
self-interest of regentes with the objective of maximizing ecosystem service 
provision.  By encouraging the regente to seek profit within a system that requires 
competition, the cost of contract preparation may, as explained above, decline for 
some landowners wishing to participate.  Doing so, however, actually fosters the very
behavior presumed to be inherent.
Regentes are, actually, concerned with the social implications of their work, and they 
are motivated by altruistic factors.  Nearly every regente with whom I spoke 
independently identified the social development benefits of the PSA, particularly 
with regard to small landowners (e.g. Alfaro, interview, 23 Jan 2012; Herrera, 
interview, 23 Jan 2012; Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012; Zuñiga, interview, 30 Jan 
2012).  Herrera, for example, referred to material improvements in participants' lives;
“they are able to buy a motorcycle or car, or improve the path to their house.  …or 
[they] can at least pay for colectivos [rural shared taxis] and get the [school] uniform 
for their family” (Herrera, interview, 23 Jan 2012).  Alfaro, as well, explained that 
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many of these families “don't have very much money or not very much education … 
it's good to help them” through enrollment in the PSA (Alfaro, interview, 23 Jan 
2012).  Even a private regente, Igor Zuñiga, within a profit-driven firm, stressed the 
importance of working with small owners and expressed desire to provide economic 
assistance in the form of ecosystem service payments.  However, he also explained 
that he would not be able to generate a living wage if he did so (Zuñiga, interview, 30
Jan 2012).69  Rather than pursue social objectives, the regente must pursue economic 
efficiency in order to survive in the competitive system.  They are not driven by an 
inherent self-interest to maximize personal gain; they are placed within a system that 
encourages, in fact demands, such behavior.
Zuñiga cannot be blamed for seeking profit and neglecting the smallest landowners.  
He must operate within the parameters of the program or place his livelihood at risk; 
he must submit to the coercive laws of competition.  Self-interest is not inherent to 
his character, but rather encouraged by the system in which he operates.  Behavior 
that is ordinarily admonished under prevailing social norms is promoted by these 
conditions.  The competitive system, which requires profit maximization, is 
normalizing self-interest.  Once it is socially acceptable (indeed economically 
preferable) to be self-interested, it becomes far easier to take a decision that is as 
seemingly asocial as swiping ATAL's contracts.  Why wouldn't ATAL's regente keep 
hold of the contracts if they were in his name, he had labored to produce them, and 
they provided him with stability within a highly competitive system?  Essentially, the
competitive system is making such behavior permissible.  It is in no way “natural” 
69 The standard of living to which regentes are entitled is an entirely relevant question that warrants 
further exploration.
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for individuals to act in self-interested ways:  self-interest is encouraged by the very 
systems designed to harness it.
A Viable Alternative?
In order to address the problem of unevenly distributed benefits from competitive 
contracting, and the more fundamental changes to environmental governance that 
come along with it, regente compensation would need to be a function of something 
other than contract size – that is, regentes would need to be paid in some way other 
than by a percentage of the contract value.  Removal of the incentive to favor large 
properties would allow regentes to make contracting decisions for reasons other than 
their effect on the bottom line.  The assumption of those who favor the independent 
contractors model, however, is that only a competitive system can be efficient and 
that contracting based on more equitable flat-rates (regardless of contract size or 
location) would result in wasteful administration expenses.
This position derives from an oversimplified conception of human behavior which 
presumes regentes will charge as much as possible unless checked by competitive 
market forces.  As McAfee suggests, however, “economically 'rational' behaviour 
aimed at individual gain is often less determinant than social obligations and 
communal norms” (2012, 118).  This is certainly the case with Jane Segleau of 
ASIREA and another regente, Alejandro Alfaro, who explained that he continues to 
offer his services through a community development organization in spite of the fact 
that he could earn more drafting PSA contracts independently (Alfaro, interview, 23 
Jan 2012).  Relying on this sort of social responsibility, it is possible to envision a 
model that spreads enrollment fees across the population without compromising 
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regente performance or raising the overall cost of administration (lowered rates for 
small landowners could be offset by only marginal increases for large ones).  In fact, 
such a model existed in Costa Rica until it was undermined by further 
neoliberalization that took the form of individualizing landowner participation.  A 
form of collective participation, aimed at distributing costs, previously allowed small 
landowners to pool their resources and enter the program for a much lower fee.
Competition vs. Cooperation
Group Contracting through “Contratos Globales”
The contratos globales, or “global contracts”, were developed early in the program's 
evolution as a form of group contracting intended to level transaction costs and make
it no more expensive for small landowners to participate than it is for large ones.70  
They were developed in direct recognition of the high fixed costs of contract 
preparation and comparative disadvantage for small landowners (Pagiola et al. 2005).
The idea was that landowners could pool their resources under a single contract, 
distribute regente fees across the group and, thus, reduce the per-hectare rate for all 
involved.  This provided an entry point for disadvantaged individuals that would 
otherwise have found accessing the program (and its benefits) prohibitively 
expensive.  In addition, grouping supported small owner participation by helping 
less-educated and poorer farmers to navigate complex application and management 
procedures (Zbinden and Lee 2005).
These contracts were typically coordinated by non-governmental organizations and 
70 Note that these are not global in the sense that they are international or worldwide, they are simply 
“global” to the members of the group.
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farmers' cooperatives, which grouped the landowners of local communities and 
assisted their PSA contract preparation.  Many small landowners could band together 
in these groups to form larger contracts that would be more appealing to regentes.  
Benefiting from greater “economies of scale”, regentes could then offer lower rates 
than they otherwise could to any single member of the group; it was an efficiency 
gain that did not require a competitive framework.  A single contract was issued at 
the end of the process, with all members of the group agreeing to the terms of the 
inscribed management plan.  Payments from the group's enrollment were then 
distributed proportionally to members according to the amount of land each held.
Initial uptake was high.  The group contracting mechanism was instrumental in 
building a base of participating landowners.  In the first year of the program, nearly 
60% of program funds were disbursed to participants in these groups (Porras 2010).  
FONAFIFO relied on established conservation groups, agricultural associations, and 
community organizations to promote the PSA and recruit participants through these 
means.  NGOs such as ASANA were issued cuotas for exactly this purpose.  The use 
of the grouping mechanism was not only extensive in the beginning, it was touted by 
a broad range of actors as an important tool for integrating the poor.  Bennett and 
Henninger (2008), for example, highlight the mechanism in their report to an 
international forum of legislators as a key strategy for distributing transaction costs 
so that the poor are not excluded.  Even the World Bank supported group contracting 
(initially) by providing “training and technical support” to NGOs through the 
Ecomarkets project (World Bank 2007, 45-46).  The mechanism, however, was met 
with several challenges, including how to handle instances of individual non-
compliance and ownership change within the groups.
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As designed, problems with single members could cause payment delays or even 
contract invalidation for the entire group (Porras 2010).  Most often this occurred 
when group members wanted to sell their land or make changes to its status; outright 
breach of contract by members was unusual (Segleau, interview, 16 Jan 2012).  When
these problems occurred, however, the contract had to be re-written, suspending 
payments and incurring new expenses.  On occasion, such incidents escalated to 
crisis point.  ASANA, for example, was once accused of stealing payments from its 
group members on a contract that was undergoing one of these adjustments (Ewing, 
interview, 13 Jan 2012).  The dispute was eventually resolved when the contract was 
restored (Ewing, interview, 13 Jan 2012), but issues such as this sealed the fate the 
contratos globales.
Individualization
A consensus emerged that the grouping mechanism was flawed, mainly in that it 
lacked dispute resolution procedures and the ability to handle individual ownership 
change (Ortiz, interview, 12 Dec 2011).  In response to these problems, FONAFIFO 
revised the mechanism to culminate in individual contracts (Pagiola 2008) – the scale
at which participating landowners cooperate was shifted downwards.  As Edgar Ortiz
(director of the regente training program at the Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica) 
explained, group contracts are no longer signed or managed by the coordinating 
NGO.  NGOs “do the work with small landowners …, but at the moment of signing 
…, each individual landowner signs a contract” (Ortiz, interview, 12 Dec 2011).  
This, of course, provides a solution to the ownership change and partial compliance 
problems, but it also undermines the coherence of collective participation.
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In effect, the “group” only exists during the recruitment stage.  Once the NGO has 
found willing participants, individual management plans are drawn, and individual 
contracts are issued.  These changes diminish the role of NGOs from coordinators of 
collective participation to the equivalent of an independent private regente – that is, 
NGOs no longer orchestrate communal action, they simply provide contracting 
services to disparate actors.  Furthermore, the individual contracts mean that many of
the fixed-costs of participation are replicated across the former group and transferred 
to each of its members; the regente must manage multiple sets of paperwork, have 
multiple billing and accounting ledgers, and arrange multiple individual inspections 
each year.  This negates the efficiency gains from the greater economies of scale and 
results in “much smaller savings” (Pagiola 2008, 722) for the landowners who 
participate, further compounding the problem of large landowner advantage.  In the 
competitive system, large landowners enjoy lower regente fees, so they can do quite 
well outside of these groups – indeed, they may even do better (Ewing, interview, 13 
Jan 2012).  The small owners, on the other hand, are confronted with higher rates 
outside of these groups and, thus, lose out in the shift from collective to individual 
participation.
Obviously, these changes to group contracting are far more significant than simple 
procedural modifications (i.e. they are more than a simple change to how contracts 
are issued).  They effectively constitute the wholesale individualization of 
participation.  In fact, the practice of grouping has changed so fundamentally that the 
head of PSA at FONAFIFO characterizes the contratos globales as having ended 
completely (Sánchez, interview, 15 Feb 2012).  Indeed, the program's operations 
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manual, the annual document issued by FONAFIFO and MINAE that sets guidelines 
for the program, contains no reference to grouping after 2003 (FONFIFO 2003).  
Corresponding to this, there has been a marked shift from group to corporate 
participation over the first decade of the program's existence (figure 6.4; Porras 
2010).  It is clear that the changes to group contracting were not as much a fix to the 
administrative challenges of collective participation as they were an altogether 
abandonment of the mechanism.
Allocation of PSA Funds by Contract Type
Figure 6.4 (adapted from Porras 2010).
Governance and The Indigenous Exception
While participation has been individualized for all ordinary contracts, it is important 
to note that collective indigenous participation currently remains.  Further research 
would be required to evaluate how well these indigenous contracts function, but the 
fact that they still exist suggests that they have not suffered from the same problems 
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as the contratos globales.  This is presumably a result of better governance.  Unlike 
the contratos globales (which are managed by local, but external, non-governmental 
organizations), the indigenous contracts are managed internally by a tribal council 
that has considerable authority in matters of dispute resolution and compliance 
enforcement.  The relatively weaker governance of external NGOs in the case of non-
indigenous collective participation is almost certainly a contributing factor in the 
problems and ultimate failure of the mechanism.  Given that the organizations that 
were involved in group contracting (e.g. conservation NGOs) were not, in the first 
place, community development organizations, they would have been ill equipped to 
manage matters of group conflict.  A comparison of organizations previously 
involved in the contratos globales to the various tribes holding indigenous contracts 
could offer some insights into what is required for effective collective participation.71
The demise of group contracting, however, cannot be attributed entirely to ineffective
governance.  It is down to institutional neglect and the laissez-faire attitude of 
liberally-minded actors influential over program management.  Few appreciated the 
need to actively foster and develop the mechanism.  This is evident in a World Bank 
publication by Chomitz et al., for example, where the claim is made that a number of 
NGOs “spontaneously adopted” the role of project “bundlers” in the Costa Rican 
system (1999, 161).  From this perspective, collective participation is something that 
spontaneously emerged to fill a need (in the sense of Hayek's spontaneous order 
premise), not something that required active support.  In fact confidence among 
analysts that the provision of such needs would self-regulate appears to be so great 
71 Which organizations had difficulty managing their groups, and which did so effectively?  Were 
agricultural associations (which are more oriented towards managing community agreements) 
better at resolving disputes and preserving their group contracts than conservation organizations?  
And how do those compare with the success of indigenous groups?
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that the decline of collective participation has gone largely unnoticed in the policy-
oriented literature; reference to group contracting continues to be made well after it 
was abandoned in 2003 (e.g. Bennett and Henninger 2008; Pagiola et al. 2005; Sills 
et al. 2005; World Bank 2006; World Bank 2007).
Competition vs. Cooperation
The individualized version of “group” contracting that exists today – the version that 
has very little cost saving benefits for small landowners – still retains some important
advantages.  For example, organizations that assemble group applications often reach
out to landowners that might otherwise lack the social capital or knowledge to get 
involved on their own.  Even if organizations help smaller, poorer landowners join 
the PSA, however, the competitive system means that they receive diminished 
benefits – smaller landowners must still pay higher (sometimes illegally high) rates 
to their regentes.  Without the ability to band together under a single contract, the 
fixed costs remain high and ensure lower net payments.  This is particularly true 
when contracting must be done through a private independent regente, but it is also 
increasingly the case when contracting is facilitated by non-governmental 
organizations as well.
As Silva (2003) points out, organizations that offer contracting services are 
threatened with diminishing revenue due to competition by profit-driven independent
regentes.  This is certainly the case for ASIREA, as explained above.  Where budgets 
depend on funds generated by PSA contracting services, organizations “have a strong
incentive to ignore smallholding, poor peasants” (Silva 2003, 113).  Since these 
organizations “get more revenue per staff member by accepting large projects” (Silva
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2003, 113), some of the organizations that formerly protected small landowner 
interests have been pulled into the business of competitive contracting, making them 
the virtual equivalent of private profit-driven institutions operating in a market-based 
system.  With the elimination of grouping, small landowners have lost not only their 
ability to defray and distribute administrative costs of participating in the PSA, they 
have lost the support of the institutions that assisted their participation as those 
institutions are drawn into the competitive system.  The administrators of forest 
policy have made “a clear choice in favor of market-oriented conservation and 
reforestation instead of support for community development or cooperative behavior”
(Silva 2003, 113).
The particular scale at which the tensions between competition and cooperation are 
mediated is, of course, by no means arbitrary.  It is deliberately produced to achieve a
particular economic vision and maintain a particular balance of power.  As Smith 
points out, “the demarcation of scale [is] absolutely central to the processes and 
politics of uneven geographical development” (2003, 229).  The decision to 
individualize both participation and contracting is a highly political one that, I have 
shown, clearly favors the largest and wealthiest landowners.  During the recent 
transformation of Costa Rica's forestry industry, the scale at which the various agents
involved in the PSA are brought into competition (or encouraged to cooperate) has 
been shifted to achieve specific political and economic ends.  In this case, it has been 
the re-organization of the program according to neoliberal ideals that elevate 
economic efficiency over social or environmental responsibility.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to illuminate the social and ecological 
implications of two scalar shifts in mediating between competition and cooperation 
in PSA contracting – one concerning the individualization of forestry work though 
the creation of the competitive regencia system, and one concerning the 
individualization of landowner participation through the removal of cooperative 
group contracting.  As a conceptual basis, I drew upon Marxist ideas of the coercive 
laws of competition and Neil Smith's (2003) theorization of the social production of 
scale.  As such, I have interpreted these shifts in Costa Rican forest policy as highly 
political moves that deliberately produce a competitive environment and place 
economic efficiency ahead of social and environmental responsibility.  I have also 
linked these shifts to the emergence of new social relations that are governed by the 
coercive laws of competition, and I have identified how they are driving the pursuit 
of profit-maximization and individual accumulation, instead of cooperative 
management in the interest of distributed benefits.
As I showed, a series of moves initiated by a new market-oriented faction within the 
Ministry of Environment during the 1990s led to the privatization of forestry work 
and the erosion of “social forestry” policies.  While most historical accounts interpret
this as the abandonment of an ineffective and corrupt centralized agency, I view it as 
a politically motivated and deliberate upheaval of existing power relations.  These 
moves did not simply replace a failing agency with a more effective and better 
managed one, they re-shuffled power structures by altering the scale at which the 
tensions between competition and cooperation are mediated.  Placing individual 
foresters in direct competition with one another introduces the coercive laws of 
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competition, which usher in a very specific set of economic relations.  The 
introduction of competition was not simply a neutral means of promoting economic 
efficiency, it was the establishment of a system that delivers benefits to a particular 
set of people.
In contrast to the way that the industry operated previously, the profit imperative is 
now central to the regulation of Costa Rican forestry.  Today oversight of forest 
management is conducted privately, with FONAFIFO performing only limited 
independent inspections.  Where professional foresters were once employed as 
salaried government regulators under the DGF, regentes are now contracted on a 
private market and paid directly by their client landowners.  The government plays 
almost no role in these agreements, and, instead, regentes are encouraged to pursue 
maximum profit as independent contractors (the assumption being that this will 
achieve efficiency through competitive downward bidding for the most lucrative 
contracts).  Indeed, regentes within this competitive system are compelled to lower 
rates (where possible) or else risk loss of the contract to a rival.  This is, of course, 
was the intended goal of introducing competition and is now touted as an important 
success of the institutional re-organization.
My objective, however, has been to demonstrate how this has resulted in an uneven 
decline in rates.  As I explained, this is due to the fact that lower rates are only 
possible on certain contracts.  Since regente pay is a function of contract size, while 
the costs are largely fixed, there is far greater potential for profit on the largest 
contracts.  In other words, the regente's expenses in management-planning rise more 
slowly with increasing contract sizes than does the potential payout.  This means that 
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regentes will compete quite fiercely to obtain the largest, most lucrative contracts, 
and also that they are able offer greater discounts in order to attract those large 
landowners.  At the same time, the smaller, less lucrative contracts receive very little 
competition, or may even be excluded entirely if the cost of the management plan is 
greater than the regente's maximum (legal) 18% rate.  The result is that the largest 
landowners receive the lowest rates and, thus, greatest net payments from enrolling 
their land in the PSA.
As I explained above, regentes have no innate or political desire to favor the larger 
wealthier landowners – indeed, they frequently reminded me of the important social 
development benefits that the PSA can provide to the poor.  However, given the 
design of the system, they are forced to take decisions that provide large landowners 
with an advantage.  The coercive laws of competition compel regentes to set aside 
altruistic social and ecological motivations to offer discounted rates on the contracts 
that will secure their livelihoods.
Further to this uneven decline in rates, the competitive system gives rise to other 
undesirable consequences by edging out alternative motivations, undermining 
resistance, and fostering self-interest.  Each of these, I showed, was the result of 
organizations being priced out of the PSA contracting market.  Whether they lost the 
institutional supports that guaranteed their operations, were drawn into the business 
of competitive contracting, or were simply out-competed, organizations that operated
outside of the profit imperative are largely no longer involved in enrolling 
landowners in the program.  Many of those that remain have become the virtual 
equivalent of private independent regentes, offering contracting services in the most 
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lucrative cases to bolster institutional budgets.  By contrast, in cases where there are 
non-competitive conditions, such as where cuotas still exist, regentes are not as 
immediately bound by the profit imperative.  In the case of ASIREA, for example, 
guaranteed cuotas and reduced competition under other modalities have enabled to 
the organization to continue offering contracting-services to the smallest of small-
landowners.
Conditions that formerly enabled organizations to assist small landowners overcome 
their competitive disadvantage, I showed, were eliminated in the other scalar shift 
that I dealt with in this chapter.  A further re-negotiation of the tensions between 
competition and cooperation occurred in the de-collectivization of landowner 
participation.  Until FOANFIFO acted to reverse measures, small landowners were 
able to pool their resources under a single contract, reduce the individual fixed-costs 
of participation, and obtain lower rates for all members of the group, enabling small-
owner access to the PSA on equal footing with larger landowners.
Group contracting had been developed specifically to help small landowners with the
high fixed-costs of participation by cooperating at a particular scale.  As such, the 
revision of protocols to require each landowner to sign a contract independently is a 
highly political act, particularly since it was taken without consideration of how 
small landowners would cope.  Contrary to the way the situation is typically 
characterized, removal of the grouping mechanism is not simply a technical fix to a 
technical (and apolitical) problem.  Grouping certainly did have flaws, but these were
not as much solved as the mechanism itself was abandoned.  This completely shifted 
who is able to participate and, ultimately, who stands to gain from the PSA as a 
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whole.  Revised to culminate in individual contracts, grouping is now little more than
a temporary recruitment tool applied by development organizations.  Since 
landowners must sign contracts separately, the efficiency gains from larger 
economies of scale are negated, fixed-costs are replicated across the population, and 
small landowners are left to compete individually for regente services on a open 
market.  The result is higher regente rates and lower net-payments, relative to larger 
landowners.
The larger the amount of land an owner controls, the greater advantage he or she has 
in the PSA. The competitive system means that individual small owners cannot 
access the PSA without paying excessively high rates.  Nominally, competition 
provides efficiency gains, but this can only be seen to be beneficial if who may 
access the PSA is completely ignored; average regente rates have declined, but this 
has been achieved by encouraging regentes to work with those landowners for whom 
discounts are possible.  Furthermore, the scalar shift that removed cooperative 
participation compounded the problem of large landowner advantage.  Cooperation 
has been supplanted by competition, elevating economic efficiency, profit 
maximization, and accumulation over social or environmental responsibility.
Beyond the immediate implications for Costa Rica, however, the neoliberalization 
that has taken root here speaks to the conceptual ground I staked out in earlier 
chapters.  What we see in the shift from cooperative to competitive Costa Rican 
forest management is an ideologically-motivated disregard for issues of social equity 
and justice, which I have suggested is a marker of neoliberal activity and an effective 
means of training the critical gaze on (partial and ever-adapting) expressions of 
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neoliberalization.  Utilizing a concern for justice in this way helps to identify the 
junctures where neoliberal policies push through ostensibly non-neoliberal practices. 
If conceptual emphasis had been placed on evaluating the “neoliberalness” of policy 
changes against a baseline conception of how neoliberalism ought to look, actually-
existing elements might have been missed – after all, Costa Rica's PSA does not 
correspond that well to the idealized model and, thus, many of its neoliberal 
characteristics are not often readily apparent.  My treatment of the concepts, on the 
other hand, places emphasis on the ways neoliberalism has taken root despite all of 
its apparent contradictions.  In contrast to the growing literature focused on the ways 
PES deviates from neoliberal doctrine, an initial focus on social justice serves to 
illuminate the places where neoliberalization is likely to be operating.
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CHAPTER VII
Neoliberalization of Property Ownership
Costa Rica's segment of the Pan-American Highway passes through diverse 
landscapes.  A journey along it offers views of lands under many different ownership 
regimes, including rural small-holdings, corporate plantations, indigenous reserves, 
cooperatively-managed farms, state-owned parks and protected areas, privately 
owned nature reserves, and foreign-owned vacation homes, as well as urban 
landlessness and many others.  Such views, however, are limited.  A fuller picture of 
the social relations that constitute this range of land uses and ownership patterns 
requires closer examination and more immediate contact with the people who live 
there.  And a more detailed view is necessary for understanding what, for example, 
“private property” actually means, in terms of permissible practices and rights of 
access.
Figure 7.1:  Along the Pan-American Highway
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On one such journey along this route, I had a particularly revealing encounter that 
highlighted key differences between my own Euro-American understanding of 
property and those commonly held locally.  It was outside of the car that these 
differences came into sharper contrast.  While stopped at a small market, several of 
the people with whom I was traveling stood waiting for the group to reassemble.  
While waiting, one of our local counterparts, Carlos, made himself comfortable by 
leaning against an adjacent vehicle.  This seemed to be unusual behavior, as we were 
quite certain he did not know the owner.  I recall being unsettled, as such casual 
contact with another's possessions would very likely be unacceptable at home.
When the owner of the vehicle returned, however, he barely took notice.  Carlos, too,
seemed unconcerned.  Even as the man got into his car and prepared to leave, neither 
displayed any indication that this was out of the ordinary.  Finally, with a polite 
gesture, the owner of the car signaled that he was ready to leave, Carlos leaned 
forward, and the man drove away.
Days later, after having some time to consider what had taken place, I asked Carlos 
about the incident.  I suspected that a different set of cultural norms existed in Costa 
Rica regarding the boundaries on private possessions.  In affirmation of my 
assessment, he barely recalled the encounter.  For Carlos, it had been such an 
ordinary experience that it had not been worth noting.  The unfamiliar cultural norms 
and misalignment of understandings about these boundaries is instructive for the 
scholarly examination of land ownership practices in cross-cultural scenarios.  To be 
clear, however, this example is not being presented to suggest that the same social 
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protocols concerning material properties like a car extend to access rights of privately
owned land (though, as will be explained below, some parallels in this case do exist). 
What this anecdote is intended to illustrate is that “private property” does not mean 
the same thing to everyone in every case.
In this chapter, I will discuss how a simplified understanding of what is meant by 
“private property” in Costa Rica has concealed the expansion of exclusionary land 
ownership practices, specifically within the context of the new dominant PSA 
conservation regime.  I will demonstrate this to be the case by, first, discussing the 
property and ownership regimes on which payments for ecosystem services programs
are founded.  Then I will review, in conceptual terms, the various theoretical 
framings of property, access, privatization, and accumulation.  Following that, I will 
present a historical account of land ownership in Costa Rica, demonstrating that the 
country's tradition of privately owned land has historically meant something very 
different from conventional Euro-American understandings.  Then I will explain how
these practices are shifting to be more exclusionary under the land management 
practices of Costa Rica's recent conservation activities.  Finally, I will draw some 
conclusions about our understanding of property ownership and privatization under 
neoliberal regimes.
PES and Property
The practice of making “payments for ecosystem services” is about the formation of 
new social relations between land managers (e.g. farmers, indigenous groups, 
government actors) and the human beneficiaries of functioning ecological systems.  
More specifically, it is about establishing economic relations that (theoretically) 
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transfer financial resources from “users” of services to “producers” who institute 
prescribed land management practices.  As such, these schemes hinge on well-
defined property rights (Farley and Costanza 2010), so that participating land 
managers may be rewarded (as well as held accountable) for their management 
activities.
Whether these rights should be based on private land ownership or other more 
inclusive regimes is the subject of active debate (Muradian et al. 2010).  Many 
advocates of PES tend to favor individualized private ownership (Pagiola 2008; 
Wunder 2005; Engel et al. 2008), while other more cautious assessments observe that
such regimes may have undesirable social and ecological implications (Redford and 
Adams 2009).  The influential Coasian view (see Tacconi 2012) sees “clearly defined
and enforced” property rights as a condition for successful user-financed schemes 
(Engel et al. 2008, 667;  see also Muradian et al. 2010; Barbier and Tesfaw 2012), but
the enclosure of land under individualized private control can mean (and historically, 
has meant) the dispossession of vulnerable communities and the accumulation of 
resources by the elite (Andreasson 2006).  Understandably, those with an acute sense 
of history find the renewed prospect of privatization associated with PES 
disconcerting.
It should, perhaps, not be surprising that, where tenure security is weak, PES 
programs can put communities at heightened risk of dispossession and 
marginalization (Barbier and Tesfaw 2012).  But what about when PES operates in 
areas where private ownership rights are robust and widespread?  Are we to believe 
that the tendency towards privatization poses no threat and that implementation does 
234
no harm because no change of ownership is required?  Robertson suggests that when 
ecosystem services “are vested in sites already privatised … we may struggle to 
define the actual problem” because “without dispossession in the traditional sense, 
who is harmed?” (2012, 397).  Certainly, as Robertson recommends, we need to 
understand PES “as part of the larger process of rendering surplus value” (Robertson 
2012, 397) – that is, the larger role it plays in facilitating capitalist expansion – but 
we also must reveal exactly why it is a problem in “already neoliberal” economies by
seeking an understanding of precisely how, for example, it has altered ownership 
practices.
While Costa Rica's PSA is one of the best known, and perhaps most advanced, 
initiatives carrying out PES worldwide, very little attention has been directed 
specifically at the effect of the program on property ownership.  This is, perhaps, the 
result of a commonly held perception that Costa Rica (unlike most other Latin 
American countries) has a long tradition of privately owned land (Chomitz et al. 
1999; Campbell 2006; World Bank 2007, 1) and, therefore, is not experiencing a new
wave of privatization with the introduction of PES.  As I will argue, however, this 
assessment of historical ownership practices is being presented rather uncritically, 
with little appreciation for the shifting social relations that constitute property 
ownership or the actual practices being introduced under the PSA.  The tendency to 
make certain presumptions about what the private property relationship entails has 
diverted attention away from shifting patterns of access and the narrowing 
distribution of benefits.  The assumption being made is that land access patterns 
under the new program are consistent with those that have existed historically, as if 
“private ownership” has always carried the same meaning.
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In actual practice, what private land ownership represents in Costa Rica is changing 
significantly under the PSA.  This has gone unnoticed, however, because property 
(“the right to benefit from things”) and access (“the ability to derive benefits from 
things”) are being conflated (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 153).  Without an appreciation 
of the differences between these concepts, it can seem that “private property” before 
the PSA and “private property” under the PSA are one-and-the-same.  Such nominal 
equivalence belies the very different practices that occur under divergent governing 
regimes.  Even though the type of ownership may be unchanged by the new regime, 
the patterns of access are an entirely separate question.  In fact, as I will demonstrate 
below, land owners who enroll in the PSA are required to manage their lands in ways 
that are far more exclusionary than ever before.
There are many implications to the assumption that property in Costa Rica has 
always (since colonization) been privately owned.  For one, it precludes the existence
of privatization – if ownership was already private, the PSA cannot make it more so.  
My argument, however, is, in a way, precisely that.  If privatization is taken to be the 
expansion of exclusionary land management practices – the greater restriction of 
people's ability to access resources – then it can in fact be taking place regardless of 
the ostensible preexistence of private ownership.  The assumption that access rights 
remain unchanged because ownership has always been “private” conceals important 
shifts in who controls and ultimately benefits from resources.  As Ribot and Peluso 
suggest, benefits are often “redistributed and captured in the course of changing 
social relations and legal frameworks as new conflicts and cooperative arrangements 
emerge” (2003, 160), and as Kosoy and Corbera indicate, “where new property rights
236
regimes are introduced, there is an inherent risk that these are defined by those with 
economic and social power” (2010, 1234).  The PSA, I am arguing, is an instance of 
such shifting relations and frameworks, and the result is an expansion of exclusionary
land management practices and the consolidation of control over resources – 
effectively, the privatization of already-private resources.
On Property and Access
In order to make this case, we must first conceptualize property and access, and 
theorize how they have been linked (and differentiated) historically.  Contemporary 
notions of property (in the Western tradition) stem largely from the work of John 
Locke, an influential thinker of the 17th century.  Locke's “labor theory of property” is
at the foundation of our current conceptions of ownership.  His ideas, however, fall 
short in terms of appreciating the many social mechanisms that determine access.  
The work of Ribot and Peluso (2003), on the other hand, provides important insight 
for understanding these matters.  This section lays a framework for my analysis of 
shifting property/access relations under the PSA by re-interpreting “privatization” as 
more than the individual accumulation formal rights to property.  Instead, I adopt an 
expanded understanding of privatization as the individual accumulation of the ability 
to benefit.
Property
Considered the “father of private property” (Wolford 2007, 553), Locke believed that
exclusive ownership was a right derived from laboring on land (Mansfield 2007a).  
In his view, it was the God-given right of “man” (and in his time it was only men) to 
claim resources from the commons, through the expenditure of physical effort:
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He that is nourished by the acorns picked up under an oak, or the apples he 
gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to 
himself.  No body [sic] can deny but the nourishment is his.  I ask then, when 
did they begin to be his?  …if the first gathering made them not his, nothing 
else could. … And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, 
he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make 
them his? … If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, 
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him (Locke 1821 [1689], 210).
In Locke's view, “natural law” gave humans the right to property through labor.72  He 
also believed that it was the duty of the state to protect those rights (Wolford 2007), 
guaranteeing individuals exclusive control over the land they had brought into 
production (McCarthy and Prudham 2004).
The conventional reading is that Locke's “labor theory of property” constitutes the 
foundation of liberal framings of private ownership and exclusionary land use 
practices – as McCarthy and Prudham point out, the “Lockian discourse of an 
atomistic society of free, equal, landed individuals … resonates strongly with 
neoliberalism” (2004, 277).  This is typically held to be antithetical to the Marxist 
framing of property as state sanctioned theft – the appropriation of rights by those 
who are able to mobilize “laws, customs, and conventions” in their favor, from those 
who labored to add value (Ribot and Peluso 2003).  Wolford, however, argues that 
Locke's work is nuanced enough to justify “both the neoliberal focus on individual 
contractual rights to property … and the populist focus on 'land for those who work 
it'” (2007, 551).
Locke certainly was not “arguing for the unlimited individual accumulation of land 
72 Interestingly, Marx also subscribed to a version of this 'labor theory of property', saying that “all 
production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual” (1973, 87).  He added, however, 
that “it is altogether ridiculous to leap from that to a specific form of property, e.g. private 
propterty” (ibid.).
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and property”, which according to McCarthy and Prudham (2004, 277) is the 
interpretation mobilized by contemporary liberally-oriented actors.  Rather, Locke 
indicates limits to accumulation:
It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits 
of the earth, &c. [sic] makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as 
much as he will.  To which I answer, Not so.  The same law of nature, that 
does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too (Locke
1821 [1689], 212, emphasis original).
To the question of how much property may be claimed from a commons, Locke 
specifies that it should be:
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, 
so much he may by his labour fix a property in:  whatever is beyond this, is 
more than his share, and belongs to others (ibid., 212-213).
The context in which Locke formulated his theory of property was one of grossly 
inequitable accumulation of land and property by the feudal lords of his time.  In 
appreciating this context, the idea of the individual right to land (proportional to one's
own labor) can be seen as an emancipatory concept that opposed the hegemonic 
order.  It can be interpreted as advocating the expansion of access to land and 
resources through the redistribution of (private) property rights.
Locke further explains that it was the invention of money that allowed “man” to 
acquire “more land than he himself can use the product of” (1821 [1689], 229).  But, 
here, he still does not say that unlimited accumulation is appropriate or acceptable.  
Rather, he is asserting that it “invade[s] not the right of others” for people to store the
surpluses of their own labor in non-perishable objects such as money (1821 [1689], 
227).  The limit to such accumulation, then, is the limit of any single individual's 
productive capacities.  Accumulation beyond that requires, for example, the 
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employment of others' labor at incommensurate rates.  Property gained in that way is,
as Marx saw it, theft.  A careful reading of Locke suggests that he would have even 
agreed with Marx in this regard.  For example, Locke states that:
every man has a property in his own person: this no body [sic] has any right 
to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his.  Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature 
hath provided, … he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own … this labour being the unquestionable property of the 
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to (Locke 
1821 [1689], 209-210).73
Locke believed that humans had the right to products of their own labor, not the 
products of others'.
Access
The difficulty, of course, is that the outcome of Locke's “vision of a society better for 
all … was not a society of equals but a new class structure” (McCarthy and Prudham 
2004, 277).  This happened because Locke did not appreciate that the right to 
property does not guarantee access to it.  One of the most important contributions, in 
this regard, is made by Ribot and Peluso (2003).  Their theory of access makes a 
distinction between property and access that, as noted above, takes the ability to 
benefit from land or resources as entirely separate from the right to benefit ascribed 
by formal ownership.  Access, they explain, is determined by “a wider range of social
relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from resources without 
focusing on property relations alone” (ibid., 154).
This is important because formal property rights are (often) a rather minor factor in 
73 Locke goes even further qualifying this statement by saying that people may only have the right to 
the products of their labor “where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others”, 
suggesting that if resources become scarce, accumulation may have to be limited and rationing 
may be required.
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determining who benefits from productive activities.  As Ribot (1998) demonstrates 
in the case of Senegalese charcoal production, who owns the forest is relatively 
insignificant compared with who controls access to the resources and opportunities at
each stage in the commodity chain.  Even if the national state officially owns the 
forests, political structures and social relations of local villages dictate who can use 
them, and control over the various other stages in the chain (including transport, 
distribution, and sale) is the primary determinant in who actually benefits from the 
process as a whole.  Ribot shows that “[p]roperty, title or ownership rights alone are 
simply not sufficient to guarantee that any individual or group can or will benefit 
from forests, pastures or farmlands” (1998, 335).  The theory of access articulated by 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) complicates the straightforward assumption that individual 
rights to property result in the just distribution of benefits from labor, and it explains 
why Lockian conceptions of property merely re-shuffled familiar class structures.
An individual's ability to leverage another's labor (e.g. through political influence, 
social connections, threat of violence, or access to capital) results in the uneven 
accumulation of benefits.  Excess capital, then, allows for the expansion of influence 
and greater control over access to resources, regardless of anyone's formal claim to 
property.  As Ribot and Peluso (2003) explain, the tension between those who control
resource access and those who must pay tribute in order to maintain their access is at 
the root of the re-emergent class structure identified by McCarthy and Prudham 
(2004).  Furthermore, they observe that this relationship parallels the one that Marx 
identified “between capital and labor”:
The relation between actors who own capital and those who labor … parallels
the relation between actors who control others' access and those who must 
maintain their own access.  In both cases, it is in the relation between these 
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two sets of actors that the division of benefits is negotiated.  To maintain 
access, subordinate actors often transfer some benefits to those who control it.
They expend resources to cultivate relations or transfer benefits to those who 
control access in order to derive their own benefit (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 
159).
Extending this observation, the consolidation of control over access to land or 
resources can be seen to parallel the concepts of “primitive accumulation” and 
“accumulation by dispossession”.
Accumulation
Primitive accumulation is the process conceived by Marx to explain the origin of 
surpluses that allowed for the capitalist mode of production to emerge.  It can be 
understood as the original enclosures that allowed the bourgeoisie to accumulate 
more than their fair share (Glassman 2006; Corson and MacDonald 2012).  Liberals 
(classical or neo-) take this process to have been peaceful, essentially arising from 
differences in individuals' willingness to labor harder or for longer (Harvey 2010) – 
this belief is rooted, of course, in (a misconstrual of) the ideas of accumulation in 
Locke's labor theory of property, explained above.  In contrast to the liberal framing, 
Marx saw the process as the “'forcible usurpation' of common property” through 
violence and state-sanctioned theft (Glassman 2006, 610).  Certainly, this “original” 
accumulation was also enacted through the many other social mechanisms identified 
by Ribot and Peluso (2003).
As outlined in Chapter 2, however, David Harvey has explained that the term 
“primitive” suggests that this accumulation occurred long ago and, thus, “is 
considered no longer relevant” (2003, 144).  Instead, he argues, this process of 
accumulation through “predation, fraud, and violence” is ongoing (ibid.).  To clarify 
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this commonly misunderstood concept, he offers the term “accumulation by 
dispossession” as an alternative for the same process.  This recognizes the fact that 
not only is wealth accumulated through capitalist re-production, it is also stolen 
through various processes, including privatization, commodification of labor, debt, 
and appropriation of assets, to name but a few (ibid., 145).
At a superficial level, “privatization” can be understood as simply the primitive 
accumulation of formal property rights – the conversion of “previously state-owned, 
unowned, or communally owned” resources to exclusive individual control (Castree 
2008, 142).  But this focus on rights, rather than the myriad other social relationships 
that determine access, does not, as Ribot (1998) and Ribot and Peluso (2003) have 
shown, adequately explain the division of benefits in society.  A fuller appreciation of
this complexity requires that privatization be understood to include the primitive 
accumulation of access.  In other words, the consolidation of control over resources 
has more to do with the (re-)negotiation of relative shares than the possession or re-
distribution of formal property rights.
Land Ownership in Costa Rica
In order to understand how “privatization” (i.e. the expansion of exclusionary 
ownership practices) can still occur in a context of already-private resources, we 
must give attention to “locally specific histories of environments, land use, 
governance and agrarian relations”, as current relations are shaped by an “array of 
prior enclosures and forms of territorialization” (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012, 
248).  In this section and the one that follows, I expand on the context provided in 
Chapter 4 to establish a detailed account of historical ownership patterns and a 
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nuanced understanding of the meaning of “private property” in Costa Rica.  The 
purpose is to show how, despite a tradition of small-holder “private” ownership, a 
move towards new forms of conservation management is resulting in more 
exclusionary practices.
Historical developments affecting ownership patterns
Costa Rica is set apart from its Latin American neighbors in many ways, particularly 
by its historical patterns of land ownership.  Unlike many of its neighbors, the 
country has a reputation for broad private ownership and strong institutions 
protecting property rights.  According to the World Bank (2007, 1), approximately 
60% of Costa Rican forest cover and 80% of deforested areas are on privately owned 
lands.  In Costa Rica, small and medium-sized family farms have predominated over 
large-scale latifundio and indigenous holdings (Wilson 1998).74  This is, of course, 
the product of many historical developments and Costa Rica's unique history within 
Central America.
Costa Rica's historical land tenure differences predate Spanish colonization.  The 
territory that is today Costa Rica was situated between and at the periphery of the 
great pre-Columbian empires and, thus, had a comparatively sparse indigenous 
population (Evans 1999, 4).  This, of course, had implications for European 
settlement patterns at the start of the colonial era.  Since the power centers were 
located elsewhere, only a small colonial presence was required to assert control.  
Again at the fringe of the governing power, and only weakly bound to it, Costa Rica 
74 It should be noted that, despite these land ownership patterns, the situation is far from egalitarian, 
as “economic and social life in Costa Rica [has been] characterized by significant income and 
wealth disparities” (Wilson 1998, 14).
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was a poor colony with development (mostly agricultural) lagging well behind 
(Booth 1998; Brockett 1988).  Since Costa Rica did not contain large deposits of gold
or other important resources, the area did not attract further settlement – the 
European population of Costa Rica barely surpassed 2000 in the first two centuries of
its colonization (Booth 1998).  Limited colonial economic activity meant that 
collective indigenous ownership was relatively undisrupted throughout most of the 
country.  This situation was tenuous, however, as the simple act of a European 
colonist putting “free” land to some use would displace any other claims.
After gaining independence in 1821, Costa Rica was able to expand trade beyond 
Spain.  This accelerated agricultural development, and as explained previously, 
coffee production became the basis of the economy.  Land management, however, 
remained tied to the colonial past.  Since colonial settlers had been minimally 
successful in subduing indigenous labor, they were unable to amass control over vast 
resources (Wilson 1998).  As a result, “most Costa Rican coffee growers farmed on 
small, family-owned cafeteras … [rather than] large-scale plantation monoculture 
(the latifundista experience typical in much of the rest of Latin America)” (Evans 
1999, 6).  Unlike its neighbors, Costa Rica did not see the consolidation of control of 
vast lands in the hands of elite agriculture barons.  Indeed, European settlements 
during the coffee production period occupied only 2% of the national landmass 
(Wilson 1998, 25).
Costa Rica's second major export commodity, bananas, was equally formative of land
ownership patterns.  The agreement, described in Chapter 4, between U.S. railroad 
tycoon Minor C. Keith and the government of Costa Rica granted nearly 7% of Costa
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Rica's national territory to a single company on a 99 year lease (Brockett 1988).  This
move changed the face of the Costa Rican economy from a small-scale 
owner/producer coffee industry to one based on international investment, large-scale 
ownership, and wage labor.  As banana production required greater capital 
investment (in terms of labor force and transportation infrastructure), it was not a 
feasible venture for most small-scale operations (Evans 1999).  The result was 
unprecedented accumulation, extensive ecological devastation, and the exploitation 
of labor.
Costa Rica's experience with banana production had lasting effects on human 
migration patterns, especially with regard to (re-)settlement of the frontiers.75  When 
the banana producers had exhausted the productive capacities of their plantations, 
they simply abandoned their operations (and workers!) and moved on.  This 
happened twice in Costa Rica – once on the Caribbean side, and again in the southern
Pacific areas.  Those left behind “flocked to the countryside to settle, farm, and eke 
out a living in the forest” (Evans 1999, 37).  Precarismo, wherein the landless poor 
laid claim to “unused” public, private, and indigenous land, was common.  It was 
facilitated by timber production, which provided roads and deforested land that could
be brought into agriculture or ranching.  The practice expanded small-holder land 
possession throughout Costa Rica, though always under tenuous legal conditions and 
with no formal rights.
While the precaristas were sometimes considered “invaders” by large private land 
75 Though Costa Rica's indigenous population was “comparatively sparse”, it is important to note that
the “frontiers” were hardly empty landscapes, and that the influx of Costa Ricans of European and 
Afro-Caribbean descent constituted the dispossession and dislocation of native peoples.
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owners, they rarely took land that was “under conspicuous use” (Evans 1999, 42), 
and broad sympathy existed for their condition.76  Nevertheless, the first law aimed at
addressing precarismo was passed in 1942.  Although the law professed legal 
protection of “the right to cultivate and take possession of uncultivated lands” 
(Yashar 1997, 253), it's title, Ley de Parásitos, was indicative of the bearing it would 
have and of who it would ultimately favor.  While the law provided precaristas with 
legal protection of lands in possession, it also “assumed responsibility for 
compensating owners whose land was affected” (Yashar 1997, 253).  Abuse of the 
provision meant that the law primarily favored large landowners, who were granted 
new lands in remuneration for occupied ones, even though they often actively enticed
squatters to “invade” their old depleted lands (Evans 1999, 59).  This created a 
situation wherein large landowners were ensured a constant supply of fertile lands, 
while the disadvantaged segments of the population received only depleted ones – the
legacy of which is marked in the current patterns of ownership and productivity.
Following the model laid out by the banana industry, Costa Rican economic 
development had, by the mid-20th century, shifted toward further foreign investment 
and large-scale operations.  George Guess, for example, remarked in the late 1970s 
on the “declining importance of the small farmer-entrepreneur in the overall 
development strategy” (1978, 599), saying that the “public policy emphasis on large-
scale agro-export production virtually assures the elimination of small farm 
activities” (ibid., 605).  Palm oil production was one such “large-scale agro-export” 
industry that emerged in the 1950s.  Like bananas, palm oil was “capital-intensive” 
76 The closest English equivalent of precarista may be “squatter” but, as it is used in Costa Rica, the 
word does not usually carry the same negative connotation.
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and did not provide opportunities for small owner-producer operations (Evans 1999). 
At the same time, the older industries were faced with greater international 
competition in the increasingly globalized world.  This caused prices to decline and 
the export industry to falter.  Coffee, the country's enduring small-producer 
commodity, suffered from “a sharp decline in world … prices” during this period 
(Evans 1999, 37).  This, of course, had reverberating effects on ownership patterns 
and income distribution – the result being a narrower control of land and productive 
activities in the hands of industrial operations and corporate interests.
As the internationalization of agricultural production continued, the cattle industry 
rapidly took center stage as Costa Rica became the largest beef exporter in Central 
America.  As noted earlier, the demand for beef to supply an “exponentially growing”
North American fast-food market drove a wave of deforestation, but it also had an 
important effect on ownership patterns in the cattle producing regions (Evans 1999, 
38).  Contrary to what might be expected, however, expansion of this industry caused
a fragmentation of ownership.  Up until the post-WWII boom, cattle production was 
one of the few sectors that had seen prior latifundismo.  Within the main cattle 
producing region of Guanacaste, land had been concentrated primarily in the hands 
of just 13 families since the late 1800s, but shifting political conditions (as well as 
shifting economic structures) allowed new actors to enter the industry (Edelman 
1985).  Specifically, nationalization of Costa Rica's banking system “permitted credit 
to be channeled on the basis of political criteria” (Edelman 1985, 170), which opened
new opportunities for investment by “upwardly mobile middle class groups 
associated with the forces [that] were victorious in the 1948 civil war” (ibid. 178).  
Nevertheless, 78% of the Guanacaste landmass continued to be held by landowners 
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with over 100 hectares and 41% by owners with over 1000 hectares (Edelman 1985, 
158).77  Beyond that, export oriented growth had the added effect of driving up local 
prices for dairy and beef, lowering “the overall standard of living for the nation” as a 
whole (Evans 1999, 39).
After the 1948 civil war, the ruling junta actively pursued policies that would address
growing disparities from agricultural industrialization.  To do this, the Figueres 
administration sought to resolve the (still) uncertain conditions for precaristas.  In 
light of widespread sympathies held for the rural poor, and in recognition that 
“squatters were really more of a symptom of the larger problem of inequitable land 
distribution”, the administration aimed to formalize their tenuous ownership 
conditions (Evans 1999, 59).  It was not until 1961 that the Law of Lands and 
Colonization was actually passed, but it re-oriented the government's position on land
allocation and countered the prevailing trend driven by agro-exportation.  The 
language of the law made its objective quite clear – it sought to “contribute to the 
more just distribution of wealth” by “avoiding the concentration of national lands in 
the hands of those who would use them for specialization against the general interests
of the nation” (quoted in Evans 1999, 60).  The law also established ITCO (the 
Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), which was charged with administering 
“agricultural colonization” and allocating legal rights to precaristas.  It did so with 
varying degrees of effectiveness – thousands obtained legal rights to the lands they 
occupied, but a backlog of applicants meant that only a fraction of those seeking title 
ever received it (Evans 1999).  Nevertheless, ownership of land by informal small-
holders came to be legally recognized, even if not always formally documented.
77 100 hectares is 1 square-kilometer.
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This shift in policy ultimately encouraged settlement of rural lands in much the same 
way as the Homestead Act in the United States – free land to those who “improved” 
it – both being rooted in John Locke's “labor theory of property”.78  While this was a 
progressive social policy that was intended to aid the poor, it is often faulted for 
having caused extensive environmental devastation, as making “improvements” was 
taken to mean bringing land into agricultural production.  Sanctions were actually 
imposed on landowners who retained uncultivated lands (Evans 1999, 42).  Very 
often, however, it is the poor farmers themselves that are blamed for this 
environmental damage, rather than the shortsighted policies that conceived of 
“improvements” as the removal of forest.  As Vivanco points out, the rural poor 
“have been widely projected as the main culprits in [Costa Rica's] rapid 
deforestation” (2003, 65; 2006).
For instance, Evans asserts that the forests were being “threatened with the influx of 
squatter farmers and their families seeking new lands to clear and farm” (1999, 58-
59), and that once the lands were depleted they “searched for and moved to new 
frontiers, renewing the destructive cycle” (ibid., 42).  While there is some 
acknowledgment in his analysis that the precarismo “problem” stemmed from wider 
economic injustices, Evans (1999) does not expand on the fundamental cause.  A 
more reasoned explanation is that flawed conceptions (typical of the era) about what 
constituted wise use of land are the real reason for the damage sustained to the 
environment, rather than the allocation of rights to impoverished people.  Certainly, 
78 Significantly, the law also asserted that all lands “not under title of private ownership legally 
belonged to the state” (Evans 1999, 60), which laid the foundation of the government's authority 
create the country's now famous system of parks and protected areas.
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far more damage can be attributed to the industries that recklessly pursued short term
capital gain over sound ecological management.  The current understanding (that 
functioning ecological systems provide important benefits to society) would, without 
a doubt, have altered what “making improvements” actually meant, and would have 
resulted in a very different outcome.
As noted in Chapter 4, conservation interests, alarmed by the rate and extent of 
ecological degradation, responded with what is now viewed as one of the world's 
most successful campaigns to preserve tropical biodiversity.  Beginning in the 1970s 
and lasting through the 1980s, the influential and well connected conservationist 
class succeeded in establishing one of the most extensive systems of parks and 
protected areas worldwide (Evans 1999).  In all, 25% of Costa Rican land came 
under some form of legal protection (Roberts and Thanos 2003, 79).  This was 
achieved (primarily) through state action, which involved the expansion of public 
holdings through expropriation, land swaps, and relocation of entire communities 
(Evans 1999).79  Given the historical prominence of “private” ownership, however, 
the extent of these efforts was ultimately limited by the availability of suitable land 
and the political viability of the approach – political and social conditions would only
ever allow a certain amount of nationalization.
Accordingly, the government was also acting on a second front through the Forest 
Laws identified in Chapter 4 (Ley Forestal 4465, Ley Forestal 7032, Ley Forestal 
79 Significant conservation was also achieved under private efforts, for example in the Monte Verde 
region (Vivanco 2006).
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7174, Ley Forestal 7575).  As explained, these were implemented in an attempt to 
stem the rate of deforestation on private lands.  The second incarnation of the forest 
law, in particular, came into conflict with the Costa Rican traditions of private 
ownership, as it sought to regulate not only activities on state lands, but also those on
privately held ones (Watson et al. 1998).  The law provided the government with the 
ability to intervene in private timber operations, which some landowners and the 
logging industry viewed as an incursion on the institution of private ownership 
(Evans 1999, 165-166).  The dispute was ultimately brought before the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court, which nullified the law on the grounds that it had not
passed with sufficient majority to allow restrictions on private land use activities, 
having fallen short of the two-thirds majority required regulate such matters by a 
single vote (Evans 1999).
The result of these historical developments is a unique pattern of land ownership and 
a distinct socio-political context for contemporary conservation action.  While some 
similarities with other countries in Latin America exist (e.g. a large number of urban 
landless and wage laborers in agricultural production and manufacturing; Seligson 
1980), Costa Rica has a comparatively high degree of privately owned small-parcel 
lands (Watson et al. 1998, 31), albeit frequently without legal title.  A common 
assumption is that this condition makes Costa Rica ideally suited for implementation 
of payments for ecosystem services – if much of Costa Rica's forests are already 
privately owned, conservation can be achieved by merely persuading landowners that
it is an economically competitive option, that it is the economically rational way to 
manage their lands.  The conventional logic is that the property situation makes Costa
Rica a “natural” fit for PES and that implementation does no harm because no change
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of ownership occurs.  However, as I have already suggested, this assessment is being 
presented rather uncritically, as precisely what is meant  by “ownership” and “private
property” is not universal – what sort of rights are afforded and what sort of practices
are permitted is highly variable.  Whereas North American conceptions of private 
property have long been “based on an absolutist and static assumption of domain and
control”, Costa Rican ones have been far less exclusionary (Vivanco 2006, 33).
Access and the meaning of “ownership”
In the case that opened this chapter, I explained that the way in which property is 
understood in Costa Rica is culturally specific and (potentially) unfamiliar to 
individuals from other cultural perspectives.  Varied social norms concerning access 
to possessions, land, or resources cannot be assumed to follow familiar patterns of 
control and exclusion.  Different conceptions of property have many implications for 
how privately owned land has historically been managed in Costa Rica.  What sort of
activities are permissible (or unacceptable) on land claimed or held by others must be
understood in the context of accumulated social history.
Rural Costa Rican practices on private lands have historically allowed considerable 
access to the broader community.  As Vivanco has observed in the Monte Verde 
region of Costa Rica, it is “appropriate to view notions of private property … in 
terms of labor investment”, where access is understood to be considerably more 
flexible and negotiable than it is under “absolutist property concepts” (2006, 33).  
Individuals often do not strictly enclose their lands, and communities retain many 
rights of access.  Extractive activities (such as hunting, harvesting, and collection) on
private lands may be undesirable but are often tolerated, whereas non-extractive 
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activities (recreation, right-of-way, tourism) are generally accepted (Herrera, 
interview, 18 Feb 2013).  Even though the “period of relatively open cogiendo de 
derechos” (“grabbing rights”) may not have lasted beyond the closure of the frontier 
(Vivanco 2006, 32), this mentality has had a lasting effect on how ownership is 
understood and land is managed, particularly in remote rural areas.  Indeed, the 
situation could arguably be interpreted as an informal system of usufruct rights 
wherein members of the community are entitled to “use the fruits” of the land, so 
long as it does no lasting harm to the property or owner.
While lands under conspicuous use are generally respected as the exclusive property 
of the individual who labored to bring them into production, marginal lands (even 
those over which somebody may claim possession) are frequently treated as open 
access parcels (Herrera, interview, 18 Feb 2013).  Previously, this might have meant 
that forested land would be under heightened risk of deforestation or degradation, but
extractive practices such as the removal of timber are now highly regulated in Costa 
Rica and fairly uncommon on the industrial scale.  It is now virtually impossible, due
to strict regulation, for a person to claim “unused” land and extract resources for 
commercial purposes.  It is still the case, however, that personal- and local-scale use 
of forest products (such as meat, palmito, spring water, and wood), though 
technically subject to the same regulation, does occur on these marginal lands.80  It 
would also not be unusual to see “unused” agricultural lands brought into informal 
cultivation by local actors – as sometimes occurs on lands situated between two 
owners/holders and on lands that have no definite claim (Herrera, interview, 18 Feb 
80 While the impact of these activities is a conservation concern (Redford 1992; Carrillo et al. 2002), 




Property boundaries are often fluid and overlapping in rural Costa Rica, and it is not 
unusual for “ownership” of land to be an informal matter of community agreement, 
rather than official documentation.  In remote areas, “handshake understandings” 
between neighbors are often more prevalent than legal title, and if land lies fallow for
too long new claims may be placed upon it.  It is a system that can appear (and, 
indeed, often be) rather chaotic for outsiders accustomed to formalized legal status.  
Following the Costa Rican tradition of “possession-by-occupation” (Vivanco 2006, 
32),81 customary ownership generally requires that the property be under active use to
remain under one's control – indeed, this is often times also the case even when legal 
title is held (Herrera, interview, 18 Feb 2013).82  Lands that are not physically 
occupied, may be perceived as available to others – a condition that has complicated 
the country's transition from agriculturalism to ecological conservation.
The many conceptions of property that are embodied in Costa Rica's historical land 
uses (coffee production, banana production, forestry, frontier settlement, ranching, 
agrarian reform, conservation, etc.) have layered to produce a system of small-holder 
ownership/possession and broad access for the landless.  While anything but 
egalitarian (Wilson 1998), this system has ensured a level of distributed wealth and 
access to land that is considerably more equitable than in other parts of Latin 
America (Stallings and Peres 2000).  “Private property” may be more prevalent in 
81 Possession-by-occupation likely has it's roots in the colonial era, when European settlers were able 
to lay claim to indigenous land simply by putting it to some new use.  In present context, however, 
it is a custom that empowers the underclasses (indigenous peoples having long ago been 
dispossessed and confined to reserves).
82 This is a manifestation of Locke's idea that no person has the right to more land than he himself or 
she herself is able to work.
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Costa Rica (Chomitz et al. 1999), but the actual practices that occur in many rural 
parts of the country do not necessarily follow familiar patterns of control and 
exclusion.  Indeed, the prevailing traditions of land management run counter to the 
conventional wisdom that Costa Rica's property institutions are a manifestation of 
neoliberal ideals.
Costa Rica's PSA, however, has recently added a new layer of governance that is 
rapidly altering the level of access to land that is permissible.  The program is, 
perhaps, the most significant development affecting land management in recent 
times, particularly with regard to the way in which it actively disrupts the permissive 
culture of usufruct access.  Certainly the program has resulted in progress towards 
the responsible management of ecosystems, but it is also fundamentally altering 
social relations within rural communities by imposing exclusionary practices, 
monitoring requirements, and the policing of boundaries.  These changes, however, 
have not yet received adequate scholarly attention, largely because there has been no 
apparent change in ownership designation.  Oversimplified understandings of what 
constitutes “private property” have diverted attention away from the fact that certain 
(more inclusionary) practices are being displaced.
Land Management Practices Under the PSA
One of the greatest challenges for Costa Rican conservationists was to reverse the 
conventional understanding that “unimproved” (i.e. non-agricultural) land was freely 
available.  Forested land had to come to be seen as “in use” in order to be spared 
from development.  Certainly, the country's transition to an ecotourism-based 
economy has aided in this, and it is now broadly accepted that forest no longer 
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constitutes “empty” land, free for the taking.  But ecotourism is not the only 
environmentally related activity that has “contributed to changes in concepts of 
property ownership and forest management” in Costa Rica (Vivanco 2006, 5).  
Introduction of the PSA has done a great deal to specify who is responsible for 
managing particular bits of forest, and in what ways, effectively formalizing claims 
over “unused” lands and prescribing management practices.
Instituting the PSA
The PSA emerged at a time when Costa Rica had already firmly established its 
reputation for environmental conservation on public lands.  Faced with the “grand 
contradiction” of chronic deforestation on non-state lands (Evans 1999), however, the
country had something of an ecological crisis on its hands.  The existing forest 
management program was considered to be failing, but the alternative (further 
expropriation of land by the state) was viewed as impractical and politically inviable. 
Since direct intervention in private timber operations had just been overruled in favor
of property rights, the government began to pursue a new mechanism for promoting 
action by private actors.  The Legislative Assembly established a Special Forestry 
Commission that was tasked to develop such a plan (Watson et al. 1998).  The 
existing incentive scheme was also viewed as a major liability for the debt-strapped 
nation (Rojas and Aylward 2003).  Under the pressure of a third round of World 
Bank-imposed structural adjustment, Costa Rica was forced to eliminate any form of 
government subsidy, including the forestry certificate schemes (de Camino et al. 
2000, 17).  As has already been explained, the Commission recommended a series of 
actions that culminated in the most recent revision of the nation's forest law (Ley 
Forestal 7575).
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The management regime that emerged – the PSA – was, of course, aimed at 
establishing financial links between “users” and “providers” of ecosystem services.  
The new system is not based on environmental ethics or state support for preferred 
management techniques, but rather on personal self-interest and an assumption of 
economic rationality.  The program aims to set up relationships that would have 
“users” of services compensate landowners for ensuring the delivery of particular 
ecosystem benefits (Sage and Sanchez 2002).  Though only a loose correspondence 
between this idealized model and actual practice exists, the foundational motivations 
for doing conservation have been altered by the program.
Landowners that wish to participate in the program must submit an application to the 
Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal (FONAFIFO), the quasi-governmental 
organization that oversees the program.  Applications must include a land 
management plan drawn up by a certified regente, as well as other supporting 
documents (see Pagiola 2008).  These management plans specify the practices that 
are permissible under the contract, as well as various other requirements, should the 
application be accepted.  The activities vary according the contract type (referred to 
as the contract modality), but upwards of 90% of participants do so under the 
conservation modality (Porras 2010).
Participants in the program agree to manage their land according to a contract that is 
signed with FONAFIFO.  These contracts transfer the ecosystem “service rights” to 
the agency, which may sell them to service “users” in order to finance the program.83 
83 Thus far, however, the market has largely failed to materialize and financing from the sale of these 
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In exchange, the participant landowner receives an annual payment at a standard per-
hectare rate, currently $64/ha/yr on a 10-year renewable contract for the conservation
modality (MINAET 2012).  A percentage of these payments (established in an 
agreement between the landowner and regente) is then transferred to the regente as 
compensation for preparing the contract.84  Regente involvement continues 
throughout the duration of the contract, as routine monitoring of enrolled properties 
is required by law.  FONAFIFO, as well, performs routine checks on a sample of 
properties to ensure the integrity of regente reports.  Violations by landowners are 
rare (Segleau interview, 16 Jan 2012), but can result in contract termination (Pagiola 
2008).  Inspections ensure that contracts are being honored, but it is the landowners 
themselves that are responsible for day-to-day management and surveillance.  They 
must, for example, report incursions by third parties.  FONAFIFO keeps records on 
the frequency of these incidents and ultimately decides whether or not further 
investigation or action is required (Alfaro interview, 23 Jan 2012).
Expansion of Exclusionary Practices
When landowners enroll in the PSA, they make a decision to manage their land 
according to the guidelines laid out in the regente's plan.  This decision, however, has
bearing on more than just the owner's use of land.  It also affects the levels of access 
enjoyed by members of the broader community.  Surveillance requirements oblige 
participants to monitor their forests and enforce the practices outlined in their 
agreements (MINAET 2009).  While it is unusual for landowners to be found in 
violation of their contracts, they occasionally must deal with incursions by non-
services remains insignificant (FONAFIFO 2011).
84 The fact that regentes are paid by their client landowners presents a disconcerting conflict of 
interest.  If a regente reports a contract violation, and the contract is terminated, the regente also 
stands to lose his or her source of income.
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owners (Zuñiga interview, 30 Jan 2012; Alfaro interview, 23 Jan 2012).85  Because 
they themselves are being monitored, landowners must report these incursions or else
stand to have their contracts terminated, resulting in the loss of future payments.  
Even if a landowner might have previously tolerated usufruct access to his or her 
forest, enrollment in the PSA means that they no longer can.
The stakes are high, and non-compliant landowners have much to lose.  Given an 
average conservation contract size of 91.4 hectares (Zbinden and Lee 2005), the 
typical PSA participant receives an annual payout of about $5850, a substantial sum 
in a country where the average annual income is just $7640 (World Bank 2011).  
Financial pressure to remain in good standing with the program by enacting 
exclusionary practices is, therefore, quite strong.  Indeed, it is even more pronounced 
with the largest contracts.  Individuals that are able to enroll the maximum 300 
hectares will net $19200 per year, more than 2.5x the average Costa Rican income.  
Even when accepting that landowners are motivated by more than just bottom-line 
economics, the threat of losing such a substantial source of income certainly does 
become a factor in their decision calculus.
The program fundamentally alters the relationship between owners, their land, and 
would-be trespassers.  This, of course, might be considered a designed-in (and 
desired) feature of the program – certainly reduced ecosystem degradation is a 
positive consequence – but what I am concerned with here is the distribution of 
benefits from access to resources and the shifting social relationships that constitute 
85 Whether landowners are violating contracts and reporting them as incursions by neighbors is 
unclear, but I was assured this is not likely (Segleau interview, 16 Jan 2012) and that the problem 
is quite rare, occurring on only two of the seventy properties that one regente supervises (Alfaro 
interview, 23 Jan 2012).
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property and access.86  The PSA prescribes a set of practices that require enrolled 
landowners to deny access.  Whether or not they would choose to exclude or allow 
access to the broader community on their own volition does not enter the picture.  
Participants in the program are, in effect, transformed into boundary guards, 
establishing an adversarial relationship with the wider community.  The result is the 
accumulation of benefits to an individual, rather than the broader distribution across a
population, as might have otherwise existed.
PSA regulations also stipulate the requirement to signpost enrolled land (MINAET 
2009; see figure 7.2).  This requirement is a response to the historical understanding 
that “unused” land is free for the taking, and it is a performance of the new definition
of what constitutes “conspicuous use”.  It serves to communicate to the broader 
community that the forest is off limits, and it allows landowners to expand their 
control over ever-greater resources.  Even though small farmers of the previous era 
frequently asserted claims to wooded lots beyond what they themselves could bring 
into production, the resources within them and access to them often remained outside
of their control.  With the PSA, this is no longer the case.  Signposting allows 
individuals to assert control over an amount of resources that is greater than their 
“fair share” (in the sense of John Locke's labor theory of property) by mobilizing the 
authority of the state.
86 It is important to note that support for broad access to land is not the same as calling for a return 
open-access resource extraction – conservation is certainly the more ecologically and socially 
preferable option, it just needs to be done in a way that allows for a broad distribution of benefits.
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Figure 7.2:  Signposting required for participation in the PSA.
The sign reads:  “On this farm we are reforesting and thereby protecting nature”.
Under the PSA, enrolled lands are effectively cordoned off and monitored to ensure 
that no extraction takes place.  The program is, in effect, introducing new concepts 
and regimes of property that are “based on an absolutist … assumption of domain 
and control” (Vivanco 2006, 33) – owners must monitor their lands, restrict access, 
deny the use of resources, and report any violations to the authorities.  Payments for 
ecosystem services, often assumed to be the antithesis of the older “fortress” 
approach to conservation (see Brockington 2002), actually has much in common with
it, including enforcement of exclusionary measures, narrow control over resources, 
and an antagonistic relationship to local communities.  The only difference appears to
be the way in which these practices are enacted – whereas the fortress model relied 
on employment of rangers and guards to exclude communities from parks and 
protected areas, the PSA enlists private actors through guarantees of property rights 
and facilitation of the ability to deny access.  Participants in the program are impelled
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to action by monetary incentives, while internalizing practices that lead to 
institutionally desired outcomes.  The program acts as a form of neoliberal 
governmentality (Fletcher 2010), that results in the corrosion of social cohesion and 
the consolidation of control over resources.  Landowners do far more than just ensure
conservation; they enact an exclusionary system of management that is rooted in 
personal self-interest rather than social responsibility and ethics.
Furthermore, the forest law (Ley Forestal 7575) contains unprecedented language 
concerning settlement and eviction.  Evidently encouraged by the World Bank (de 
Camino et al. 2000, 71), Article 36 of the law reverses some of the most fundamental 
protections for the landless and dispossessed that have historically existed in Costa 
Rica.  The provision empowers police to evict settlers at the behest of landowners 
involved in forest programs,87 effectively making land “invasion” a criminal offense 
enforceable by police action.  It also states that police have “a maximum period of 
five days to execute the eviction and present the allegations before the competent 
courts”, oddly implying that the eviction should happen first and be taken to court 
later.88  Quite astonishingly, given the far-reaching effects that this provision could 
potentially have, it does not appear to have yet received any scholarly analysis.  
Study of how this is playing out on the ground is urgently needed.  What the 
provision appears to achieve is a complete inversion of the historical valence of 
power between the landless and property owners (Ley Forestal 7575, Title 3, Chapter
87 The provision reads:  “Las autoridades de policía deberán desalojar a quienes invadan inmuebles 
sometidos voluntariamente al régimen forestal o dedicados a la actividad forestal, a solicitud del 
titular del inmueble o su representante y, previa prueba del sometimiento voluntario del inmueble 
al régimen forestal” (Ley Forestal 7575, Title 3, Chapter 4, Article 36).
88 The provision reads:  “Las autoridades de policía dispondrán de un plazo máximo de cinco días 
para ejecutar el desalojo y presentar las denuncias ante los tribunales competentes” (Ley Forestal 
7575, Title 3, Chapter 4, Article 36).
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4, Article 36).
Participation in the PSA not only strengthens ownership, though, it also formalizes 
rural property relations and creates a particular type of property owner.  This is 
occurring in two main ways.  The more obvious way this is occurring is through 
land-titling efforts that have been promoted by the World Bank (Porras 2010).  Both 
Ecomarkets I and Ecomarkets II have provided assistance to development 
organizations to help rural land holders formalize their claims (World Bank 2006, 46;
World Bank 2007, 7).  In addition, there is also a pathway for participation in the 
PSA that results in de facto title over lands in possession.  Initially the PSA did not 
allow enrollment of lands that were not under legal title, as law forbade the use of 
public funds in that way (Pagiola et al. 2005).  FONAFIFO, however, was able to 
circumvent these restrictions by mobilizing private funds, until the law was 
eventually revised to allow informal land holders to participate directly (Pagiola et al.
2005).  Once enrolled in the PSA, holders of these informal lands are entitled to all 
the protections guaranteed by the forest law.  This means that, despite lacking a 
traditional title, holders of lands enrolled in the PSA have the ability to deny access 
and exclude others (forcibly, if need be) from the benefits.  While property rights can,
in certain ways, be emancipatory for the historically dispossessed (Mansfield 2007b),
these newly empowered land holders are being made, under PSA management 
prescriptions, to behave according to idealized notions of independent, self-
interested, and “rational” economic actors.  They must exclude others and 
accumulate benefits to themselves, regardless of how they might have chosen to 
manage their lands previously.
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Exclusion, surveillance, and the policing of boundaries means the accumulation of 
benefits among landowners with proper title (or those who are able to secure legal 
tenure), and it means the dispossession of access for the landless and broader 
community.  If the PSA were to reflect the more distributed allocation of and access 
to resources that has historically existed in Costa Rica, it would have to make 
payments on a community level – instead of managing lands in an exclusionary and 
adversarial way, it would have to manage them in an inclusive and cooperative way.89
The assumption that such broader access to resources will lead, as it did previously, 
to unrestrained extraction, however, is rather unfounded, as extractive practices are 
far less acceptable in this era of conservation awareness.  Distributed benefits should 
not, therefore, be equated with resource depletion.  The equivalent of the PSA under 
a system of distributed benefits would reward communities (rather than individuals) 
for sound ecological management.  As it actually functions, benefits are centralized 
and conservation is achieved by forcibly excluding access.
Conclusion
In their assessment of neoliberalization in rural land conservation, Hodge and Adams 
(2012) make use of counterfactual analysis as a way to “get beyond a simplistic 
dichotomy of 'free market' versus 'state intervention' and to explore the particular 
changes that occur in both the formal and informal institutional arrangements” (2012,
477).  This approach compares the world in which changes have occurred against a 
world absent those changes, in order to assess their effect (Hodge and Adams 2012; 
Sayer 1995).  In the case of Costa Rica, an understanding of the PSA's effect on 
89 Indigenous communities are actually permitted to participate on such a collective basis, but an 
assessment of the equity implications requires detailed knowledge of indigenous politics and 
practices and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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property requires consideration of what ownership practices would have been if the 
regime had not been put in place.  In effect, what are the “real” differences caused by 
the activities of the PSA?  The counterfactual to this regime is ostensibly private 
ownership, although with broad usufruct access.
The tendency towards privatization that these PES programs introduce is downplayed
in the case of Costa Rica, as much of the country is assumed to be already under 
private ownership.  As I explained, however, this assessment of historical ownership 
practices was being presented rather uncritically, with little appreciation for the 
shifting social relations that constitute property or the actual practices being 
introduced under the PSA.  Certain presumptions about what the “private property” 
relationship entails have concealed the greater restriction of access and narrower 
distribution of benefits.  Even though the type of ownership may be unchanged, 
patterns of access are an entirely separate question.  If privatization is taken to be the 
expansion of exclusionary practices and the consolidation of control over resources, 
it can be seen to be occurring in the case of the PSA, despite the ostensible pre-
existence of private ownership.
As a conceptual basis for this claim, I presented theories on property, access, and 
accumulation.  I argued that classical theories of property do not account for the 
myriad social relationships that determine access and that “primitive accumulation” 
requires more than the acquisition of formal rights to property.  A focus on property 
rights alone does not adequately explain the division of benefits in society.  Without 
the ability to deny access to others, accumulation remains incomplete.  If property is 
claimed by an individual, but full control of access is not held, the opportunity for 
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further consolidation of private control remains.  In other words, privatization has 
more to do with the re-negotiation of relative shares of benefits than the re-
distribution of formal property rights.  The claim I made was that a broader 
conception of privatization is required so that the effect of market-based conservation
on “already neoliberal” economies is not overlooked.  Privatization, I suggested, 
should be interpreted as the individual accumulation of the ability to benefit, rather 
than simply the individual accumulation of formal rights to property.
In the case of Costa Rica, I demonstrated that what has historically been referred to 
as private property, has actually allowed considerable usufruct access.  While Costa 
Rica has a comparatively high degree of privately owned small-parcel lands, 
absolutist notions of domain and control have not been prevalent.  The flexibility of 
these ownership norms, however, is commonly overlooked by those evaluating the 
country's payments for ecosystem services scheme.  Conventional logic holds that 
Costa Rica's property situation makes it ideally suited for PES and that 
implementation does no harm because no change of ownership is required.
As I showed, however, the practices being introduced under the PSA are leading to 
an expansion of exclusionary management.  Not only are participating landowners 
required to manage their land in the agreed upon way, they must act as enforcement 
agents and deny access to others.  This establishes an entirely new regime of 
ownership practices that run counter to what has existed historically.  The result is 
vastly more adversarial social relationships and the accumulation of benefits among 
an ever-narrower segment of the population, regardless of how individual owners 
might have chosen to manage their land absent the PSA.  The program is, in effect, 
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disciplining landowners to behave in ways that are consistent with capitalist notions 
of rational self-interested profit-maximizing actors.  This is, of course, what enables 
the continued expansion of capitalism into the realm of environmental conservation 
(Robertson 2012).  As landowners are taught to bring resources under their control 
and exclude others from accessing the benefits, land is transformed from a resource 
that sustains community well-being into an abstract “service commodity” that should 
be circulated through the economy for personal gain (Robertson 2012).
What this case primarily demonstrates, however, is the actual effects of the private 
ownership model that is favored by market proponents (e.g. Pagiola 2008; Wunder 
2005; Engel et al. 2008).  Programs that promote conservation by incentivizing 
exclusionary management corrode social cohesion and contribute to the expansion of 
wealth disparity.  More importantly, this case shows that such programs cannot be 
assumed to be benign simply because they are applied in areas where “private” 
ownership already predominates.  The question of how the commodification of 
ecosystem services is affecting the lives of actual communities in areas already “lost”
to neoliberalization is essential for recognizing why it must be resisted.  While 
Robertson (2012) may be correct that defining the problem with making payments 
for ecosystem services on “already privatized” lands may be difficult, I believe that a 
nuanced understanding of local conditions will inevitably reveal detrimental 
implications.  As I showed, the meaning of private property is not universal, and the 
type of practices that are encouraged by these programs can exacerbate existing 
inequities.  Certainly, we need to understand PES “as part of the larger process of 
rendering surplus value” (Robertson 2012, 397), but we must also reveal exactly why




This thesis has been a historical study of one of the most significant and influential 
programs to develop PES worldwide.  It has demonstrated the contradictory nature of
neoliberalism and the fragmented way in which it operates.  Unlike most studies that 
approach PES from an implementation-oriented perspective that evaluates and 
prescribes “best practices”, I have engaged critically with the policies to understand 
not only the program's material implications, but also the conceptual insights that it 
provides.  I have employed theories on neoliberalization and capitalist development 
to get a handle on the underlying economic drivers of the push to financialize 
conservation.  And I have, in turn, spoken back to those theories to contribute to our 
understanding of neoliberalism itself and the conditions of contemporary capitalism 
at its newest frontiers.
In Chapter 2, I laid out the conceptual basis for this thesis.  I explained that I allied 
with the critically-oriented literature that remains cautious of new financialized 
approaches to conservation and skeptical of their grand promises.  Drawing on 
concepts concerning the neoliberalization of nature, I adopted an analytical 
framework that would orient my treatment of PES towards fundamental questions of 
social and ecological justice – who controls what resources, how, for what purposes, 
and to whose ultimate benefit?
I distinguished between neoliberalism, a coherent ideology, and neoliberalzation, an 
incomplete and ever-adapting process.  It is a distinction that is, by now, well-
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established among critical scholars (e.g. Castree 2008a; Peck and Tickell 2002; 
Brenner and Theodore 2002; Bakker 2010; Larner 2000).  From this perspective, 
“ideal type” neoliberalism (which entails privatization, marketization, deregulation, 
re-regulation, etc) is an abstraction that never actually exists in pure form.  
Neoliberalization, by contrast, is the “actually existing” (Brenner and Theodore 
2002) manifestation of neoliberalism that may be observed in practice.  It operates in 
partial and unfinished ways and may even exist simultaneously alongside overtly 
non-neoliberal practices.  As I explained, however, this disjointed character can make
identifying neoliberalization rather challenging, as its manifestations are frequently 
ideologically fragmented and divergent across space and time.
The distinction between neoliberalism and neoliberalization also poses conceptual 
challenges, as it presents scholars with understandings that are, on the one hand, 
“monolithic and omnipresent” and, on the other, “excessively concrete and 
contingent” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381-382).  While the former risks an overly 
generalized understanding of neoliberalism that has no practical expression, the latter
“may downplay neoliberalism as an extra-local project” (McCarthy and Prudham 
2004, 276).  As Castree explains, we require a means of steering “between the 'dead-
end' of idiographic analysis and the perils of overly universal understandings of how 
nature is neoliberalised” (2008b, 161).
In this conclusion, I re-visit the question of how to connect localized expressions of 
neoliberalization to the broader “neoliberal project”.  With recourse to the internal 
contradictions of capital discussed in Chapter 1, I explain how “idiographic” analyses
may be bound together by the logics of capital that govern neoliberalization.  
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Essentially, I make the case that the internal contradictions of capital are responsible 
for the particular (locally- and politically-specific) forms of neoliberalization that 
emerge in capitalist development, and I explain how this provides coherence to the 
concept of neoliberalism as an (extra-local) project.  First, however, I recap my 
engagements with the neoliberalization of nature in Costa Rica's PSA, in order to 
provide context and empirical grounding to my conceptual claims.
Neoliberalizing Costa Rican Nature
My three points of engagement with the neoliberalization of Costa Rican nature 
provide much more than a simple exemplification of neoliberalism-in-action; they 
reveal important things about the nature of neoliberalism itself and the way it 
operates in partial and perpetually unfinished ways.  These are i) neoliberalism is 
self-contradictory in that markets can rarely stand on their own, thus requiring active 
development and state support; ii) neoliberalism is fragmented and often integrated 
with non-neoliberal practices; and iii) neoliberalism is crisis-prone because of its 
internal contradictions and, thus, is constantly in search of new outlets for growth and
accumulation.  My empirical engagements situate these observations in actual 
context.  While they are, by no means, a perfect or pure representation of neoliberal 
ideals (or even of the neoliberal vision articulated for the PSA program) they are a 
clear manifestation of an actively unfolding process of neoliberalization.  
Additionally, these three points of engagement demonstrate how, by directing the 
critical gaze at pressing justice considerations, it is possible to identify the crucial 
junctures at which neoliberal policies push through ostensibly non-neoliberal 
practices.  They are summarized in turn below.
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PSA Financing
As I explained in Chapter 5, the evolution of PSA financing constitutes an ongoing 
process of neoliberalization.  The shift from taxation to “user fees” reoriented the 
program away from state-centered support of responsible ecosystem management, 
towards direct financial transactions between users and providers of ecosystem 
services.  With markets clearly envisioned to be the foundation of the PSA (Sage and 
Sanchez 2002), the initial tax was interpreted as an effort to kickstart exchange 
(Fletcher and Breitling 2012).  When markets failed to arise, however, the 
government took action to facilitate their development.  I showed that this took place 
through a complex process of political and inter-agency maneuvering that resulted in 
a new tariff on water usage.  Short of the ability to create actual markets, public 
financing was re-designed to behave according to market logic.
The government's effort to establish the tariff began in a partnership with the World 
Bank.  In need of institutional development funds and driven by a mandate to expand
the PSA budget, FONAFIFO sought support through a “medium-sized project” grant 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF).  In order to meet the GEF's co-
financing requirements, however, FONAFIFO and the Ministry of Environment had 
to secure loans from the World Bank.  Two separate projects – “Ecomarkets” and 
MMBI (aka “Ecomarkets II”) – were established.  In total the World Bank lent over 
$62 million, the GEF granted $18 million, and the PSA budget expanded by 107x 
over the initial medium-sized project request.90  Given this substantial investment, the
Bank was ensured significant influence over PSA development.
90 Ecomarkets included loans in the amount of $32.6 million and grants in the amount of $8 million 
(World Bank 2000a).  MMBI included loans in the amount of $30 million and grants in the amount
of $10 million (World Bank 2006).  The initial “medium-sized project” grant request was 
$750,000.
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When, in 2002, the Ministry of Environment decided to expand the PSA, the World 
Bank was able to exercise its influence and encourage market development.  The 
Ministry had intended to expand the PSA by developing a second tax revenue stream,
this time on water pollution, in addition to the earlier tax on fossil fuel consumption 
(Rodriguez, interview, 14 Feb 2012).  The Bank, however, wanted to see the new 
revenue stream reflect the concept of user fees (Khouri, interview, 5 Dec 2011),91 and
after “many many conversations”, the Environment Minister was persuaded (Platais, 
interview, 23 Feb 2012).92  The final tariff mandate contained language stipulating 
that revenues from fees would have to be used within the watershed in which they 
were generated, establishing more direct correspondence between “users” and 
“providers” of ecosystem services.
While the tariff certainly does not constitute a market in any conventional sense, it 
represents an attempt by the government of Costa Rica and its World Bank partners 
to approximate market relationships.  It is the expression of a (partial and unfinished)
process of neoliberalization.  In the absence of a “true” market for ecosystem services
(which would increase the exchange value of nature), there was a danger that 
ecosystems would actually be devalued by the very mechanisms that were supposed 
to ensure their conservation.  In response, the state was forced to intervene and create
91 Nadim Khouri, task team leader for the Bank during the proposal phase of Ecomarkets II, 
explained that the PSA had succeeded in establishing half of the direct financial relationship (i.e. 
“service providers” were receiving payment), but the program had not yet achieved the ideal 
outcome by ensuring that it was the “service users” that were the ones paying (Khouri, interview, 5
Dec 2011).
92 Gunars Platais, a member of the World Bank team, explained that eventually the Minister of 
Environment “took [the idea of user fees] and really went with it” (Platais, interview, 23 Feb 
2012).  Franz Tattenbach, founder of FUNDECOR and an important actor in PSA development, 
affirmed that “the water legislation had a lot to do with [the World Bank's] push” (Tattenbach, 
interview, 30 Jan 2012).
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the “market” so that ecosystem services could hold some level of proxy value in 
exchange.  The result was a form of state-led neoliberalization.  As Harvey (2014) 
explains, state interventions are often deployed to correct for such market failures, 
but “[w]hile these interventions may seem progressive, their effect is to further 
promote the penetration of market processes and market valuations into all aspects of
our lifeworld” (Harvey 2014, 250).
PSA Contracting
In Chapter 6, I explored two scalar shifts within PSA contracting to understand how 
the tensions between competition and cooperation were mediated, and to understand 
what effect this had on the distribution of program benefits.  I drew on Marxist 
theories of the “coercive laws of competition” to explain how profit-seeking in the 
name of economic efficiency diminishes social and environmental responsibility.
I showed that a series of moves initiated by a new market-oriented faction within the 
Ministry of Environment during the 1990s led to the privatization of forestry work 
and the erosion of “social forestry” policies.  Private regentes were encouraged to 
pursue maximum profit as independent contractors, under the assumption that it 
would lead to greater efficiency through competitive downward bidding.  The result, 
however, was an uneven decline in contracting fees, due to the fact that lower rates 
were only possible on larger contracts.  Regentes will compete for lucrative large 
contracts, but they are forced to charge high (sometimes illegally high) rates to small 
landowners.
Further to the uneven decline of rates, I showed that the competitive system gave rise
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to other undesirable consequences by edging out alternative motivations for 
conservation, undermining resistance to profit-oriented decision making, and 
fostering self-interest among forestry workers.  Organizations that operated under 
social imperatives lost institutional supports that guaranteed their operations, were 
drawn into the business of competitive contracting, or were simply out-competed.  
Thus, I showed the coercive laws of competition not only deliver advantages to larger
landowners, they actively erode existing support for smaller ones.
In a second scalar shift (away from cooperative participation in the PSA) small 
owners again suffered competitive disadvantages as contracting was de-collectivized.
A form of group contracting, developed early in the program to help small 
landowners with the high fixed-costs of participation, was revised to culminate in 
individual contracts.  Grouping thus became little more than a temporary recruitment 
tool applied by development organizations to streamline operations.  The result, I 
showed, was higher regente rates and lower net-payments, relative to larger 
landowners.  Nominally, competition provides efficiency gains, but this can only be 
seen to be beneficial if who may access the PSA is completely ignored; average 
regente rates have declined, but this has been achieved by encouraging regentes to 
work with those landowners for whom discounts are possible.
PSA and Property
Finally, in Chapter 7 I explored the effect of the PSA on property relations.  I 
explained that the program was encouraging an expansion of exclusionary land 
management practices in what is essentially the privatization of “already private” 
resources.  I placed these claims in the context of historical patterns of land 
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ownership, the long tradition of informal possession, and broad usufruct access.  
Although Costa Rica is commonly assumed to have widespread private ownership 
(Chomitz et al. 1999), exclusive access has not historically been the norm.  I 
explained how a superficial understanding of “private property”, and what that 
relationship entails, is obscuring the ways that the PSA is narrowing access to 
resources and the benefits they provide.
Under the PSA, participants are obliged to manage their lands in ways that contrast 
sharply with the practices that have long existed.  This included the obvious 
transition from extraction-oriented management to conservation-oriented 
management, but it also saw the rise of exclusionary practices that re-define many 
rural social relations.  Participation in the PSA, I explained, requires that landowners 
monitor and report extraction violations, transforming neighbors into forest guards 
and masters of exclusive domains.  Not only are participating landowners required to 
manage their land according to their contracts, they must act as enforcement agents 
and deny access to others.  Whereas “unused” lands have historically allowed broad 
access to the wider community, management under the PSA consolidates access 
under the control of the legal owner.  The effect of the PSA on rural property 
relations is, thus, narrower control and the accumulation of benefits to a smaller 
segment of the population.
Rethinking the Political Economy of PES
There are, of course, very practical reasons that these neoliberal developments should
be understood, but beyond immediate resource management concerns, the 
neoliberalization that has taken root in Costa Rica speaks to the conceptual ground I 
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staked out in this thesis.  Namely, it offers insight to the ways that we may connect 
localized expressions of neoliberalization to the broader patterns of governance that 
constitute this era of neoliberal environmentalism.  As I explained in Chapter 2, 
critical scholars of nature's neoliberalization have grappled with this issue, offering 
several ways to conceptualize “the more generic and abstract features of the 
neoliberalization process” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 382).
The concern for these scholars is with understanding “the variable ways in which 
different 'local neoliberalisms' are embedded within wider networks and structures of 
neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 380).  In order to handle this tension between 
the generalized and particular conceptions, Brenner et al. (2010) formulate 
“variegated neoliberalization”.  As they explain, the variegated conception allows 
neoliberalization processes to be seen as “simultaneously patterned, interconnected, 
locally specific, contested, and unstable” (Brenner et al. 2010, 184).  While this is an 
effective means of handling the concepts, it is, to my view, an unnecessary theoretical
innovation.  Castree (2008a; 2008b), by contrast, utilizes an ideal-type conception of 
neoliberalism as a means of bringing coherence to disparate instances of 
neoliberalization.  As I explained previously, I find Castree's approach rather more 
direct and conceptually more straightforward and, thus, align my analysis with his 
perspective.
I understand neoliberalism as an ideology – a belief system to which people 
subscribe – but I appreciate that practical manifestations of this ideology are only 
ever expressed as partial and incomplete neoliberalizations.  The ideology of 
neoliberalism, of course, varies from person to person and context to context, but as a
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(loosely bound) set of principles, it provides the basic vision underlying the 
neoliberalization process.  The process itself, in turn, unfolds in the context of the 
conditions that capital produces.  And, as I suggested in the introduction to this 
thesis, it is the internal contradictions of capital that are (largely) responsible for the 
particular form of neoliberalization that emerges.  An understanding of the 
contradictions of capital, thus, can provide an explanation of how neoliberalization 
unfolds in locally and politically specific contexts.  What I am suggesting here is that 
disparate instances of neoliberalization (and “idiographic” analyses of them) are 
bound together by the logics of capital that govern the process.
In particular, it is the contradictory logic of providing use values through exchange 
value structures that underlies the neoliberalization of payments for ecosystem 
services.  The principal assumption of PES is that exchange of ecosystem service 
commodities can increase the value of nature beyond the immediate value of its 
material resources, making conservation the economically rational, indeed profitable,
management option.  The difficulty, however, is in getting these exchange values to 
“stick”, which requires that ecosystem services circulate in markets.  Service 
commodities that are “weakly comparable” (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998) or 
“uncooperative” (Bakker 2004), however, may actually be devalued in an exchange 
value system, presenting an internal contradiction of PES that makes it inherently 
crisis-prone.  If service commodities are unsuitable for exchange, attempts to apply 
valuation may actually exacerbate the hazard to nature, exposing it more fully to the 
brutal logic of market rationality.
Furthermore, as I have observed in Costa Rica, there is frequently a disconnect in 
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PES between the ecosystem being valued and the actual commodities that are 
exchanged.  If hydrological services (e.g. filtration and flow control) are the target, it 
is not the ecosystem that gets valued, but rather the water itself.  In Costa Rica, water 
concession holders are charged user fees to pay for conservation that enhances 
natural hydrological systems, but the connection is indirect and mediated by the 
consumption of water.  Water is the commodity, not the watershed.  The situation is 
even more stark in the case of the fuel tax originally levied on fossil fuel consumers.  
In either case, there is no actual exchange of ecosystem services, meaning that 
ecosystems do not actually hold an exchange value.
In order to sustain PES in the face of this use and exchange value contradiction, 
intervention is required.  Markets must be propped up, or else devalued ecosystem 
services would be lost to competing uses.93  In an effort to foster exchange value, 
Costa Rica developed the water tariff as a market-like financing mechanism.  
Designed to approximate direct transactions between “users” and “providers” of 
ecosystem services, it is the closest alignment of policy to neoliberal ideology that 
market-oriented factions could achieve.  It is in this response to the exchange value 
contradiction that we see how neoliberalization is shaped by the internal logics of 
capital.  The neoliberal ideal would have been complete marketization of ecosystem 
functions, but the exchange value contradiction prevented it.  The neoliberalization 
process responded to the contradictions of capital and produced the closest 
approximation possible.  The significance of these observations is in the way capital 
has produced the characteristics of the neoliberalization that has unfolded.  Capital 
93 This is actually the argument that is made by advocates of PES – ecosystems are degraded because
they are “undervalued” – but, here, I am suggesting that market valuation becomes a necessity, 
rather than just an ideological preference.  Once the logics of capital are embedded, ecosystems are
fully exposed to the brutal logic of market rationality.
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produces the particular breed of neoliberalism that emerges in specific locations.
Even though, as I suggested in Chapter 5, the tariff “market” is still likely to result in 
uneven patterns of conservation-development, opportunities for accumulation remain
limited relative to “true” markets where exchange value is entirely unbound from use
value.  The market-like mechanisms for exchange introduced by the state do not offer
the same opportunities for speculative accumulation that are presented in capitalist 
circulation directly.  Since accumulation cannot be maximized under these 
conditions, opportunities must be sought elsewhere.  Essentially, when confronted by 
the contradiction of use and exchange value in PES, the problems of capital are 
simply, to borrow the phrase of Harvey (2014), “moved around”.
In order to continue facilitating capitalist development despite any real circulation of 
commodities, neoliberalization must expand to other aspects of production.  This can 
be achieved, for example, by strategically introducing competition, selectively 
reducing cooperation, or reconfiguring property relationships.  In Costa Rica, I 
showed that the neoliberalization process responded to the exchange value 
contradiction by restoring opportunities for accumulation in the forestry labor market
and property regimes (the focus of Chapters 6 and 7); competitive PSA contracting 
ensured large landowners captured the greatest benefits, individualized participation 
shifted contracting advantages away from small landowners, and the expansion of 
exclusionary land management consolidated control of resources in the hands of 
landed individuals.  Neoliberalization unfolded in the context of the internal 
contradictions of capital and then responded by shifting target when accumulation 
stalled.
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Scholarship, Action, and Resistance
The conceptual arguments developed in this thesis are intended to facilitate the 
recognition of neoliberalization in action and enable critical appraisal of its 
implications.  This is important because it helps to expose the false promises of the 
win-win and triple-win rhetoric that is driving the spread of capitalist ideology 
throughout conservation and environmental governance.  It problematizes the claims 
of market apologists and frustrates the ambitions of market advocates.  The 
conceptual frameworks to which I am contributing are the infrastructure of the 
critiques that have flourished in recent years (e.g. McAfee and Shapiro 2010; 
Robertson 2012; Buscher 2012; Sullivan 2012; McAfee 2012).  Almost as rapidly as 
the ideas are introduced, critiques are delivered, de-stabilizing the footing on which 
they stand.
Resistance to the colonization of conservation by capital is indeed making inroads.  
This is evident in the pace at which concepts are cycled through the consciousness of 
economically-oriented conservation scholars and practitioners.  When I began this 
research, not all that long ago, ecosystem services was touted with frenzied 
excitement – it was a panacea, a “magic elixir” that would finally solve our 
environmental woes – but already, by this point, the sheen has started to wear.  
Indeed, “natural capital” is emerging as the favored substitute.  Payment schemes 
based on ecosystem services were cast as the solution to environmental decline, and 
various offshoots such as REDD (Reducing Emission for Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) were ambitiously promoted as their logical extension.  But already, as I 
recently observed at the World Parks Congress in Sydney, they have fallen from 
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fashion, and “natural capital accounting” has risen to take their place.  The mutation 
of one into the other is, in itself, an intriguing development, but it also reveals the 
short staying-power that these capitalist strategies have.  They seem to fall as quickly
as they rise.  Critique is having this effect.  Critique is playing a pivotal role in the 
short shelf life of these concepts; it is disrupting the optimistic narratives, and it is 
undermining their legitimacy.  Often dismissed as irrelevant compared to direct 
action, critique is making a difference, and this thesis, in itself, is an act of resistance.
In response to the frequency with which scholarly resistance and academic critique is
delivered, frustrated supporters often proclaim that these capitalist tools are the best 
we have, that we must act (and do so with urgency!) or else all will be lost.  I 
routinely have this sentiment directed at me by implementation-oriented colleagues 
and practitioners with whom I engage and/or come into conflict.  The ecological 
problems we face are urgent indeed, but this mentality of “don't think, just do” is 
reckless.  These voices would have us abandon critique and throw all effort behind 
pursuit of “best practices”.  For those whose interests these concepts serve, this is 
certainly the favored course of action, but it demonstrates a complete lack of 
recognition of the politics inherent to conservation decisions and a disregard for their 
justice implications.  With an understanding of scholarship as resistance, however, it 
is possible to imagine a path forward in which there is a radical divergence from the 
status quo.
As the flaws in these concepts are exposed and the seeds of doubt are sown, the 
uncritical flock to the next big-idea-in-waiting.  And in this, there is opportunity.  If 
critique can be sustained while an anti-capitalist strategy is developed, we can 
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prevent further entrenchment of hegemonic notions while building a new counter-
hegemonic “common sense” for environmental governance.  This was understood by 
Milton Friedman and the architects of our current neoliberal system.  Eventually, the 
material conditions that enable the present system will change, and at that moment, 
we must be ready with a radically different alternative.  The challenge will be to 
sustain the critique while promoting and developing such alternatives.  This effort, 
however, is already well underway.  Contrary to what the champions of market-based
conservation so frequently (and so forcefully) proclaim, the foundations of these 
alternatives exist today.
They are based in practices and ideologies that make social justice and equity central.
Chief among them is the concept of de-growth (Demaria et al. 2013; D'Alisa et al. 
2014), which has developed into an impressive movement of both scholars and 
activists.  Beyond this there is a diversity of concepts – including steady-state 
economics (Czech and Daly 2014), re-commoning (www.recommon.org/eng/), 
ethics-based management (Azqueta and Delacamara 2006), and a not-for-profit or 
“social economy” (Connelly et al. 2011) – that may be drawn upon in building an 
alternative.  Another future most certainly is possible.  Indeed, another future is 
inevitable.
This thesis has been a historical study of active neoliberalization through “payments 
for ecosystem services”.  Rather than uncritically apply the concept (like so much of 
the implementation-oriented literature has done), I have sought to understand the 
processes by which it has become embedded in current policy.  My primary focus has
been on understanding how neoliberalization operates in practice (placing particular 
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emphasis on its incomplete and ever-adapting character), while explaining how the 
logics of capital shape the process itself.  In light of the deceptively ambiguous way 
in which neoliberalization operates, I explained that pressing justice considerations – 
who controls what resources, how, for what purposes, and to whose benefit? – could 
be utilized to direct the critical gaze at the crucial junctures where neoliberal policies 
push through ostensibly non-neoliberal practices.  This differs from much of the 
recent critical literature that emphasizes the ways the PES deviates from neoliberal 
doctrine (e.g. Dempsey and Robertson 2012; Fletcher and Breitling 2012; Shapiro-
Garza 2013), enabling me to identify neoliberalization where others have missed it.  
Rather than emphasize the ways in which neoliberalization has failed to influence 
conservation policy, my handling of the concepts has placed attention on the ways it 
has taken root in spite of its apparent contradictions.  This has opened the door for 
critique that challenges the new dominant modes of environmental governance, and it
has produced opportunities for radical alternatives that place social and 
environmental justice ahead of economic accumulation and profit-maximization.
284
REFERENCES
ADAMS, W. 2013. Against Extinction: The Story of Conservation, Taylor & Francis.
AGRAWAL, A. 2005a. Environmentality:  Technologies of government and the 
making of subjects., Durham, Duke University Press.
ANDREASSON, S. 2006. Stand and Deliver: Private Property and the Politics of 
Global Dispossession. Political Studies, 54, 3-22.
ARIELY, D., BRACHA, A. & MEIER, S. 2009. Doing Good or Doing Well? Image 
Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially. American 
Economic Review, 99, 544-555.
ARRIAGADA, R. A., FERRARO, P. J., SILLS, E. O., PATTANAYAK, S. K. & 
CORDERO-SANCHO, S. 2012. Do Payments for Environmental Services 
Affect Forest Cover? A Farm-Level Evaluation from Costa Rica. Land 
Economics, 88, 382-399.
BAKKER, K. 2009. Neoliberal nature, ecological fixes, and the pitfalls of 
comparative research. Environment and Planning A, 1781-1787.
BAKKER, K. 2010. The limits of ‘neoliberal natures’: Debating green neoliberalism.
Progress in Human Geography, 34, 715-735.
BARBIER, E. B. & TESFAW, A. T. 2012. Can REDD+ Save the Forest? The Role of
Payments and Tenure. Forests, 3, 881-895.
BEBBINGTON, A. 2004. NGOs and uneven development: geographies of 
development intervention. Progress in Human Geography, 28, 725-745.
BENNETT, K. & HENNINGER, N. 2008. Payments for Ecosystem Services in 
Costa Rica and Forest Law No. 7575.  [Accessed 13 June 2011].
BHASKAR, R. 1989. Reclaiming reality: a critical introduction to contemporary 
philosophy, Verso.
BHASKAR, R. 2009. Scientific realism and human emancipation, Routledge.
BLACKMAN, A. & WOODWARD, R. T. 2010. User financing in a national 
payments for environmental services program: Costa Rican hydropower. 
Ecological Economics, 69, 1626-1638.
BOHLEN, P. J., LYNCH, S., SHABMAN, L., CLARK, M., SHUKLA, S. & SWAIN,
H. 2009. Paying for environmental services from agricultural lands: an 
example from the northern Everglades. Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment, 7, 46-55.
285
BOOTH, J. A. 1998. Costa Rica: quest for democracy, Westview Press.
BOYD, W., PRUDHAM, W. S. & SCHURMAN, R. A. 2001. Industrial Dynamics 
and the Problem of Nature. Society & Natural Resources, 14, 555-570.
BRAUN, B. & CASTREE, N. 1998. Remaking reality: nature at the millenium, 
Routledge.
BRENNER, N., PECK, J. & THEODORE, N. I. K. 2010. Variegated 
neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, pathways. Global Networks, 10, 
182-222.
BRENNER, N. & THEODORE, N. 2002. Cities and the Geographies of “Actually 
Existing Neoliberalism”. Antipode, 34, 349-379.
BROCKETT, C. D. 1988. Land, Power, and Poverty:  Agrarian Transformation and 
Political Conflict in Central America, Winchester, MA, Allen & Unwin, Inc.
BROCKINGTON, D. 2002. Fortress Conservation, James Currey.
BROCKINGTON, D. & DUFFY, R. 2010. Capitalism and Conservation: The 
Production and Reproduction of Biodiversity Conservation. Antipode, 469-
484.
BROCKINGTON, D. A. N. 2011. Ecosystem services and fictitious commodities. 
Environmental Conservation, 38, 367-369
BROWN, J. & BIRD, N. 2011. Costa Rica's Sustainable Resource Management: 
Successfully Tackling Tropical Deforestation, London, Overseas Development
Institute.
CAMACHO, M., O. SEGURA, V. REYES, & A. AGUILAR, 2000.  “Pago por 
Servicios Ambientales en Costa Rica”.  San Salvador, El Salvador:  PRISMA.
CAMPBELL, F. 2006. Keeping Costa Rica Green: The Profitability of Ecomarkets 
[Online]. Available: 
http://gefweb.org/outreach/action/costa_rica_ecomarkets.html [Accessed 17 
June 2011.
CARRILLO, E., SAENZ, J. C. & FULLER, T. K. 2002. Movements and activities of 
white-lipped peccaries in Corcovado National Park, Costa Rica. Biological 
Conservation, 108, 317-324.
CARRIÈRE, J. 1991. The Political Economy of Land Degradation in Costa Rica. 
International Journal of Political Economy, 21, 10-31.
CASTREE, N. 1995. THE NATURE OF PRODUCED NATURE: MATERIALITY 
AND KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION IN MARXISM. Antipode, 27, 12-
48.
286
CASTREE, N. 2001. Socializing Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics. In: 
CASTREE, N. & BRAUN, B. (eds.) Social Nature. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, Inc.
CASTREE, N. 2006. From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, 
confusions, and necessary illusions. Environment and Planning A, 38, 1-6.
CASTREE, N. 2008a. Neoliberalising nature: processes, effects, and evaluations. 
Environment and Planning A, 40, 153-173.
CASTREE, N. 2008b. Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and 
reregulation. Environment and Planning A, 40, 131-152.
CASTREE, N. 2009. Researching neoliberal environmental governance: a reply to 
Karen Bakker. Environment and Planning a, 1788-1794.
CASTREE, N. 2010a. Crisis, Continuity and Change: Neoliberalism, the Left and the
Future of Capitalism. Antipode, 41, 185-213.
CASTREE, N. 2010b. Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 
‘Neoliberalism’ is, and What Difference Nature Makes to it. Geography 
Compass, 4, 1725-1733.
CASTREE, N. & BRAUN, B. 1998. The Construction of Nature and the Nature of 
Construction: Analytical and Political Tools for Building Survivable Futures. 
In: BRAUN, B. & CASTREE, N. (eds.) Remaking Reality: Nature at the 
Millenium. New York, NY: RoutLedge.
CASTREE, N. & BRAUN, B. 2001. Social Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics, 
Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
CAVANAGH, C, & T. BENJAMINSEN. 2014. "Virtual Nature, Violent 
Accumulation:  Unpacking the 'Spectacular' Failure of Carbon Offsetting at a 
Ugandan National Park",  Geoforum, 56, 55-65.
CHAVEZ, G., 1998.  “World Bank president to sign ecological agreement”.  La 
Nacion.  3 March 1998 
<http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/1998/marzo/03/english3.html>.  (Accessed:  
17.7.2013).
CHOMITZ, K. M., BRENES, E. & CONSTANTINO, L. 1999. Financing 
environmental services: the Costa Rican experience and its implications. The 
Science of The Total Environment, 240, 157-169.
COASE, R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 
1-44.
287
CORSON, C. 2010. Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: 
USAID for Conservation. Antipode, 42, 576-602.
CORSON, C. & MACDONALD, K. I. 2012. Enclosing the global commons: the 
convention on biological diversity and green grabbing. Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 39, 263-283.
COSTANZA, R. & FOLKE, C. 1997. Valuing Ecosystem Services with Efficiency, 
Fairness, and Sustainability as Goals. In: DAILY, G. (ed.) Nature's Services: 
Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems. Washington DC: Island Press.
COWEN, M. P. & SHENTON, R. W. 1998. Agrarian doctrines of development: Part 
I. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 25, 49-76.
DAILY, G. C. (ed.) 1997. Nature's services: societal dependence on natural 
ecosystems: Island Press.
DAILY, G. C. 2000. Management objectives for the protection of ecosystem services.
Environmental Science & Policy, 3, 333-339.
DAILY, G. C., SÖDERQVIST, T., ANIYAR, S., ARROW, K., DASGUPTA, P., 
EHRLICH, P. R., FOLKE, C., JANSSON, A., JANSSON, B.-O., KAUTSKY,
N., SIMON, L., LUBCHENCO, J., MÄLER, K.-G., SIMPSON, D., 
STARRETT, D., TILMAN, D. & WALKER, B. 2000. The Value of Nature 
and the Nature of Value. Science, 289, 395-396.
DANIELS, A. E., BAGSTAD, K., ESPOSITO, V., MOULAERT, A. & 
RODRIGUEZ, C. M. 2010. Understanding the impacts of Costa Rica's PES: 
Are we asking the right questions? Ecological Economics, 69, 2116-2126.
DE CAMINO, R., SEGURA, O., GUILLERMO ARIAS, L. & PEREZ, I. 2000. 
Costa Rica Forest Strategy and the Evolution of Land Use, Washington D.C., 
World Bank.
EDELMAN, M. 1985. Extensive land use and the logic of the latifundio: A case 
study in Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica. Human Ecology, 13, 153-185.
ENGEL, S., PAGIOLA, S. & WUNDER, S. 2008. Designing payments for 
environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues. 
Ecological Economics, 65, 663-674.
ENGELS, F. & MCLELLAN, D. 1993. The Condition of the Working Class in 
England, Oxford University Press.
ESCOBAR, A. 1996. Construction nature: Elements for a post-structuralist political 
ecology. Futures, 28, 325-343.
EVANS, S. 1999. The green republic: a conservation history of Costa Rica, 
University of Texas Press.
288
FAIRHEAD, J., LEACH, M. & SCOONES, I. 2012. Green Grabbing: a new 
appropriation of nature? Journal of Peasant Studies, 39, 237-261.
FARLEY, J. & COSTANZA, R. 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: From local 
to global. Ecological Economics, 69, 2060-2068.
FLETCHER, R. 2010. Neoliberal environmentality: Towards a poststructuralist 
political ecology of the conservation debate. Conservation and Society, 8, 
171-181.
FLETCHER, R. & BREITLING, J. 2012. Market mechanism or subsidy in disguise? 
Governing payment for environmental services in Costa Rica. Geoforum, 43, 
402-411.
FOUCAULT, M., SENELLART, M. & FRANCE, C. D. 2008. The birth of 
biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, Palgrave Macmillan.
GLASSMAN, J. 2006. Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, 
accumulation by ‘extra-economic’ means. Progress in Human Geography, 30,
608-625.
GOLDMAN, M. 2001. Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-governmentality 
and other Transnational Practices of a 'Green' World Bank. Social Problems, 
48, 499-523.
GOULDER, L. & KENNEDY, D. 1997. Valuing Ecosystem Service: Philosophical 
Bases and Empirical Methods. In: DAILY, G. (ed.) Nature's Services: 
Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems. Washington DC: Island Press.
GUESS, G. 1978. Narrowing the Base of Costa Rican Democracy. Development and 
Change, 9, 599-611.
GÓMEZ-BAGGETHUN, E. & RUIZ-PÉREZ, M. 2011. Economic valuation and the 
commodification of ecosystem services. Progress in Physical Geography, 35, 
613-628.
HARVEY, D. 2003. The New Imperialism, OUP Oxford.
HARVEY, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, UK.
HARVEY, D. 2010. A Companion to Marx's Capital, Verso.
HARVEY, D. 2014. Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Verso.
HEINDRICHS, T., 1997. “Innovative Financing Instruments in the Forestry and 
Nature Conservation Sector of Costa Rica”.  Eschborn, Germany:  Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH.
289
HEYNEN, N. & ROBBINS, P. 2005. The neoliberalization of nature: Governance, 
privatization, enclosure and valuation. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16, 5-8.
HODGE, I. D. & ADAMS, W. M. 2012. Neoliberalisation, rural land trusts and 
institutional blending. Geoforum, 43, 472-482.
HONEY, M. 2004. Giving a Grade to Costa Rica's Green Tourism. In: GMELCH, S. 
(ed.) Tourists and Tourism. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc.
HOPE, R., PORRAS, I., BORGOYARY, M., MIRANDA, M., AGARWAL, C., 
TIWARI, S. & AMEZAGA, J. 2007. Negotiating Watersheds. London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
HUNT, T. 2010. Marx's General: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels, New 
York, NY, Holt.
IGOE, J. & BROCKINGTON, D. 2007. Neoliberal Conservation: A Brief 
Introduction. Conservation and Society, 5, 432-449.
JESSOP, B. 2002. Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State–
Theoretical Perspective. Antipode, 34, 452-472.
JUNIPER, T. 2013. What Has Nature Ever Done For Us?: How Money Really Does 
Grow On Trees, Profile.
KATZ, C. 1998. Whose Nature, Whose Culture? In: BRAUN, B. & CASTREE, N. 
(eds.) Remaking Reality: Nature at the Millenium. New York, NY: Routledge.
KISHOR, N. & CONSTANTINO, L. 1993. Forest Management and Competing Land
Uses: An Economic Analysis for Costa Rica. Washington DC: The World 
Bank Group.
KOSOY, N. & CORBERA, E. 2010. Payments for ecosystem services as commodity 
fetishism. Ecological Economics, 69, 1228-1236.
LANSING, D. M. 2013. Understanding linkages between ecosystem service 
payments, forest plantations, and export agriculture. Geoforum, 47, 103-112.
LARNER, W. 2003. Neoliberalism? Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 21, 509-512.
LARNER, W. & CRAIG, D. 2005. After Neoliberalism? Community Activism and 
Local Partnerships in Aotearoa New Zealand. Antipode, 37, 402-424.
LINNER, B. 2003. The return of Malthus: environmentalism and post-war 
population-resource crises, Harris, UK, White Horse Press.
LOCKE, J. 1821. Two Treatises on Government, R. Butler.
290
LUKE, T. 1999. Environmentality as green governmentality. In: DARIER, E. (ed.) 
Discourses of the Environment. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
MANSFIELD, B. 2007a. Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature–
Society Relations Introduction to the Special Issue. Antipode, 39, 393-405.
MANSFIELD, B. 2007b. Property, Markets, and Dispossession: The Western Alaska 
Community Development Quota as Neoliberalism, Social Justice, Both, and 
Neither. Antipode, 39, 479-499.
MARX, K. 1976. Capital, Volume I, New York, NY, Penguin Books.
MATULIS, B. S. 2013. The narrowing gap between vision and execution: 
Neoliberalization of PES in Costa Rica. Geoforum, 44, 253-260.
MCAFEE, K. 1999. Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green 
developmentalism. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 17, 133-
154.
MCAFEE, K. 2012. The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets.
Development and Change, 43, 105-131.
MCCARTHY, J. & PRUDHAM, S. 2004. Neoliberal nature and the nature of 
neoliberalism. Geoforum, 35, 275-283.
MCCAULEY, D. J. 2006. Selling out on nature. Nature, 443, 27-28.
MEA, 2003.  “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Ecosystems and Human Well-
Being”. Washington, DC: Island Press.
MEA, 2005.  “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment:  Synthesis”. Washington, DC: 
Island Press.
MIRANDA, M., PORRAS, I. & MORENO, M. 2003. Social Impacts of the 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) Scheme in Costa Rica. London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
MIRANDA, M., PORRAS, I. & MORENO, M. 2004. Social Impacts of Carbon 
Markets in Costa Rica:  a case study of the Hueter-Norte Region. London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
MORELL, M. 1997. Financing Community Forestry Activities. Unasylva, 188, 36-
43.
MURADIAN, R., CORBERA, E., PASCUAL, U., KOSOY, N. & MAY, P. H. 2010. 
Reconciling theory and practice: An alternative conceptual framework for 
understanding payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics, 
69, 1202-1208.
291
NASH, R. 2001. Wilderness and the American Mind, New Haven, CT, Yale 
University Press.
NAVARRO, G. & THIEL, H. 2007. On the Evolution of the Costa Rican Forestry 
Control System. Verifor.
O'CONNOR, J. 1988. Capitalism, nature, socialism a theoretical introduction . ∗
Capitalism Nature Socialism, 1, 11-38.
ORTIZ MALAVASI, E. 2011. Caracterización del Programa Forestal Huetar Norte 
(PFHN): Impacto social y fijación de C02. FONAFIFO.
PAGIOLA, S. 2008. Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. Ecological 
Economics, 65, 712-724.
PAGIOLA, S., ARCENAS, A. & PLATAIS, G. 2005. Can Payments for 
Environmental Services Help Reduce Poverty? An Exploration of the Issues 
and the Evidence to Date from Latin America. World Development, 33, 237-
253.
PAGIOLA, S., BISHOP, J. & LANDELL-MILLS, N. 2002. Selling Forest 
Environmental Services: Market-Based Mechanisms for Conservation and 
Development, Taylor & Francis.
PAGIOLA, S., & G. PLATAIS, 2002.  “Payments for Environmental Services”.  
Environment Strategy Notes.  Washington DC:  The World Bank Group.
PAGIOLA, S. & PLATAIS, G. 2007. Payments for Environmental Services: From 
Theory to Practice. Washington: World Bank.
PECK, J. 2004. Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism. 
Progress in Human Geography, 28, 392-405.
PECK, J. 2010. Zombie neoliberalism and the ambidextrous state. Theoretical 
Criminology, 14, 104-110.
PECK, J. & TICKELL, A. 2002. Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode, 34, 380-404.
PEET, R. & WATTS, M. 1996. Liberation ecologies: environment, development, 
social movements, New York, NY, Routledge.
PERC, 2014a.  “About Us”.  <http://perc.org/about-us> (Accessed: 14 May 2014).
PERC, 2014b.  “What is FME?”.  <http://perc.org/about-perc/what-fme> (Accessed: 
14 May 2014).
PERC, 2014c.  “PERC Enviropreneur Institute”.  <http://perc.org/programs/perc-
enviropreneurs/enviropreneur-institute> (Accessed: 14 May 2014).
292
PERC, 2014d.  “Overview”.  <http://perc.org/programs/perc-
enviropreneurs/enviropreneur-institute/about> (Accessed: 14 May 2014).
POLANYI, K. 1944. The Great Transformation, Boston, MA, Beacon Press.
PORRAS, I. 2010. Fair and Green? Social impacts of payments for environmental 
services in Costa Rica. London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development.
PORRAS, I., N. NEVES, & M. MIRANDA, 2006.  “Developing Markets for 
Watershed Protection Services and Improved Livelihoods”.  London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
PORRAS, I., & N. NEVES, 2006.  “Markets for Watershed Services”.  London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
PROCTOR, J. D. 1998. The social construction of nature: Relativist accusations, 
pragmatist and critical realist responses. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 88, 352.
PRUDHAM, S. & HEYNEN, N. 2011. Introduction: Uneven Development 25 Years 
On: Space, Nature and the Geographies of Capitalism. New Political 
Economy, 16, 223-232.
REDCLIFT, M. 2005. Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of
age. Sustainable Development, 13, 212-227.
REDFORD, K. H. 1992. The empty forest. (cover story). BioScience, 42, 412-422.
REDFORD, K. H. & ADAMS, W. M. 2009. Payment for Ecosystem Services and the
Challenge of Saving Nature. Conservation Biology, 23, 785-787.
RIBOT, J. C. 1998. Theorizing Access: Forest Profits along Senegal's Charcoal 
Commodity Chain. Development & Change, 29, 307.
RIBOT, J. C. & PELUSO, N. L. 2003. A Theory of Access*. Rural Sociology, 68, 
153-181.
ROBERTS, J. T. & THANOS, N. D. 2003. Trouble in paradise, ROUTLEDGE 
CHAPMAN & HALL.
ROBERTSON, M. 2012. Measurement and alienation: making a world of ecosystem 
services. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37, 386-401.
RODRÍGUEZ ZÚÑIGA, J. M. 2003. Paying for Forest Environmental Services:  the 
Costa Rican Experience. Unasylva, 54, 31-33.
ROJAS, M. & AYLWARD, B. 2003. What are we learning from experiences with 
markets for environmental services in Costa Rica?  A review and critique of 
293
the literature. London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development.
ROSE, G. 1997. Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics. 
Progress in Human Geography, 21, 305-320.
SAGE, L. & SANCHEZ, O. 2002. Evolucion esperada para el mercado de pago de 
servicios ambientals en Costa Rica. Revista Forestal Centroamericana, 37, 
72-73.
SAYER, A. 1995. Radical Political Economy: Critique and Reformulation, Wiley.
SCHOMERS, S. & MATZDORF, B. 2013. Payments for ecosystem services: A 
review and comparison of developing and industrialized countries. Ecosystem
Services, 6, 16-30.
SELIGSON, M. A. 1980. Trust, Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A 
Study of Costa Rican Peasants. British Journal of Political Science, 10, 75-
98.
SIERRA, R. & RUSSMAN, E. 2006. On the efficiency of environmental service 
payments: A forest conservation assessment in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica.
Ecological Economics, 59, 131-141.
SILLS, E., HARTSHORN, G., FERRARO, P. & SPERGEL, B. 2005. Evaluation of 
the World Bank-GEF Ecomarkets Project in Costa Rica. North Carolina State 
University.
SILVA, E. 2003. Selling Sustainable Development and Shortchanging Social Ecology
in Costa Rican Forest Policy. Latin American Politics & Society, 45, 93-127.
SILVERMAN, D. 2007. A very short, fairly interesting and reasonably cheap book 
about qualitative research, SAGE.
SKROCH, M. & LÓPEZ-HOFFMAN, L. 2010. Saving Nature under the Big Tent of 
Ecosystem Services: a Response to Adams and Redford. Conservation 
Biology, 24, 325-327.
SKUTCH, A. 1971. A Naturalist in Costa Rica, Gainsville, FL, University of Florida 
Press.
SMITH, N. 2003. Remaking Scale: Competition and Cooperation in Pre-National 
and Post-National Europe. State/Space. Blackwell Publishing.
SMITH, N. 2007. Nature as Accumulation Strategy. Socialist Register, 43, 16-36.
SMITH, N. 2008. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of 
Space, University of Georgia Press.
294
STALLINGS, B. & PERES, W. 2000. Growth, employment, and equity: the impact 
of the economic reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
SUKHDEV, P., 2014.  “Valuing Natural Capital: What Next and Why?”. The 
Huffington Post. 22 April 2014 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pavan-
sukhdev/valuing-natural-capital-w_b_5193610.html> (accessed: 14 May 
2014).
SULLIVAN, S. 2009. Green Capitalism and the Cultural Poverty of Constructing 
Nature as Service Provider. Radical Anthropology, 18-27.
SWYNGEDOUW, E. 2005. Dispossessing H2O: the contested terrain of water 
privatization. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16, 81-98.
SÁNCHEZ-AZOFEIFA, G. A., PFAFF, A., ROBALINO, J. A. & BOOMHOWER, J.
P. 2007. Costa Rica's Payment for Environmental Services Program: 
Intention, Implementation, and Impact. Conservation Biology, 21, 1165-1173.
TACCONI, L. 2012. Redefining payments for environmental services. Ecological 
Economics, 73, 29-36.
VATN, A. 2010. An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services. 
Ecological Economics, 69, 1245-1252.
VIVANCO, L. 2003. Conservation and Culture, Genuine and Spurious. In: 
MINTEER, B. & MANNING, R. (eds.) Reconstructing Conservation. 
Washington D.C.: Island Press.
VIVANCO, L. A. 2006. Green Encounters: Shaping And Contesting 
Environmentalism in Rural Costa Rica, Berghahn Books, Incorporated.
VON PLATEN, H. 1999. Payments for environmental services:  a new slogan for old
incentives or a new economic concept? Gesellschaft fur Agrarprojekte, 4, 21-
30.
WATSON, V., CERVANTES, S., CASTRO, C., MORA, L., SOLIS, M., PORRAS, I. 
& CORNEJ, B. 1998. Making Space for Better Forestry. London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development.
WEBER, M. 2007 [1904]. 'Objectivity' in Social Science. In: CALHOUN, C., 
GERTEIS, J., MOODY, J., PFAFF, S. & VIRK, I. (eds.) Classical 
Sociological Theory. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
WHITTINGTON, D. & PAGIOLA, S. 2011. Using Contingent Valuation in the 
Design of Payments for Environmental Services Mechanisms: A Review and 
Assessment.
295
WILSON, B. M. 1998. Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.
WOLFORD, W. 2007. Land Reform in the Time of Neoliberalism: A Many-
Splendored Thing. Antipode, 39, 550-570.
WORLD FORUM, 2013. “About”.  <http://www.naturalcapitalforum.com/about> 
(Accessed: 6 May 2014).
WUNDER, S. 2005. Payments for Environmental Services:  Some Nuts and 
Bolts, Occasional Paper No. 42, Bogor Barat, Indonesia, Center for 
International Forestry Research.
WUNDER, S. 2008. Payments for environmental services and the poor: concepts and
preliminary evidence. Environment and Development Economics, 13, 279-
297.
WUNDER, S., ENGEL, S. & PAGIOLA, S. 2008. Taking stock: A comparative 
analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and 
developing countries. Ecological Economics, 65, 834-852.
WÜNSCHER, T., ENGEL, S. & WUNDER, S. 2008. Spatial targeting of payments 
for environmental services: A tool for boosting conservation benefits. 
Ecological Economics, 65, 822-833.
WWF, 2014.  “Valuing Nature”.  World Wildlife Federation – Initiatives. 
<http://worldwildlife.org/initiatives/valuing-nature> (Accessed:  14 May 
2014).
YASHAR, D. 1997. Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica 
and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s, Stanford University Press.
ZBINDEN, S. & LEE, D. R. 2005. Paying for Environmental Services: An Analysis 
of Participation in Costa Rica's PSA Program. World Development, 33, 255-
272.
ZHANG, W. E. I. & PAGIOLA, S. 2011. Assessing the potential for synergies in the 
implementation of payments for environmental services programmes: an 
empirical analysis of Costa Rica. Environmental Conservation, 38, 406-416
296
Policy and Project Documents
CI, 2011.  “Strengthening the Water Payments for the Environmental Services 
Program in Costa Rica:  Proposal for Technical Cooperation between 
Conservation International and the Government of Costa Rica”.  
Conservation International.
COLEGIO, 2011a.  “Valor de visita regencial”.  Colegio de Ingenieros Agronomos, 
Costa Rica.
COLEGIO, 2011b.  “Cuotas por visita según modalidad”.  Colegio de Ingenieros 
Agronomos, Costa Rica.
DECREE 37784-MTSS, 2013. “Fijacion de Salarios Minimos Para el Sector 
Privado”. San Jose, CR: Government of Costa Rica. 
<http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2013/07/10/COMP_10_07_2013.html#_Toc36
1153395>.
FONAFIFO, 2005.  “Over a decade of action”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.  
FONAFIFO, 2010.  “Montos Asignados por Hectareas para el Pago de los Servicios 
Ambientales, 1997-2010”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, Costa Rica. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/MontosAsignado
sHaArb1997-2010.pdf> (accessed 21.09.11).
FONAFIFO, 2011a.  “Distribucion de los Pagos de los Servicios Ambientales por 




FONAFIFO, 2011b.  “Distribución de las Hectáreas Contratadas en Pago de 
Servicios Ambiéntales, por Año y por Modalidad, Período 1997-2010”.  San 
Jose, CR:  Ministry of Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.  
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/distrib_ha_Contr
atadas.pdf> (accessed 21.09.11).
FONAFIFO, 2011c.  “Asignación Presupuestaria para CAF y PSA por Fuente de 
Financiamiento Período 1995-2011”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.  
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Dist_Presu_Mont
os.pdf> (accessed 21.09.11).
FONAFIFO, 2011d.  “Hectáreas PSA, Árboles SAF y Montos Contratados en los 
Territorios Indígenas de Costa Rica, Período 1997-2010”.  San Jose, CR:  




FONAFIFO, 2011e.  “Montos asignados al Pago de los Servicios Ambientales por 
Modalidad, para el año 2011”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, Costa Rica.  
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Montos_Asignad
os.pdf> (accessed 21.09.11).
FONAFIFO, 2011f.  “Datos Históricos de las Presolicitudes Recibidas en el Período 




FONAFIFO, 2012.  “Convenios con FONAFIFO”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.  <convenios.xlsx>
FONAFIFO, n.d.  “Canon de Aprovechamiento de Aguas: Que es? Cual es su 
objectivo? Como se aplica?”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, Costa Rica.  <Canon_Agua-2.pdf>
MIDEPLAN, 2007.  “Indice de Desarollo Social 2007”.  San Jose, CR:  Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Policy.  <mideplan_2007_sdi.pdf>
MINAE, 2003.  “Manual de Procedimientos Para el Pago de Servicios Ambientales”. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Manuales/Manua
l2003.pdf> (accessed 27.02.2014).
MINAE, 2006.  “Canon de Agua”.  Decreto Ejecutivo 32868-MINAE.  San Jose, CR: 
Ministry of Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.




MINAET, 2008.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 34371-MINAE. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/Dec343
71.pdf > (accessed:  29.04.2013).




MINAET, 2009.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 35119-MINAET. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/Decreto
35119.pdf> (accessed:  29.04.2013).
298
MINAET, 2009b.  “Manual de Procedimientos Para el Pago de Servicios 
Ambientales”.  La Gaceta (46):  58-71 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Manuales/Manua
l2009.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2013).
MINAET, 2010.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 35762-MINAET. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/Decreto
35762.pdf> (accessed:  29.04.2013).




MINAET, 2011.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 36516-MINAET. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/Decreto
36516.pdf> (accessed:  29.04.2013).
MINAET, 2011b.  “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal 2011-2020”.  San Jose, CR: 
Ministry of Environment and Energy, Costa Rica.
MINAET, 2012.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 36935-MINAET. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/N
%C2%BA  %2036935%20Decreto%20PSA%202012.pdf> (accessed:  
13.03.2013).
MINAET, 2013.  Decreto Ejecutivo, No 37660-MINAET. 
<http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/text_files/servicios_ambientales/Decretos/  ALCA7
4_23_04_2013.pdf> (accessed:  29.04.2013).
WORLD BANK, 1998a. “Biodiversity Resources Development Project – Project 
Appraisal Document, #17207-CR”.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 1998b. “Biodiversity Resources Development Project – 
Implementation Completion and Results Report, #36179”.  Washington DC: 
The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2000a. “Ecomarkets – Project Appraisal Document, #20434-CR”.  
Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2000b. “Ecomarkets – Project Information Document, #PID8876”. 
Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2001. “Making Sustainable Commitments”. World Bank 
Environment Strategy 2001.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2006. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management – Project Appraisal Document, #36084-CR”.  
Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
299
WORLD BANK, 2007. “Ecomarkets – Implementation Completion and Results 
Report, #ICR433”. Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2011a. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management –Implementation Status and Results Report, 
#ISR2710”.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2011b. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management –Implementation Status and Results Report, 
#ISR4984”.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2011c.  “GNI per capita, Atlas method”. 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/CR?
display=graph> (Accessed:  15.03.2013).
WORLD BANK, 2012a. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management –Project Restructuring Document, #70624-CR”. 
Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2012b. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management –Implementation Status and Results Report, 
#ISR6508”.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2012c. “Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for 
Environmental Management –Implementation Status and Results Report, 
#ISR8626”.  Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
WORLD BANK, 2012d. “Toward a Green, Clean, and Resilient World for All”.  






Description of Institutions Represented
in Interview Dataset
FONAFIFO – the Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal is the quasi-
autonomous government agency tasked with implementing the PSA.  It holds 
a unique status within the government hierarchy that allows it to manage both
public and private program funds, exercising a great deal of autonomy over 
the latter.  Originally established as a simple trust to manage program 
finances, FONAFIFO was given responsibility for day-to-day operations of 
the PSA (application management, monitoring, site targeting, buyer 
agreements, etc) in 2003.
MINAET – the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications is the 
government agency responsible for FONAFIFO.  They issue (more or less) 
annual decrees and operational guidelines to govern the PSA's activities, in 
terms of priorities, quotas, and regulations.
World Bank – this is the shorthand conventionally used for the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, which is one of the five institutions that
makes up The World Bank Group.  The World Bank is a development 
organization that provides loans and grants to governments for development 
projects.  Its stated objective is poverty reduction.  The Bank's involvement in
Costa Rica's PSA takes the form of two projects:  “Ecomarkets” and 
“Mainstreaming Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Management” 
(aka MMBI or Ecomarkets II).  They deal closely with figures at FONAFIFO.
Colegio de Ingenieros Agronomos – the Colegio is the professional association 
responsible for licensing regentes and advocating for their interests.  All 
practicing regentes must be licensed by the Colegio and pay annual dues.  
The Colegio establishes minimum rates that regentes should charge to ensure 
living wages.  They also screen PSA management plans for completeness 
before they are submitted to FONAFIFO.
Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica – the more prominent of the two educational 
institutions that trains regentes, often referred to as Tec.  Students that 
complete an education in forestry engineering become certified regentes, 
though they must then be licensed by the Colegio before being permitted to 
practice.  Connections between FONAFIFO and Tec are strong, and some 
instructors routinely function as consultants at the agency.
FUNDECOR – the Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera Volcánica 
Central is a Costa Rican based international NGO.  FUNDECOR was 
instrumental developing Costa Rica's PSA, and has continued be involved.  
The organization has played a unique role in assisting FONAFIFO to develop 
agreements with private buyers of ecosystem services.  FUNDECOR pursues 
projects that simultaneously promote conservation and economic growth.
Conservation International – CI is a prominent international conservation NGO 
that has embraced the use of PES in its activities.  A vice-president at CI, 
Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, is a former Costa Rican Minister of Environment.  

Rodriguez played a key role in the formulation, development, institution, and 
implementation of Costa Rica's PSA.  He remains well connected to 
FONAFIFO, MINAET, and the World Bank.  CI has been involved in 
development of the PSA's Biodiversity Trust Fund (a effort initiated under the
World Bank's MMBI).
ASANA – the Amigos de la Naturaleza del Pacífico Central y Sur is a registered 
Costa Rican NGO that works to ensure conservation of a regional biological 
corridor.  ASANA was one of several NGOs recruited to promote the PSA in 
its early years.  They received support under the World Bank's Ecomarkets 
project to coordinate local contracting activities, and they employed a regente
to draw up management plans for private landowners in their area.  ASANA 
has since ended its contracting activities and now only engages with the PSA 
as a participant.
ASIREA – the Asociación para el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Región Atlántica is 
another Costa Rican NGO that provides regente services.  They staff three 
regentes and prepare PSA contracts for landowners in their area, placing 
special emphasis on the “reforestation” (i.e. plantation forestry) and 
agroforestry modalities.  They too received support under the World Bank 
projects for their contracting activities.
CEDARENA – the Centro de Derecho Ambiental y de los Recursos Naturales is 
an NGO that is involved in several conservation activities, including the PSA.
They act as a private contractor with regentes on staff.  They have also been 
working with the World Bank, FONAFIFO, and Conservation International in
development of the PSA's Biodiversity Trust Fund.
IngeoFor – this is a private environmental engineering company.  It provides 
regente services to its client landowners.  It has connections to the board of 
the Colgeio de Ingenieros Agronomos.
ATAL (pseudonym)94 – ATAL is an NGO that promotes conservation and provides 
regente services.
IIED – the International Institute for Environment and Development is a non-profit
development organization that has conducted several studies of Costa Rica's 
PSA, several of which concern the social and distributional impacts of the 
program.
UNA / CINPE – the National University's Centro Internacional de Politicas 
Economicas is a research institute that has connections to various 
conservation development programs in Costa Rica.
Hacienda Barú – this a private tourism operation that is connected with a National
Wildlife Refuge and ASANA.  It is currently involved in the PSA as a 
participant, but has had connections to ASANA's contracting activities in the 
past.  Representatives at Barú have also been involved, at high levels, in other
conservation activities in the country, including the PSA.
94 “ATAL” is a pseudonym to protect the identify and reputation of those associated with it.  Specific 
names and descriptive characteristics have been fictionalized to ensure anonymity.

APPENDIX II
Classification of Institutions by Role
(Interview Dataset)
Role Description
Contracting Services PSA contracting services are provided by a number of 
organizations and private contractors in Costa Rica.  
Regentes are employed to draw up management plans 
with landowners and prepare their applications for 
submission to FONAFIFO.  I conducted interviews with 
people that play this role at several institutions, including:




There is a small “inner-sanctum” of well-positioned, 
connected, and influential people that are responsible for 
most of the program innovation and experimentation.  
These people are the source of the “big ideas” and 
conceptual elements of the PSA.  I interviewed 
individuals that play this role at several institutions, 
including: FONAFIFO, the World Bank, Tec, 
Conservation International, and FUNDECOR.
Implementation Implementation of the PSA takes place on many levels, 
including contracting with landowners, contracting with 
buyers, management of labor, and training.  I interviewed 
individuals involved in these aspects of the PSA at:  
FUNDECOR, the Colegio, Tec, ASANA, ASIREA, 
ATAL, CEDARENA, Talamanca Caribe, and IngeoFor.
Assessment and 
Research
Aside from FONAFIFO's and the World Bank's own 
internal assessments and studies, there are a number of 
institutions conducting research on the PSA.  These 
include:  IIED, UNA / CINPE, and Tec.
Governance The governance of the PSA program takes place at 
several levels. Day-to-day operation are managed by 
FONAFIFO, broad level guidelines and regulations are 
set by MINAET, and professional regentes are 
represented by the Colegio.  Representatives and former 





I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh carrying out research on 
ecosystem services in Costa Rica.  This research concerns the evolution of Costa 
Rica's Pagos por Servicios Ambientales program and seeks to understand how policy 
negotiations have shaped it over time.
Your participation in this project is important to its success.  I am therefore 
requesting that you grant permission for me to use information gathered during our 
interviews and interactions by signing below.  You will retain the right to withdraw 
from this research at any time.
If you wish your identity to remain concealed, please indicate that below.  In the 
event that you do wish to remain anonymous, your name and identifiable 
characteristics such as employer and position will be concealed.
After the research has been carried out, you will be given the opportunity to review 
the findings and confirm that you are not being misrepresented.  Indicate your desire 
to review these materials below.
The information gathered in the course of this research will be used in the production
of a PhD thesis and may be used in further research publications or presented at 
professional conferences.  All data will be stored securely in accordance with the 
United Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1998.
I agree to participate in the research. ☐
My anonymity is not essential. ☐
I do not require review of research findings. ☐






Address:  Institute of Geography, Drummond Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9XP
Email:  bmatulis@gmail.com,  Phone:  +44 771 401 9890,   Fax:  +44 131 650 2524

APPENDIX IV
Illustrated Overview of the PSA
1. A landowner that wishes to participate in the PSA must contract an 
independent regente on the open market.  Regentes compete for contracts and,
where possible95, fees are reduced.
95 As explained in Chapter 6, lower rates from competition are only possible in cases where the land 
is quite large.

2. The chosen regente prepares a land management plan.

3. An application is submitted to FONAFIFO.

4. If the application is accepted, the landowner must manage his or her land 
according to the regente's plan, which is inscribed in a contract with 
FONAFIFO.

5. FONAFIFO makes annual payments to the landowner, and a percentage goes 
to the regente for having written the management plan.

6. The regente carries out annual inspections.

7. FONAFIFO does periodic spot-checks to verify regente reports.

